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FOREWORD
This report has been prepared in response to DRDI2 of contract
NASI-18975, Advanced Manned Launch System (AMLS) Study. The
principal objective of this study is to conduct a detailed analysis
to determine whether the lifting body concept can really achieve
simpler operations with lower cost per flight at a low life cycle
cost (LCC). This vehicle system was designed for crew safety,
simple operations, and high operational utilization. An extensive
series of trade studies and supporting analyses were performed on a
reference system concept to refine the system design in preparation
for defining the final, or "preferred", system concept. The
results of these trades, scored with respect to their relative
merits, provide significant insight in the design of the preferred
system concept and are documented in the Volumes of this report.
This report was originally published as Rockwell Report
SSD90D0090. Companion reports providing additional technical
detail include:
Subsystems and Vehicle Design (DRDI0 STS90D0357-1)
- Trade Studies and Supporting Analyses
Manufacturing and Verification (DRDI0 STS90D0357-2)
- Trade Studies and Supporting Analyses
Operations and Support (DRDI0 STS90D0357-3)
- Trade Studies and Supporting Analyses
Hardware/Software Design Description (DRD 3 SSD90D0091)
Acquisition Phase Definition (DRD 4 SSD90D0092)
Operations and Support Analysis (DRD 5 SSD90D0093)
Reliability/Maintainability Analysis (DRD 6 SSD90D0094)
Life Cycle Cost Analysis (DR]) 7 SSDgODO095)
Technology Development Plan (DRD 8 SSD90D0096)
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1.0 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
To assure national leadership in space operations and
exploration in the future, NASA must be able to provide cost
effective and operationally efficient space transportation.
Several NASA studies and the joint NASA/DoD Space Transportation
Architecture Studies (STAS) have shown the need for a multi-vehicle
space transportation system with designs driven by enhanced
operations and low costs. The NASA is currently studying a
personnel launch system (PLS) approach to help satisfy the crew
rotation requirements for the Space Station Freedom. Several
concepts from low L/D capsules to lifting body vehicles are being
examined in a series of studies as a potential augmentation to the
Space Shuttle launch system. Rockwell International Corporation,
under contract to the NASA Langley Research Center, has analyzed a
lifting body concept to determine whether the lifting body class of
vehicles is appropriate for the PLS function. This report
discusses the results of this pre-phase A study.
i.i BACKGROUND
The principal objective of this study is to conduct a detailed
analysis to determine whether the lifting body concept can really
achieve simpler operations with lower cost per flight at a low life
cycle cost (LCC). This vehicle system was designed for crew
safety, simple operations, and high operational utilization. A
concurrent engineering process was used to ensure coordination of
all functional disciplines to establish a total system approach.
Producibility, operability, and maintainability requirements were
continuously integrated into the system design process. Costing
tasks focussed on extracting cost effective design concepts and
costing trends and drivers. The study employed the combined
experience of several study participants including Pan Am World
Services, Inc., ECON, Inc., and other Rockwell divisions including
RSOC.
This study focussed on the definition of a single vehicle
configuration, the HL-a0, without modifications and a single
mission, Space Station crew rotation (Figure I-i). The present
Rockwell task was to conceptually define the structure, subsystem
complement, and operational concepts for the PLS system. Later
studies will explore the changes required to accommodate alternate
missions. For nominal missions, the vehicle is designed to land
horizontally on a runway at the launch site (KSC). It may also be
landed at any suitably-equipped airport by providing portable GSE
and any required landing aids.
An extensive series of trade studies were performed on a
"reference" system concept, developed at the outset of the study,
to refine the system design in preparation for defining the final,
or "preferred", system concept. The results of these trades,
scored with respect to their relative merits, provide significant
insight to the definition of the preferred system concept. Figures
of merit for this study include life cycle cost, operational
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Figure i-I. The Lifting Body Spacecraft Provides Crew Rotation
Services to Space Station Freedom.
utilization, maintainability, manufacturability, crew safety, and
crew habitability.
The outputs of the study presented in this report include
quantified data that support the utility of the lifting body
concept as a cost-effective system for the Personnel Launch System
mission. Comprehensive data highlight the potentially significant
benefits which may be realized if the projected "airline" approach
to reliability, maintainability, and operations is rigorously
followed.
1.2 CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT PHILOSOPHY
The primary role of the Personnel Launch System is to provide
assured manned access to space. In meeting this objective, we have
incorporated features into the design which provide for crew
safety, cost-effective operations, and high operational
utilization. The key to the overall system design is our adoption
of airline/aircraft approaches to certification and flight-
worthiness: we do not decertify the spacecraft after each flight as
is effectively done in the Shuttle program, but rather maintain the
system in a flightworthy status. The entire system, spacecraft and
support systems, is designed for maintainability and producibility.
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The basic program has the principal objectives of achieving
high levels of operational efficiency at affordable life cycle
costs while maintaining high operational utilization and crew
safety. These goals (Table i-i) have driven the design of the
Rockwell PLS concept. The system design reflects the operational
goals through design features that have been incorporated into the
flight vehicle design concept. It also provides features which
facilitate manufacturing, maintenance, and inspection and overhaul.
Table i-I. Program Requirements Drive The System Design.
PROGRAM REQUIREMENT PLS FEATURES
CREW SAFETY
SIMPLE OPERATIONS
HIGH OPERATIONAL UTILIZATION
LOW COST PER FUGHT & LOW LIFE
CYCLE COSTS
OPERATIONS & SUPPORT EFFICIENCY
ECONOMICALLY PRODUCIBLE
PAD ESCAPE SYSTEM
CREW MODULE INTEGRITY (WATER LANDINGS)
MULTIPLE INGRESS/EGRESS HATCHES
ANY RUNWAY
STANDARD MISSIONS & PROCEDURES
CREW FLIGHT PROFICIENCY MAINTENANCE
COMMON DATA BASES
HIGH LEVEL OF AUTONOMY
MINIMUM TURNAROUND TIME
USE OF AIRLINE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES
MAINTENANCE SCHEDULING
SUBSYSTEMS DESIGNED FOR MINIMUM MAINTENANCE
INSPECTABILITY & ACCESSIBILITY TO SUBSYSTEMS
HIGH-REUABILITY SUBSYSTEMS
COST-OPTIMIZED BUILD RATE
DESIGNED FOR ACCESSIBILITY & MAINTAINABILITY
TRANSPORTABlUTY
BUILT-IN TEST
AUTONOMOUS OPERATIONS
MANUFACTURING ACCESS
EXTERNAL SYSTEMS INSTALLATION
LESS COMPLEX WELDMENTS
HEAT SHIELD INSTALLATION/REMOVAL
LARGE DESIGN MARGINS & SYSTEMS ROBUSTNESS ASSURE I
OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY AT MINIMUM DESIGN RISK I
The system concept developed for the PLS reflects an
integrated approach to the design of the system. No single area
(subsystems, design layout, manufacturing, nor operations)
dominated the design effort but rather all program requirements
were addressed concurrently in conducting the design activity.
Note that the PLS glider is considerably smaller than the
Shuttle orbiter (Figure 1-2). Its landed weight is less, and there
are substantially fewer maintenance-significant LRU's and thus
proportionally less maintenance time. The design process employed
inherently drives the system to lower operating costs, and
therefore the design reflects features required by operations and
maintenance to minimize costs.
In this study, the aircraft/airline approach to aircraft
certification and flightworthiness was used as a reference. In
this approach, the vehicle and vehicle subsystems are certified one
time and regular maintenance is scheduled to maintain that
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Figure 1-2. The PLS Glider is Much Smaller Than the STS Orbiter.
airworthiness. The subsystems, missions, and operations approaches
are designed to reflect this basic philosophy - recognizing that
this is a major cultural change from the way NASA does business
today.
1.3 CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT
A key feature of the design which results from this philosophy
is the provision for easy accessibility for performing turnaround
maintenance. Wherever possible, the subsystems are installed
outside of a pressurized crew module for direct accessibility
during ground support operations. Leeward surface access panels
are designed to be removed during the maintenance process.
1.3.1 Desiqn Features
The most obvious feature resulting from our design philosophy
are the means we have provided to enable easy accessibility for
performing turnaround maintenance. Wherever possible the
subsystems are installed outside of the pressurized crew module.
This feature provides two major benefits: I) it greatly enhances
accessibility for maintenance during turnaround while minimizing
opportunities for incurring collateral damage, and 2) it provides
for greater efficiency in manufacturing since more installers can
work at the same time (avoiding the Apollo scheduling "crunch" in
making internal installations).
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Removable panels are provided for this purpose (Figure 1-3);
they are removed for access and reinstalled When maintenance is
complete - they benefit from intensive seal research performed for
the NASP program. Access to the aft compartment is provided by
folding the fins along imaginary axes along the upper body inboard
of the fins; one-g hinges are provided which are powered externally
(internal motors drive the folding mechanism at zero-g). Access to
the crew compartment during maintenance operations is primarily
through a tunnel extending to the upper hatch (the pad
ingress/egress port) from a clean room in the maintenance facility.
Figure 1-3. Accessibility During Manufacturing and Maintenance Is a
Driving Design Feature.
The flight vehicle is made up of a number of major component
parts, each of which may be manufactured offsite and mated during
the final assembly process (Figure 1-4). The crew module is
standard 2219 aluminum made up from sheets rolled in one direction
(no compound surfaces with the exception of the windshield area)
and welded. Internal manufacturing access is provided at the aft
tunnel interface - this feature was adopted from the Shuttle
orbiter crew module manufacturing process to ease assembly and
installation of internal systems. The crew module is the primary
structure of the vehicle; outboard frames carry airloads from the
external surfaces to the module and provide support for subsystem
installation and the landing gear.
The lower heat shield concept has a legacy extending back to
1983 and the CASTS program sponsored by Langley during 1982-3. In
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Figure 1-4. Design Features Reflect the Influence of Maintenance and
Manufacturing.
that program, Rockwell designed and fabricated a graphite-polyimide
composite shuttle Orbitor body flap with tiles directly bonded to
the material (no SIP). The present heatshield is to be
manufactured in a similar manner (an alternate could be an all-ACC
heatshield similar to the Shuttle orbiter nose cap and wing leading
edges). It is attached to the carry-through frames through a
series of thermal standoffs.
Our development of the lifting body vehicle concept into the
PLS concept has benefitted from the combined experience of our
Rockwell and subcontractor participants. Given the broad
objectives on operational efficiency, low life cycle costs, and
crew safety, we have provided features enhancing accessibility for
maintenance, enabling easy access for installation of subsystems
during manufacturing, simple welds on conventional material, crew
ingress and egress hatches that accommodate deconditioned SSF
personnel, transportability in aircraft and the Shuttle orbiter,
and subsystems enhancing the ability for efficient maintenance
operations and turnaround (Figure 1-5).
1.3.2 Launch System
The existing Titan IV launch system was the initial choice for
the PLS booster system (Figure 1-6). It provides the launch
capability for the PLS from KSC to SSF. The launch escape system
(LES) is incorporated into the launch vehicle adaptor, providing a
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Figure 1-5. The PLS Concept Represents a Composite of Experience.
pad escape capability for the crew. Separation is nominally
provided at the normal separation interface, the base of . In a
potentially catastrophic launch vehicle event, or during ascent
flight, the launch escape system separates at the abort interface
and powers to a condition for safe recovery of the crew.
We are currently using an ALS stage-and-one-half concept as
the primary launch system. The general arrangement is retained,
especially the LES itself. The LES configuration is common to all
candidate boosters, including an LRB-derivative concept. Only the
LES-to-launch vehicle adaptor design will be changed for each
booster.
1.3.3 Surface Transportation
One basic groundrule that drove the vehicle sizing is the
requirement that the vehicle fit into the Shuttle orbiter payload
bay and carry two pilots and 8 to i0 station crew members. By
providing a wing folding mechanism, the PLS easily fits into the
payload bay while providing sufficient internal volume for 8
passengers in addition to the flight crew (Figure 1-7). The
folding fin feature also facilitates transport by C-SA and C-17
aircraft.
The vehicle is supported at the aft end by a bridge fitting
mated to the aft access hatch, which in itself is primary
structure. The forward end of the PLS is supported under its nose
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Figure 1-6. Titan\PLS Launch Configuration.
by a second bridge fitting. The folding mechanism is powered on-
orbit by integral motors and on the ground by an external drive.
The fins are designed to operate in a l-g environment without
additional support.
1.3.4 Crew Safety
A recovery system is provided for aborts that require a water
landing. The Launch Escape System (LES) is designed to drive to a
condition for safe crew recovery. In the case of a pad abort, the
LES fires for about four seconds, providing an 8-g acceleration
from the pad (Figure 1-8). The expended LES separates immediately
to minimize destabilizing aerodynamic forces. At an appropriate
altitude, the parachute system opens and lowers into the offshore
waters. Inflatable balloons open to ensure that the aft hatch is
maintained above water level in order to provide at least one dry
hatch for crew removal in the case of an overturned vehicle.
The principal objective of the system is to ensure safe crew
recovery thorough designing for an intact crew module - the primary
structure. The crew module is designed to remain intact and
water-tight during a water recovery to ensure safe recovery of the
crew. Structural damage to the heat shield, wings, secondary
structure, and to the subsystems is expected and no consideration
is made for reuse of the flight vehicle. In fact, the crumbling
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Figure 1-7. The PLS Glider is Sized for the Shuttle Payload Bay and
Fits Into the C-5A and C-17 Aircraft.
of the structure will provide some impact load relief to the crew.
1.3.5 Space Station Freedom Operations
Two methods exist for final mating to the space station node:
i) berthing - use of the SSF remote manipulator arm for the final
movement to the node while the spacecraft is inactive, and 2)
docking - wherein the spacecraft is controlled by the crew and
provides all maneuvering functions. The docking concept has been
selected for the PLS because finer attitude and movement control
using the vernier RCS thrusters is possible and relieves the SSF
crew from additional tasks (Figure 1-9).
The vehicle is maneuvered and controlled by a pilot located in
the aft tunnel using view-ports in the access hatch for targeting
and visual control. The conical interface remains on-orbit with
the station. No resources are required from the station but such
items as power can be utilized, if available, to recharge or extend
the life of the spacecraft batteries. Separation is accomplished
in reverse sequence.
1.3.6 Post-Landinq Eqress
Crew members returning from the Space Station are expected to
have been in space at zero-g's for up to six months, some more and
some less. In these cases, the returning crew will be decondition-
ed to the point that they must be removed from in a near horizon-
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Figure 1-8. The Launch Escape System Ensures Crew Survivability.
tal position, keeping heart and head in a level plane to avoid
adverse reaction to the l-g Earth environment. This precludes use
of the top hatch (pad ingress-egress hatch) for crew egress.
The design of accommodates this requirement easily (Figure i-
i0). The aft hatch, used for docking with the Station, is the
primary egress hatch during ground operations. Returning crew
members are removed on a pallet from their seated position (the
seats are sharply reclined for entry and landing) and assisted onto
gurneys for transport to a crew recovery facility until they regain
their ability to stand upright in the Earth's gravity.
1.3.7 Acquisition Plan
The Master Schedule (Table 1-2) outlines the sequence of major
events in the development of the PLS concept through to IOC.
Major milestones beginning with ATP for Phase A are shown. The
manufacturing schedules include lead times for procurement of
material and vendor parts as well as inhouse manufacturing and
assembly, test, and validation.
Structural and component tests will verify the design of those
elements. The need for a long term dynamic test program (test to
failure) as used for aircraft is being evaluated; the low flight
rates for these vehicles may preclude the need for such tests.
The approach and landing (ALT) flight test program includes
full scale low speed tests of launched from a B-52. These tests
i-i0
Figure 1-9.
Station.
The PLS Design Provides for Active Docking at The Space
include unpowered subsonic and landing tests and powered
acceleration tests to high supersonic speeds. These tests are
designed to verify the post-entry handling qualities, landing
performance, and the guidance and control and autoland systems.
The orbital flight tests complete the flight test series by
verifying the overall operational capability of the full system
over a wide range of operating conditions.
1.4 FEATURESENABLING MINIMUM COSTOF OPERATION
We have adopted a wide variety of measures to minimize the
cost of operations (Table 1-3). Some of these we adopted from the
airline/aircraft operating procedures while many others have been
the results of our experiences in designing and developing the
Shuttle orbiter and operating the Shuttle system. Our Apollo
experience has also been a significant benefit.
While the HL-20 is inherently smaller than the orbiter, we
have also minimized the parts count and simplified those for easier
maintenance. We have eliminated the hydraulic system and provided
and all-electric system to take advantage of the accelerating
technology of electromechanical actuators for the aerodynamic
surfaces; maintenance requirements are significantly reduced in
this manner. Serial launch operations have been eliminated by
eliminating toxics propellants: NTO and MMH. We employ hydrogen
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Figure I-i0. Inherent Features of the Lifting Body Permit Extraction
of a Deconditioned SSF Crew.
peroxide and JP4 as propellants for the RCS and OMS systems.
Built-in test systems provide a continuous history of system
health and status. This information will greatly enhance
maintenance operations by enabling the scheduling of maintenance
actions and eliminating unscheduled maintenance actions - always
expensive. The standardization of missions into a reduced number
of preplanned missions combined with a robust launch system design
will reduce the requirements for extensive flight planning.
We have found that the PLS system concept outlined here will
be more operationally efficient than current systems because we
have incorporated the experiences gained from years of developing
and operating manned space systems and the experiences of the
airline/aircraft large fleet design operations. The latter
experiences have been particularly beneficial because they have
been the results of millions of flight hours of operation - all
being incentivized by a profit making goal. Efficiency in all
activities and design approaches to achieve those efficiencies must
be major design goals for all new systems in the future.
A major issue outstanding at this time is the lack of a man-
rated launch system that is equally cost-effective to operate. The
booster system must be cost-effective for not only the PLS concept
but also for all applications.
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Table 1-2. The Master Program Schedule Highlights the Major Events
During System Development.
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Table 1-3. Why PLS Operations Are More Efficient.
DESIGN FEATURES
• SMALL/SIMPLE
• ELECTROMECHANICAL
ACTUATORS
• NON-TOXIC PROPELLANTS
• BUILT-IN TEST & HEALTH
MONITORING
• ACCESSIBILITY
OPERATIONS BENEFIT
• FEWER PARTS COUNT
• DESIGN & MAINTENANCE
• NO HYDRAULICS
• REDUCED MAINTENANCE
• PARALLEL LAUNCH OPERATIONS
• SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE
• PARALLEL MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS
• REDUCED MAN-HOURS FOR TURNAROUND
• SMALL, CERTIFIED TURNAROUND • ECONOMIC UTILIZATION OF SKILLS
CREW
• DESIGN FOR OPERATIONS • REDUCED LOGISTICS SUPPORT
• ROBUST SYSTEM DESIGN
• STANDARDIZED MISSIONS
& PROCEDURES
• SAFE ABORT MODES
39,000
HOURS
5,056
HOURS
1,48I
HOURS
STS PLS PLS
AS AS
STS ACFT
• FLEXIBLE OPERATIONS AT
MINIMUM RISK
324
MAN-YEAR28
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PLS
• REDUCED FLIGHT PLANNING STS
• SIMPLE FLIGHT OPERATIONS
• CREW SURVIVABIUTY FOR ALL CREDIBLE_
SITUATIONS
1-13

2.0 SYSTEM DESIGN PHILOSOPHY AND STUDY GROUNDRULES
This section documents the overall system design philosophy
that we have adopted and the groundrules used to conduct the PLS
Study portion of the Advanced Manned Launch Systems (AMLS)
contract.
2.1 SYSTEM DESIGN PHILOSOPHY
The primary role of the Personnel Launch System is to provide
assured manned access to space. In meeting this objective, we have
incorporated features into the design which provide for crew
safety, cost-effective operations, and high operational
utilization. The key to the overall system design is our adoption
of airline/aircraft approaches to certification and flight-
worthiness: we do not decertify after each flight as is
effectively done in the Shuttle program, but rather maintain the
system in a flightworthy status. The entire system, glider and
support systems, is designed for maintainability and producibility.
In this study, the aircraft/airline approach to aircraft
certification and flightworthiness was used as a reference. In
this approach, the vehicle and vehicle subsystems are certified one
time and regular maintenance is scheduled to maintain that
airworthiness. The subsystems, missions, and operations approaches
are designed to reflect this basic philosophy - recognizing that
this is a major cultural change from the way NASA does business
today.
A key feature of the design which results from this philosophy
is the provision for easy accessibility for performing turnaround
maintenance. Wherever possible, the subsystems are installed
outside of a pressurized crew module for direct accessibility
during ground support operations. Leeward surface access panels
are designed to be removed during the maintenance process. Several
features of this basic philosophy as derived from airline/aircraft
fleet operations are discussed in the following paragraphs.
2.1.1 Performance Trendinq
Operationally, the primary concern is to reduce manpower
requirements, costs, spares, down-town, and turn-around time thus
improving safety, mission reliability, and vehicle availability.
This is accomplished mainly by reducing the in-service or
unscheduled failures and increasing the out of service or scheduled
maintenance actions associated with PLS operations. The most
significant improvements to operations can be accomplished by
converting the existing unscheduled maintenance actions to
scheduled maintenance actions and others as presented in Table 2-1.
The application of data analysis to an operational system must
concern itself with anticipation of probable failures and
development of methods to determine degradation indicative of these
failures (thru data analysis) to allow their prediction and
resulting scheduling of maintenance to prevent the in-service
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Table 2-1. Performance Trending
WHAT IS PERFORMANCE TRENDING
• OPERATIONAL SUPPORT FUNCTION
• DETERMINE SPECIFIC DEGRADATION
• PREDICT SERVICE OR REMOVAL REQUIREMENTS
APPLICATION TO PLS
• CONVERT UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE INTO SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE
• IMPROVEDTURN-AROUND AND LOGISTICS
• CONTROL OF INFLIGHT FAILURES
• IMPROVED MISSION/SAFETY OF VEHICLE
• REFLIGHT VERIFICATION OF VEHICLE
• REDUCTION IN GROUND PROCESSING
• MANAGEMENT SUPPORT
• IMPROVED RISK ASSESSMENT
failure of the subject item.
performance trending•
This is the primary objective of
Use of data analysis in support of performance trending
results in determination of specific degradation of individual
systems, subsystems and components. This process develops an
extensive data base providing insight into the overall performance
level of the PLS. This data base provides the necessary
qualitative and quantitative health of the total vehicle
capabilities necessary to determine reflight verification of the
vehicle with a minimum of ground processing while providing
management support for improved risk assessment.
2.1._ Certified Airframe and Powerplant fA&P} Personnel
The present maintenance philosophy used for the Space Shuttle
orbiter requires a large pool of personnel highly specialized in
very narrow fields of technical capability. This concept dictates
a system requiring a significant cadre of multi-discipline support
personnel, i.e.: management, engineering, quality, safety, etc.
While this maintenance concept requires significant manpower, it
typically results in inefficient maintenance operations (requiring
extensive downtime) due to limited availability of manpower in
specific areas of specialization.
The maintenance philosophy to be applied to PLS is that of
using certified A&P personnel (Table 2-2). The typical A&P
certification is obtained by attendance in an aviation university
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requiring a minimum of three years of formal education. A high
percentage of those individuals obtaining A&P certification
typically complete a full four or more years of education thus
obtaining their BS in engineering (maintenance, aeronautical,
electrical, etc.) along with pilot qualification and associated
management degrees. Utilization of this highly qualified, broadly
educated individual allows a maintenance concept which utilizes
small numbers of support personnel. Additionally it provides a
work force requiring limited specialization resulting in a very
efficient maintenance operation (minimum down-time) thru
utilization of a broad application of existing personnel.
Table 2-2. Certified Airframe and Power Plant (A&P) Personnel
ORBITER
• UTILIZES NON-A&P PERSONNEL
• HIGH LEVEL OF SPECIALIZATION
• REQUIRES LARGE POOL OF MANPOWER
• REQUIRES EXCESSIVE SUPPORT PERSONNEL
• RESULTS IN INEFFICIENT MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS
• LIMITED BY MANPOWER NOT TIME
APPLICATION TO PLS
• UTILIZE CERTIFIED (A&P) PERSONNEL
• LIMITED SPECIALIZATION
• AVIONICS
• ELECTRICAL
• THERMAL PROTECTION
• MECHANICAL/SYSTEMS
• RESULTS IN EFFICIENT MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS
2.1.3 Certification
STS orbiter certification was derived by a design, that in
most cases, required the development of all-new components. This
requirement to design and certify totally new components even where
the items were an outgrowth of existing components utilized in
other vehicles (albeit not manned space vehicles) drove orbiter
development and operations costs. Here the major shortcoming is
the failure to utilize the extensive operational experience data
base available for existing components which could be modified for
spacecraft application. The use of such components would require
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only a delta of design and certification therefore reducing the
cost in both program time and money involved in the design and
testing process (Table 2-3).
Additionally the orbiter certification process did not test a
vehicle to destruction. This resulted in an extended flight test
applied over a broad conservative operation due to the actual
limits being unknown.
Table 2-3. Certification
ORBITER
• LARGE SCALE COMPONENT AND PIECE PAR# TESTING
• EXPENSIVE IN BOTH PROGRAM TIME AND MONEY
• INCONCLUSIVE RESULTS
• VEHICLE NOT TESTED TO DESTRUCTION
• RESULTS IN CONSERVATIVE OPERATION
• DID NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE
• CONSTRAINTS ON MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS
• REQUIRES EXTENDED FLIGHTTEST
AIRCRAFT
• SMALL SCALE COMPONENT AND PIECE PART TESTING
• REDUCTION IN BOTH PROGRAM TIME AND MONEY
• AIRFRAME TESTED TO DESTRUCTION
• INDEPTH KNOWLEDGE OF VEHICLE LIMITATIONS
• PROVIDES FOR FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES
• TAKES ADVANTAGE OF OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE BASE
• MAXIMIZES MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS
• LIMITED FLIGHT TEST
• SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
In the case of aircraft design, most components are developed
from existing components which have extensive operational
experience data bases. Utilization of this experience base allows
reduction of both design and testing efforts and the associated
cost in both program time and money. Also, a vehicle is tested to
destruction thus providing hard data as to its ultimate
capabilities. In this case, a flight test program can be developed
which will demonstrate the vehicle to limits less than its ultimate
capabilities but in excess of the maximum operational envelope.
This results in a flight test program of minimum duration which
provides full confidence in the ability to operate the vehicle to
the full limits of its operational envelope.
Application of an aircraft philosophy to the PLS certification
program also requires the development of man-rated specifications
utilizing existing commercial/military components (Table 2-4).
This concept will take full advantage of the existing experience
data base of selected components resulting in a design/-
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Table 2-4. PLS Certification
REQUIRES LOW LEVEL PIECE PART TESTING BY:
• UTILIZING MAN-RATED SPECIFICATIONS
• USING COMMERCIAL/MILITARY COMPONENTS
• TAKING ADVANTAGE OF EXISTING EXPERIENCE BASE
TEST VEHICLE TO DESTRUCTION
• INDEPTH KNOWLEDGE OF VEHICLE LIMITATIONS
• PROVIDES FOR FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES
REQUIRES LIMITED FLIGHT TEST
• SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
certification program which deals mainly with the delta
required in meeting the design and testing goals of the PLS.
Additionally, the PLS program will test a vehicle to
destruction, therefore, as in aircraft certification, providing its
ultimate capabilities. This will allow the establishment of a
flight test program which will test the vehicle to limits less than
its ultimate, but in excess of its maximum operational envelope,
resulting in a vehicle which can be utilized to its full
operational capability.
_._.4 Operational Environment
The reasoning behind the application of aircraft
specifications and components, commercial/military, to PLS is based
upon the relative similarity of their operating environments
(Table 2-5). In many areas, the average aircraft environment is
equal to or sometimes more severe than that of a spacecraft. For
instance, the thermal cycle of an aircraft in adverse summer
operation will quite often extend from as high as 200°F to a low of
-65°F, sometimes on a cycle occurring every hour. Conversely most
spacecraft internal cavity areas will tend to stabilize at
temperatures close to 50°F, with peaks to 150°F during entry• While
space craft tend to see large vibration inputs during ascent, their
on-orbit vibration is rather benign, whereas an aircraft is
constantly exposed to high vibration sometimes exceeding 10G's in
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Table 2-5. Operational Environment
AIRCRAFT ENVIROMENTS
• MANY AVERAGES EQUAL OR MORE SEVERE THAN SPACECRAFT
• THERMAL CYCLE
• VIBRATION
• MOISTURE
• G-LOADS
• ALTITUDES
PLS ENVIRONMENTS
• MIL SPEC CONVERSION OF AIRCRAFT TO SPACE ENVIRONMENT
• ELECTRO-MECHANICAL AVERAGES
• LAUNCH
• ON-ORBIT
• SPACECRAFT ENVIRONMENT
• THERMAL CYCLE
both low and high frequency ranges. While the spacecraft may be
called on to operate in a virtual vacuum, the aircraft is not far
behind, routinely operating to 51,000 feet for commercial
operations and in excess of 90,000 feet for military.
The relative merits of commercial equipment may best be
appreciated by looking at the typical certification requirements.
Here, most are certified to both DO-160B and MIL-E-5400T.
Temperature:
Vibration:
Shock:
Altitude:
-65 ° to +I60°F, 30 minutes at 203°F
0.10 DA at low freq (5G), high freq 6G
15G llMs duration
70,000 feet (1.311" Hg or approximately 4.3% of
Sea Level)
2.2 STUDY GROUNDRULES
This section consists of a description of the studx
qroundrules used to perform both the overall study tasks and
documentation requirements specified by NASA, and desiqn
qroundrules for the PLS system. These design groundrules are
program-level and project-level requirements, from which lower
level requirements are specified in a subsequent requirements
allocation process.
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2.2.1 Study Groundru_s Definition
The following groundrules form the basis for performing the
analytical and documentation activities for this study.
Gene;a_ Study Groundrules. The general study groundrules
presented in Table 2-6 were derived from NASA PLS documentation
(such as the RFP) and groundrules presented at the time of the
contract kick-off meeting. They are distinguished from the design
groundrules in that study groundrules are derived from the overall
study objectives and government direction on assumptions or methods
used to conduct the study. They establish the framework from which
the NASA task assignments are performed. Design groundrules
presented in Section 2.2.2 establish the top-level requirements
used in defining the PLS operational system.
Table 2-6. General Study Groundrules
GROUNDRULES SOURCE
NASA GROUNDRULES DOCUMENT
I
1, THE PLS WILL OPERATE AS A MANNED COMPLEMENT TO THE SPACE SHUTTLE AND OTHER
SPACE TRANSPORTATION ELEMENTS. IT SHALL :
- BE A LOW DDT&E SYSTEM WITH A LOW COST PER FLIGHT
- CAPABLE OF SAFE AND RELIABLE VEHICLE OPERATIONS
- INCORPORATE THE USE OF OPERATIONALLY EFFICIENT SYSTEMS
2. CHANGES TO THE PLS DESIGN TO ACCOMODATE DRM'S OTHER THAN THAT DEFINED AS
"DRM-I" WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED AT THIS TIME.
3. THE PLS WILL BE LAUNCHED BY THE TITAN IV
4. COSTS AND DESIGN MOD_FICATIORS REQUIRED TO MAN-RATE THE TITAN IV WILL NOT BE
CONSIDERED AT THIS TIME
5. THE PLS SHALL SUPPORT SPACE STATION FREEDOM CREW TRANSFER
6. NO DEVIATIONS FROM THE NASA DEFINED OUTER MOLDLINE WttlCH COULD AFFECT
AERODYNAMIC PERFORMANCE IS PERMITTED EXCEPT THAT REQUIRED FOR APPLICATION
OF TPS (e.g. INCREASE IN FIN THICKNESS)
7. ALL PLS DATA SHALL BE PRESENTED IN STANDARD ENGLISH UNITS.
• LaRC LIFTINGBODY PERSONNEL LAUNCH SYSTEM (PLS) STUDY GENERAL GROUNDRULES
( SEPTEMBER.1989 )
NASA GROUNDRULES DOCUMENT
NASNLaRC DISCUSSIONS (9-26-89)
NASA/LaRC DISCUSSIONS (9-26-89)
NASA GROUNDRULES DOCUMENT
STUDY KICK-OFF MEETING (9-12-89)
NASA GROUNDRULES DOCUMENT
Four of the seven study groundrules presented in Table 2-6
were extracted from the lifting-body PLS study groundrules provided
by NASA LaRC at the beginning of the study. Of these, the first
groundrule in Table 2-6 (specifying that the PLS should be a
2-7
low-cost, operationally efficient system) is derived from the
overall objective of the study.
Two study groundrules address the application of the Titan IV
as the launcher for the PLS glider vehicle. These groundrules which
evolved from follow-up discussions with NASA, specify that Titan IV
and ALS booster characteristics will be used as a throughput into
the costing analysis. No attempt will be made in this study to
assess the design and subsequent cost impacts to man-rate the Titan
IV and the ALS booster.
The overall PLS vehicle outer moldline defined by NASA will be
retained throughout this design study. Exceptions to this
groundrule are the ability to alter the fin thickness to permit
application of TPS or the geometric scaling-up of the vehicle to
increase the internal volume capability. Geometry modifications,
however, shall not alter the existing wind tunnel aerodynamic/-
aerothermodynamic characteristics for this concept, or negate the
ability to install it within the geometry constraints of the STS
orbiter. This constraint directly influences lower level vehicle
design features; however, it has been specified as a study
groundrule at this time in order to retain the validity of the
existing aerodynamic characteristics.
Figures of Merit. The figures of merit (FOM) to be used to
evaluate the relative value of improvement options were selected in
direct response to study objectives. These objectives were to
conceptually design a PLS that provides a high level of crew
safety, is relatively simple to operate, has a high utilization
rate, operates efficiently (low cost-per-flight) and is affordable.
Measures, or FOMs, were then chosen for each objective. These FOMs
were further clarified as noneconomic or economic and were then
broken down to provide more specific measures, as shown in
Figure 2-1.
Each improvement option will be evaluated in terms of the
selected FOMs. The improvements will then be ranked according to
each FOM and lower ranked (lower payoff) improvements will be
dropped. The higher payoff improvements will then be examined
carefully for credibility and additional tradeoffs will be made to
clarify evaluation behavior. When complete, Rockwell, using the
totality of the evaluation, will recommend which improvements
should be integrated into the preferred concept, and will provide
supporting rationale. When NASA acceptance is given, the preferred
concept's definition will be finalized and its life cycle cost
estimated.
MIL-STD Tailorinq. The PLS Task Statements referenced
specifications to be applied when responding to the data request.
A tailoring exercise was performed for each referenced military
specification. As a means to initiate the tailoring activity,
DOD-HDBK-248A ("Guide for Application and Tailoring of Requirements
for Defense Material Acquisitions") was reviewed. This document
provided general guidelines and a suggested format to perform the
tailoring exercise. In addition, Appendix B of Rockwell's ALS
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Figure 2-1. Figures of Merit For Trade Study Evaluation
Phase 1 System Design Data Package, which provided specification
review sheets from the ALS specification tailoring exercise, was
reviewed. Using these documents as guides, a specification
tailoring template was developed. Each task leader reviewed the
appropriate specifications and recommended modifications or
deletions to specification paragraphs with an appropriate
rationale. Appendices within several specifications provided a
guide to assist in the tailoring by identifying the paragraphs that
are appropriate for various program phases. Where these inputs
were available, they were used to justify appropriate paragraph
deletions.
In compliance with the Subsystems task requirements,
specifications DoD-STD-100C and MIL-STD-490A were reviewed and
tailored. The drawing practices defined in DoD-STD-100C are
adopted as specified, with the exception of the use of English
units for the new PLS design. The CAD-produced drawings will use
the Rockwell version of the various ANSI YI4 drawing format
conventions since it is part of the installed software package.
These variations are few and minor. The PLS vehicle/subsystem
description will follow MIL-STD-490A, Type A (System/Segment
Specification) except for sections pertaining to the requirements
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of production and delivery of hardware. The paragraphs of the
specification MIL-STD-490A other than those relating to the
characterization of the PLS vehicle and system will be top level in
nature.
The acquisition task requires the development of an
Acquisition Plan which extends from concept development through the
operational phase of the PLS program. Tailoring of the referenced
specifications will be an on-going process as part of refining the
acquisition plan prior to the initiation of the next PLS program
phase. Several of the referenced specifications such as
MIL-STD's-1547A, 1546A, 1540B, DoD-STD-167A, and MIL-Q-9858A are
applicable to hardware, and such, will be deferred until hardware
procurement in program phases B, and/or C/D. Specifications which
are applicable to a pre-phase A type study with the appropriate
tailoring are those pertaining to program management, or system
engineering, such as MIL-STD-483A.
The recommended tailoring of MIL-STD-1388-1A supports the
logistics analysis) for the operations task. The major change in
the documentation level reporting is Task 401. This task is
normally not required during this phase of a program; however,
in-house military aircraft data and STS orbiter data will be used
as a point-of-departure to determine task requirements for the cost
and operations estimating activities. The remainder of the task
definitions were chosen at the level that would normally support a
conceptual-development type of analysis. The MIL-HBK-266(AS)
requirements are addressed by the Reliability Centered Maintenance
(RCM) activity per MIL-STD-2173(AS). This activity is to be
closely coordinated between the logistics and reliability/maintain-
ability organizations during the Logistics Support Analysis (LSA)
process. RCM factors that drive operations support (MTBF, MTTR,
and Availability) are to be evaluated for each subsystem to
identify their impact on support and logistics and trades that are
required for determination of optimum repair levels/procedures.
The reliability and maintainability standards were reviewed
for this effort. MIL-STD-1629A will be tailored to include RCM as
adopted by the airlines' Maintenance Steering Group (MSG). All
references to weapon system applications are not to be reflected in
this analysis. Failure Modes and Effects analysis (FMEA) will be
performed on selected high maintenance system/subsystems scheduled
for investigation to a phase B level. These specific systems-
/subsystem studies will provide additional insight into the
reliability, maintainability, and maintenance philosophies being
applied to the PLS design process. Abbreviated Reliability
Centered Maintenance (RCM) shall also be the integration of design
and maintainability engineering and the development of design
driven maintenance programs.
o MIL-STD-470A data will cover only those task numbers that
apply to this preconcept phase.
o MIL-STD-1543A will include most of the tasks that are
evaluated at a Phase B level of documentation.
2-i0
o MIL-STD-785B will be selectively applied in most of the
tasks (except where detailed design data are needed).
o MIL-STD-2173 (AS) will support the RCM activity in
Task 1.5 and also supports MIL-STD-1629A in this task.
Only minor modification is required except where detailed
hardware and operations data would be needed. This
standard will support MIL-HBK-266(AS)-type activities.
Adoption of Airline Specifications. During the study, the
Airline Transport Association (ATA) coding system, ATA-100, will be
studied for possible tailoring to the PLS systems and operations in
support of system design breakdown and WBS. This system would
provide tracking capability for schematics, maintenance manuals,
maintenance specifications, part number system, FMEA, MSG,
procurement specifications, design specifications and technical
correspondence.
Additional areas of review not applicable to pre-phase A which
would be included in future program phases include Aeronautical
Radio, Inc. (ARINC) specifications. ARINC provides standards for
all major aircraft vendors line replaceable unit (LRU) venders and
airline engineering departments. These include design
specifications for various types of connectors, interface
configurations, environmental requirements, and racking
configurations. Other areas of future study shall include
application of ATA 300 to the PLS. This specification provides
standards for the shipping, handling and storage of flight and GSE
hardware including standardization of containers.
2.2.2 Desiun Groundrules Definition
The design groundrules shone in Table 2-7 were identified as a
means to establish the important program- and project-level set of
requirements for the requirement allocation process. Since the PLS
study groundrules provided by NASA established a thorough listing
of groundrules applicable to PLS, the majority of recommended
groundrules were extracted from this document. Vol. X, Flight and
Ground Systems Specification (Reference 2-1), and the Shuttle-C
Requirements Document, were also reviewed as a means to ensure that
a comprehensive set of groundrules is established.
Conclusions from prior applicable studies listed in Table 2-8
were also used, either to recommend a new groundrule or to justify
an existing one. Many of the reviewers selected to perform this
review task were either program managers or heavily involved with
these studies. Others are aware of study results as a means to
stay abreast of developments in their areas of expertise. The
results of this study review activity indicate that the majority of
findings from prior studies support the PLS groundrules presented
in Table 2-8. New groundrules in Table 2-8 that are traceable
solely to results of prior studies are those pertaining to Space
Station docking, cleanliness levels, and airline-type operations.
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Table 2-7. PLS Design Groundrules
REQUIREMENT
NUMBER DESIGN GROUNDRULE FUNCTION SOURCE (1)
1 DSN REQT A
10
11
12
THE PLS SHALL BE DESIGNEDTO ACCOMPLISHDRM-1 AS FOLLbWS:
• 8-10 PERSONNELTO AND FROM SPACE STATION AT 220 NMI AND
28.5 INCL
• 72 HR MISSIONDURATION
• _V = 1100 FT/SEC FOR ORBITAL MANEUVERS
ALL ELEMENTSSHALL BE MAN-RATEDPER JSC 232tl (2) WITH SPACE-
CRAFT SYSTEMS DESIGNED FOR FAIL OPERATIONAL/FAILSAFE
OPERATION ANDOPERATE WITHIN THE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
SPECIFIED IN JSCM 8080 AND OTHERAPPLICABLEDOCUMENTS
THE PLS SHALL USE PROVEN STATE-OF-ART COST-EFFECTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES AT NASA TECHNOLOGY LEVEL 5 OR BEI-rER IN
1992
THE PLS SPACECRAFTSHALL BE ABLE TO FIT WITHIN THE NSTS
ORBITER PAYLOADBAY (WITH POSSIBLE MINOR DISASSEMBLY)
THE PLS SPACECRAFTSHALL BE CAPABLE OF DOCKING WITH
SPACE STATION USING STANDARD SPACE STATION DOCKING
PROCEDURESWITH REMOTE MANNED CONTROL CAPABILITY
THE PLS SPACECRAFTSHALL BE MANNED WITH A 10 TO 15 PSI
N_IOzATMOSPHEREAND CAPABLE OF TWO PURGES AND TWO
REPRESSURIZATIONSPER MISSION
THE CLEANLINESLEVELSWITHIN THE PLS CREWMODULESHALL
COMPLY WITH SPACE STATION ENVIRONMENTALREQUIREMENTS
THE PLS CREW MODULE INTERNALVOLUME SHALL ACCOMODATE
ALL FLIGHT PERSONNEL(5 TO 95 PERCENTILE)WEARING PARTIAL
PRESSURE SUITS
THE PLS SPACECRAFT SHALL BE DESIGNED FOR EASEOF
MAINTENANCE
AFTER BECOMING OPERATIONAL,THE PLS SHALL USE AIRLINE-TYPE
OPERATIONSWITH A PROGRESSIVEPROGRAM OF SCHEDULED
HARDWARE & SOFTWAREMAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES
THE PLS SYSTEM SHALL BE CAPABLE OF SUPPORTINGUP TO EIGHT
FLIGHTS PER YEAR PERTHE BASELINEPERSONNELMISSIONMODEL
FROM KSC OR CCAFS
THE PLS SHALL HAVE AN ENHANCED ANNUAL LAUNCH PROBABILITY
COMPARED TO STS DUE TO WEATHER CONSTRAINTS. THE PLS
VEHICLE SHALL ALSO HAVE NIGHT LAUNCH CAPABILITY
DSN REQT
DSN REQT
DSN REQT
DSN REQT
DSN REQT
DSN REQT
DSN REQT
DSN REQT
2.O
3_
3.0
B,NEW
NEW
A, MODIFIED
NEW
A, MODIRED
(11 A - I.aRCUFTtNGBODYPLSSTUDYGENERALGROUNDRULES
B - NASA/LIIIRCDISCUSSIONS(9/26/89)
C • JSC-31017,CERVSPRD
(2) "GUIDUNESFORMANNEDSPACESYSTEMS"
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Table 2-7. PLS Design Groundrules (Continued)
REQUIREMENT
NUMBER DESIGN GROUNDRULE FUNCTION SOURCE(I)
1 3 4.0,6.0 A, MODIFIED
14
15
16
17
18
19
2O
21
22
(1) A •
B •
C -
THE PLS SHALL HAVE CONTINUOUS ABORT CAPABILITY FROM THE
TIME OF CREW ACCESS ARM RETRACTION THROUGH ON-ORBIT
OPERATIONS
THE PLS AND ADAPTER SHALL NOT PRODUCE LONG LIFETIME
ORBITALDEBRIS
ACCELERATIONSSHALL NOT EXCEED THE FOLLOWINGVALUES:
oe eo
XtG'm
ASCENT 4 1
ORBIT/ENTRY/LANDING 3 1
LAUNCH ESCAPE 8
WATER IMPACT (ABORT) 15 10
THE PRODUCT OF LOAD FACTOR AND TIME SHALL NOT BE
DETRIMENTALTO DECONDITIONEDFLIGHT PERSONNEL
oe
O5
O5
5O
THE PLS SPACECRAFT SHALL HAVE A MAXIMUM LANDING CROSSRANGE
CAPABILITYOF 1100 NMI AND BE ABLE TO LAND ON AN 11,000 FT LONG
RUNWAYIN DAYLIGHT OR AT NIGHT USING AVAILABLEMICROWAVE
LANDING SYSTEM OR OTHER EXTERNAL GN&C ASSETS
RECOVERY SYSTEMS ON THE PLS SPACECRAFT SHALL ENGAGE
AUTOMATICALLYTO PROVIDE A SAFE ENVIRONMENT FOR THE CREW
UNTIL RESCUE,FOLLOWINGNOMINAL AND ABORTEDMISSIONS. THIS
CAPABILITY SHALL APPLY FOR LAND AND WATER, NIGHT AND DAY,
AND ALL WEATHER CONDITIONS
THE PLS SPACECRAFT DESIGN SHALL PROVIDE FOR QUICK CREW
EGRESSAUTONOMOUSOF GROUNDCREW SUPPORT ON THE LAUNCH
PAD AND FOLLOWINGLANDING FOR NOMINAL AND ABORT MISSIONS
THE PLS SPACECRAFT SHALL BE CAPABLE OF BEING FERRIED BY
LAND, SEA, AND AIR USING EXISTINGCOMMERCIALOR MILITARY
TRANSPORT SYSTEMS WITH MINIMUM SPECIALIZED GSE
THE INITIAL OPERATIONALCAPABILITY SHALL BE BY 2000 WITH A 20
YEAR OPERATIONAL LIFE AND REDUCED LIFE CYCLE COSTS
THERE SHALL BE ADEQUATE SPARES TO AVIOD CANNIBALIZING
AND PROVISIONSSHALL BE MADE FOR ATTRITION
THE PLS VEHICLE SHALL HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF AUTONOMOUS
OPERATIONS PRE-LAUNCHTHROUGH LANDING
LaRC LIFTING BODY PLS STUDY GENERAL GROUNDRULES
NASAJLaRC DISCUSSIONS (9/25/119)
JSC-31017, CERV SPRD
5O
5O
50
f_), 7.0
7O
&O
11,0
12.0
A
A, MODIFIED
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Table 2-8. Prior and On-going Studies Reviewed
Studies for Reouired Revle¥
NASA Shuttle II Study
Shuttle Ground Operations Efflclencies/Technologiea Study, March 21, 1989, Boeing, Contract
NAS10-11344, NASA/KSC
Operationally-Efficient Launch Site (OEI_) Study Final Report (05-88-KSC-016), October 1988,
Vitro Corporation, Contract SAS10-I1436, NASA/KSC
Advanced l_.nch Syntems (AIS) r_sJqn Study, Phase 1 System Design Review (STS 88-0686), June
1988, Rockwell International, Contract F04701-87-C-0139, AF/SD
Space Transportat|on Architecture Study (STAS) (STS 87-0532), November 16, 1987, Rockwell
International, Contract F04701-85-C-O158
NASA/JaG l)oslgn Goals and Tech.ol_y Hequireme.ts for Future Launch Systems Final Report (88-
187), April 19,1988, Eaqle El,gineering/1_mso, Contract NAS2-1?900, NASA/JSC
Air Force Structural DefJnltlon Study, Contract F33615-87-C-]243, Rockwell International, 1987
National Aerospace PIn.. (HASP). Contract F33657-86-C-2127, AF/NASA Joint Pro)ect Office
Space Transportation Main and Booster Configuration Studies, Phase A, NASA/NSFC
Reducing Launch Operations Costs (New Technoloqies end Practices) (OTA-TM-ISC-28), September
1988, Office of Technology Assessment
Crew Emergency Return Vehicle (CERV) System performance Requirements Document (SPRD), JSC-
310|7, November 9, 1988
The recommended design groundrules presented below are ordered
by the function to which they apply per the preliminary top-level
functional flow diagram shown in Figure 2-2. When defining
groundrules, a typical issue that must be addressed is whether a
groundrule is actually a lower level requirement. Since this is
usually subjective, rationale should be provided to justify each
proposed groundrule. The following paragraphs provide this
rationale for each proposed groundrule.
csewm
---- F-
....... 1
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Figure 2-2. Functional Flow Block Diagram
PLS Desiqned to Accomplish DRM-I. Design reference missions
are important to the design of the system, especially that of the
flight vehicle, since they guide the further definitions of many of
the functional requirements. In particular, they guide the sizing
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of the spacecraft power, propulsion, and life support systems and
provide the basis for launch vehicle performance requirements. For
the initial phase of this study, only DRM-I is to be considered.
This DRM requires the PLS to provide for crew rotation at Space
Station, which also implies that the PLS spacecraft design must be
compatible with Space Station requirements. In addition, reference
missions also serve as an operations baseline against which the
vehicle design can be measured. Implicit in the 72 hour mission
duration of DRM-I is that 2 crew and 8 passengers will enter the
SSF following docking and power down of the PLS. Critical systems
functions which will allow the PLS to remain functionally
independent of SSF may remain active during this powered down
phase.
Man-Rated Elements/Safety. The fact that the PLS vehicle is
to be manned requires that all elements be man-rated, which affects
the design of all hardware of the system. It requires that the
hardware design has appropriate safety factors for adequate design
margins, high reliability, and minimal hazardous or highly toxic
materials. It also requires quality assurance methods, redundancy
in critical systems, and a level of fault tolerance, specified as
fail-operational/fail-safe for the PLS. This is required for crew
safety, as specified in applicable documents such as JSCM 8080
(Manned Spacecraft Design Criteria and Standards), and KHB 1700.7A
(STS Ground Safety Handbook).
Technoloav Level. The required technology level helps
determine the number of options available to the subsystem designer
when attempting to satisfy functional requirements within cost and
schedule risks constraints. The requirement for PLS is NASA
Technology Level 5 (later raised to Level 6) or better in 1992.
This requires that the component or a brass-board model has been
tested in the relevant environment. As a point of comparison, the
following provides the definition for the various technology
levels:
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
Level 1 - Basic principles observed and reported
Level 2 - Conceptual design formulated
Level 3 - Conceptual design test performed analytically
or experimentally
Level 4 - Critical-function breadboard demonstration
Level 5 - Component or brass-board model tested in
relevant environment
Level 6 - Prototype or brassboard model tested in
relevant environment
Level 7 - Engineering model tested in space
Level 8 - Baselined into production design
Typically, the first three technology levels are considered
technology development while the fourth to seventh level are
advanced development. Technology Level 8 is off-the-shelf
technology, which could be modified to satisfy unique design
requirements.
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Spacecraft to Fit Within the Shuttle Payload Bay. The
requirement that the PLS spacecraft shall fit within the Shuttle
orbiter payload bay places strict limits on the dimensions of its
outer mold-line. This, in turn, puts limitations on the available
volume and allowable size of spacecraft subsystems.
Spacecraft Dockinq to Space Station. In order to achieve
Space Station crew rotation as specified in DRM-I, the PLS
spacecraft will require the capability of docking to Space Station.
This requires rendezvous maneuvering, a docking mechanism
compatible with Space Station, and cold gas RCS thrusters for
proximity operations. An alternative to a hard-docking system is
using a Berthing technique with manipulator arms providing the
final closing maneuver. Since the PLS will be manned as specified
in DRM-I while it is approaching the Space Station, it is
anticipated that a similar docking procedure that the STS orbiter
employs will be retained. However, due to dimensional differences
between the PLS and STS orbiter, it is assumed that the PLS will
use a different docking port and docking interface hardware than
the orbiter.
MaDned/Cabin Atmosphere. Requirement 2 requires a man-rated
design, which typically affects mechanical, avionic, propulsion,
and structural design characteristics. This requirement addresses
the need for the life support of the flight personnel. The
capability to purge and repressurize will allow multiple on-orbit
EVA's, if they should become necessary.
Crew Module Cleanliness. As a consequence of the PLS docking
with the Space Station as defined in DRM-I, it is important that
the PLS spacecraft comply with Space Station environmental
requirements. This requirement affects prelaunch operations in
terms of accessibility to the crew module and design of the crew
access arm.
STS payload processing is accomplished in a Class-100,000
clean room. If launched as a STS payload, this clean room
requirements will impact the PLS processing cost. This is due to
additional cleanliness provision and procedures required in the
Operations and Checkout (O&C) building. However, Since the PLS is
not a STS payload in DRM-I, these additional costs will not be
addressed in this study.
Crew Module Internal Volume. Just as Requirement 4 sizes the
external dimensions of the PLS spacecraft, this requirement sizes
the interior of the crew module and places further restrictions on
the allowable sizes of spacecraft subsystems. Since all flight
personnel will wear partial pressure suits during all critical
flight phases in case of cabin depressurization, it is necessary to
allow sufficient space to accommodate them. The specification for
5- to 95- percentile personnel sizes has been derived from Space
Station requirements and has been used previously in other manned
vehicle design studies.
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Spacecraft Desianed for Ease o5 MainteDance. Designing for
ease of maintenance reduces turnaround time and launch delays due
to equipment failures. This requirement affects the design of all
spacecraft subsystems by ensuring that they are easily accessible
and repairable. This will result in built-in test equipment,
modular subsystem components, low-maintenance TPS, and possible
elimination of hydraulics and APU's. This requirement also has
implications for the allocation of mean time before failure and
mean time to repair.
Efficient Operations. Advanced launch system operational
approaches are required to ensure efficient and thus low cost PLS
operation. One such operational approach which offers promise is
applying, where appropriate, methodologies and techniques from the
airline industry to PLS ground processing. With this approach,
routine verification will be replaced by hardware and software
performance trend analysis and monitoring.
Fliqht Rate and Launch Sites. The specification of flight
rate is important in determining booster production rate, number of
spacecraft in the fleet, number of launch pads, and scheduling for
crew training and ground support. The identification of launch
sites determines the orbital inclination range, which directly
affects launch vehicle performance requirements/PLS spacecraft
injected weight, and is a significant factor in specifying logistic
requirements.
Hiah-Launch Probability. Launch probability is dependent on
launch vehicle design margins and launch site weather statistics.
By designing the flight vehicle to be able to launch under adverse
weather conditions (temperature, wind, and rain), its ability to
meet target launch dates and launch windows is significantly
increased. An advantage of having the PLS launch site at KSC and
Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) is that extensive weather
statistics are available to establish accurate weather
requirements. This requirement will be an important design
consideration for the design of the first-stage flight control and
guidance hardware and software. The ability to launch (and to
recover, following an abort) at night will also increase launch
probability and will potentially reduce the length of launch
delays.
Continuous Abort Capability. A significant flight crew safety
issue is the ability of a manned flight vehicle to safely perform
aborts. The requirement for continuous abort capability maximizes
the probability of safe crew return. This will necessitate the
capability of on-the-pad aborts. This groundrule will have a
direct impact on the design of the abort and recovery subsystems
hardware and software and the ground recovery operations.
No Lonq Lifetime Orbital Debris. A growing concern for
designers of spacecraft in low earth orbit is the increasing
population of man-made debris in earth orbit. This debris ranges
in size from small particles to large upper stages and
nonfunctioning satellites and is distributed nearly uniformly in
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orbital inclination in low orbits (less than 250 NMI). Concern
stems from the fact that even small particles can do significant
damage to spacecraft, due to hypervelocity impact. The probability
of such impact increases with the size and duration of a satellite
in low earth orbit -- characteristics that apply to Space Station.
An effective way to prevent the increase of this population is to
design upper stages, spacecraft, and separation devices to preclude
the generation of debris. This is a policy that NASA has agreed to
pursue.
AcGe_eration. The maximum accelerations and exposure times to
accelerations are important considerations for crew safety and
subsystem design. The maximum values for ascent are consistent
with Titan IV and ALS capabilities. Those for other nominal
mission phases were chosen to be acceptable for deconditioned crew
personnel. The peak values for launch escape and water impacts,
both of which would be encountered only during aborts, are of very
short duration.
Landina Capability. The requirements for landing capability
are important to both flight vehicle design and landing site
characteristics. Specification of cross-range capability provides
the lift-to-drag ratio required by the spacecraft and figures in
the availability of a particular landing site during any given
period. This availability is an important factor when satisfying
an abort-from-orbit requirement.
The runway length required for safe landing at alternate
landing sites is an important consideration for emergency
conditions. The use of existing landing aids, which should reduce
DDT&E and operational costs, is important to the design of the
on-board landing system and should increase the number of
acceptable landing sites.
Recovery Systems. The safe recovery of the spacecraft and
flight personnel following nominal and aborted missions is an
important consideration for the design of the PLS spacecraft and
recovery operations. This capability must be provided for land and
water, day and night, and a wide range of weather conditions. The
ability to automatically engage appropriate recovery systems on the
PLS such as location beacons and stabilization devices enhances
crew safety, especially following an abort or landing at a remote
site. The stabilization floatation devices must be sufficient to
expose an access hatch following water impact.
Quick Crew Eqress. A lesson learned from the Apollo program
is the importance of a manned spacecraft to provide quick egress of
flight personnel on the launch pad and following landing. This is
especially true for aborts in which conditions may exist where
egress is critical for flight personnel survival. This is an
important consideration in the spacecraft design (specifically
hatch size and location) and has obvious safety implications.
Ferry Capability. Since the PLS spacecraft is the only
reusable element of the PLS flight vehicle, its ability to be
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ferried easily is an important factor to providing rapid turnaround
capability. By specifying that existing transports are used with a
minimum of specialized GSE, the PLS vehicle turnaround time should
be minimized. It also reduces the amount of PLS-unique ground
support required for turnaround operations, which decreases
operating costs.
Schedule and Cost. The development of credible cost and
schedule estimates are necessary to provide design and program
decision information. In addition to nominal life-cycle-cost
estimates over an agreed upon milestone and operational schedule, a
cost risk estimate is required along with cost/benefit analyses for
each major technological and for process innovation incorporated
into the final, preferred design. The latter data provide the cost
arguments for the innovations by providing the negative cost
impacts that could be felt by a nominal PLS program if a particular
innovation was not incorporated.
The specification of the IOC enables the determination of the
schedule of important program milestones. It also has an indirect
influence on the test program type and duration which must be
performed to demonstrate, at a high confidence level, the
maintainability and reliability goals. The ATP for phase C/D which
corresponds to this 2000 IOC will be derived from the study based
on a development schedule which provides a low risk, low cost
development program.
Adequate Spares. An important lesson learned from the Space
Shuttle program is the importance of logistics, especially with
regard to adequacy of spares for all vehicle systems. By having
adequate spares to avoid the necessity of cannibalizing another
flight vehicle for replacement parts, the PLS program can
significantly reduce the chances of having "hanger queens" and can
increase the chances of retaining a full fleet of operational and
flight-ready vehicles.
Autonomous Vehicle Operations. The ability of the PLS vehicle
to perform autonomously (i.e., independently) from ground mission
control has significant implications for the design and operations
of several PLS functional areas and vehicle subsystems such as
GN&C, data processing, and health monitoring. Synergy exists with
the capability and reduced ground check-out during vehicle
processing due to having on-board fault detection and isolation at
the component level.
Although the vehicle is capable of automatic operation
throughout all mission flight phases, the ability of the flight
crew to command and monitor automatic mission sequences and to take
over active control will be provided. Automated mission sequences
which will have crew monitoring and take-over capability are
pre-launch, launch to the desired orbit, abort, performing
necessary on-orbit maneuvers including docking with the SSF,
executing the de-orbit burn, entry control, and approach and
landing at the selected landing site.
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3.0 RELIABILITY/MAINTAINABILITY ANALYSIS
The Reliability/Maintainability (R/M) Analysis Methodology
applied to the Personnel Launch System (PLS) represents the
culmination of a multi-year Rockwell SSD IR&D activity directed at
the problem of how to credibly perform R/M analyses for conceptual
and preliminary designs, i.e., those designs for which detailed
design specifics are minimum or absent and which, further, are
subject to substantial configuration change over a short time
period. Credible R/M analyses, in the context used herein, imply
that significant estimating errors and/or oversights do not exist,
and that if the design under study was subsequently to be built and
flown its operationally observed R/M attributes would closely
approximate the conceptual phase estimates.
Further, to be useful the R/M analysis tool used during
conceptual phases must be capable of rapid update as the
configuration evolves and, further, it must be capable of
responsively providing R/M-influenced data required by analysts
from other disciplines (Logistics, Life-Cycle Costing, etc.)
Matrix is the R/M analysis methodology developed for such
applications. First funded in FY 1989 as IR&D Project #89140,
continued work was authorized as FY 1990 IR&D Project #90140
entitled "Advanced Spacecraft Reliability and Maintainability Trade
Methodologies."
We began our assessment of the PLS to determine its support
requirements during turnaround operations at KSC. We also
evaluated the vehicle from a maintainability and reliability
standpoint to assure that we could maintain and operate the PLS in
a cost effective manner. One of the key items required by
maintainability was the requirement for performing test and vehicle
on-board checkout without requiring an elaborate ground test system
environment (similar to Launch Processing System (LPS) at KSC).
The primary requirement provided in the PLS Guidelines was to have
an autonomous vehicle. This requires lower level requirements that
would drive testability, and diagnostic subsystem requirements.
Our goal for reducing costs and minimizing manpower and resources
to support the PLS led us to use an airline type operation for
performing turnarounds. We have developed an extensive data base
that indicates the feasibility of this concept in the ground
operations section of the report.
The R/M analyses performed during this phase of the study were
used as a tool to influence the PLS design with respect to its
maintenance and operational impacts based on subsystem and system
configurations. Quantitative and qualitative R/M analyses provided
the "yardstick" to measure the degree of R/M and Supportability
inherent in a given design. Additionally, this analysis yielded
data essential to the LCC estimation process in the area of spares,
repair, and manpower requirements.
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3.I.A Top-down R/M analysis
The top-down parametric analysis technique illustrated in
Figure 3-1 is a direct result of Rockwell IR&D conducted in FY
1989. The technique was designed to yield credible and defensible
R/M numerical estimates for conceptually-defined spacecraft at both
the vehicle and system levels, and to require as inputs only the
gross design characteristics available at the time the analysis is
conducted.
Top-down derived numerical R/M values did not represent a
final result. They "bracketed" the range of achievable R/M values,
and thus "scope" the magnitude of potential R/M attributes by
direct comparison with known vehicles and systems for which well-
documented R/M histories were available. The top-down technique's
strength and utility stem from the fact that a definite numerical
relationship exists between an aerospace vehicle's design
parameters (weight, function, mission duration, etc.) and its
resultant reliability achievements and maintenance expenditures.
Table 3-1 identifies the Air Force reported man-hours per
maintenance action (MH/MA) - the number of manhours the average
repair requires) for a range of USAF aircraft. Note that none are
lower than the C-5's value of 4.69 MH/MA, and that the very
sophisticated F-15C is the highest at 7.34 MH/MA. It would seem
prudent to be within these two extremes when estimating MH/MA for a
new design unless, for example, the design differed markedly from
the design practices employed for new aircraft.
Table 3-1. Aircraft Maintenance Man-Hour Predictions Provide
Operations Insight for Future Aircraft
Aircraft MH/MA
F-15C 7.34
B-IB 7.06
T-39 6.44
F-16A 6.37
E-4B 5.53
C-141 5.39
C-5A 4.69
What seems to be evident is that densely-packaged aircraft
(such as fighters) offer little in the way of accessibility for
maintenance and, accordingly, require an appreciable number of
manhours per repair. On the other hand, large aircraft are not as
densely packaged and require fewer manhours per repair.
The PLS preferred design concept has a low density and the
MH/MA values are warranted and justifiable. This is mainly due to
the elimination of hydraulic systems and turbo-mechanisms for
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Figure 3-1. Top-Down Analysis at Vehicle and Subsystem Level Provides
Direct Link to R/M History
propulsion. Our estimates have been set at 4.5 MH/MA based on
these design attributes.
The data base for PLS has been developed using extensive
reliability and maintainability data from contemporary aircraft,
subsystems and components (see Table 3-2). The following list of
aircraft and the number of flights that are available from our data
set at Rockwell was used in evaluating the PLS reliability and
maintainability characteristics. In contrast the Shuttle orbiter
has less than 40 flights for estimating mature system R/M values.
Therefore, we have tailored our values from this data base and
applied space system R/M factors.
3.1.2 Bottom-up R/M analysis
The bottom-up analysis, depicted in Figure 3-2, provides the
rationale to confirm or refute the top-down analysis result. In
the bottom-up analysis LRU and component-level estimates are summed
"upwards" to subsystem, system and vehicle-level values. It is not
expected that the upwards summation will precisely coincide with
the top-down result since:
i. The full complement of LRU's and assemblies will not have
been identified during the study. This tends to give
optimistic "bottom up" R/M results.
2. Frequently, items such as connectors, cables, etc. are
omitted from the bottom-up analysis. This, too, leads to a
optimistic "bottom up" result.
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Figure 3-2• Bottom-up Analysis at LRU/Component Level Adds Depth and
Credibility to the Parametric Results
Table 3-2. Aircraft Data Base Used for PLS R/M Assessment
Aircraft Fliqhts
C-5A 32143
C-141A 181114
F-16C 109125
F-15C 78372
FB-IIIA 8833
OV-10 66298
AC-130H 2565
B-52G 41372
B-IB 72746
A-10A 22182
The Reconciliation Phase of the R/M analysis (Figure 3-3)
seeks to rationally account for the differences between the top-
down and the bottom-up results, and may result in modifications
being made to either, or both, results. Outputs from the
Reconciliation Phase "drive" Repair Level Analyses, Spares, LCC
estimates, etc.
The R/M Analysis process yields the steady-state R/M values
that can confidently be expected when the PLS is put into
operations. Our analysis also includes an estimate of reliability
growth, which is based on orbiter experience.
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Figure 3-4. We See a Highly Reliable and Maintainable PLS Design
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_,_._ pLS Top-down R/M assessment
Figure 3-4 presents the results of our preliminary top-down
R/M assessment of the current PLS configuration. It shows that the
PLS has the potential to realize an mean-time-between-maintenance
(MTBM) of approximately 4.4 hours for a 72 hour mission. (The MTBM
value is not a constant: it varies with flight duration). The
preliminary MTBM value of 4.4 hours is subject to considerable
variation as various design options are examined in our Trade Study
activity. For example, additional design redundancy will improve
mean-time-before-abort (MTBA), but will decrease MTBM (more
maintenance required). Technology issues may also drive MTBM one
way or the other.
The average system-level mean-time-to-repair (MTTR) is
estimated to be 2.5 hours, and each unscheduled maintenance task is
estimated to require an average of 1.8 men. Therefore our
projected MH/MA equals 4.5 (i.e., 2.5 x 1.8). The predicted
unscheduled maintenance actions/flying hour (UMA/FH) equals 0.2273
(i.e., I divided by the MTBM of 4.4 hours) times 4.5 MH/MA = 1.02.
For a 72 hour mission a total of 73.44 (i.e., 1.02 x 72)
unscheduled maintenance man-hours is estimated.
Historically, for aerospace vehicles in general, scheduled
maintenance is approximately 55% of unscheduled maintenance. This
equates to 40.39 scheduled man-hours for a 72 hour mission. Total
man-hours for a 72 hour mission (scheduled and unscheduled)
therefore is estimated to be 113.83.
3,_.4 PLS Bottom-up R/M assessment
Figure 3-5 presents the results of our preliminary bottom-up
analysis. This information is based on airline and military
aircraft R/M data. These data favorably compare with our original
top-down analysis (see Figure 3.1.3-1). The bottom-up assessment
includes the parameter mean-time-between-removal (MTBR), used for
the determination of the range and depth of spares required to
support the PLS at specified flight rates.
The PLS configuration used for the bottom-up assessment was
estimated to weigh 15,891 ibs (dry), whereas its weight during the
much earlier top-down assessment period was 16,769 ibs (dry). The
bottom-up estimated MTBM as 4.97 hours (top-down it was 4.447), and
MTBF is now 10.52 hours versus the earlier 11.117 hours. No
significant or unexplained differences exist at the subsystem
level.
Unscheduled man-hours/flying hour (UMA/FH) therefore equals
0.2012 (i.e., 1 divided by the MTBM of 4.97 hours) times 4.5 MH/MA
= 0.905. For a 72 hour mission a total of 65.16 (i.e., 0.905 x 72)
unscheduled maintenance man-hours will be required. Scheduled
maintenance = 55% of 65.16, or 35.84 man-hours for a 72 hour
mission. Total man-hours for the 72 hour mission is 65.16 + 35.84 =
I01.0.
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Based on these data it is evident that the PLS as configured
can be considered a low maintenance, highly reliable, and
affordable system. This is mainly due to its mission character.
It operates more like an aircraft than the Shuttle and it is one-
tenth the orbiters size. It also is planned to have state-of-the-
art systems integrated into a autonomous network that reduces
manpower intensive maintenance and diagnostics.
3.1.5 Desiqn Evolution
As the PLS design has matured, so have the estimates for
maintenance. Our model is used for estimating design impacts on a
system where most models are use to reallocate the R/M values based
on a stated reliability number. Table 5.1.5-1 illustrates this
based on the three design cycles that we went through during the
study.
Table 3-3. Dynamic R/M Process Tracks Evolving Design
Baseline MTBM MTBF MTBR
1/25/90 5.03 20.30 10.74
4/ 1/90 5.88 24.05 12.49
6/27/90 4.92 16.66 10.49
As illustrated in the table, we have increased the maintenance
requirements for PLS, however, the values have not grown radically
but have increased due to the added weight and new system additions
(avionics, air re-vitalization, dual propulsion, batteries,
electrical distribution, etc.).
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4.0 OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT
Our study of the PLS vehicle has centered on the philosophy of
"Design for Operations". During this effort we have been actively
involved in developing a support package that covers the
disciplines of; Reliability/Maintainability, Ground Operations,
Flight Operations, and Supportability (logistics). Our primary
goal was to develop an operations concept that was affordable and
that minimized safety and costs risks.
The Operations Analysis Task products have been used in the
development of PLS design guidelines and operations allocations/-
requirements that reduce overall life cycle costs. To achieve the
PLS operations goals of low recurring cost and rapid turnaround,
application of airline-based operations philosophies was instilled
wherever applicable in development of the following PLS preferred
operations concept. Task 1.5 efforts have also provided early
definition of ground and mission/flight operations and support
requirements for each PLS concept reflecting the Government
furnished vehicle configuration. We have developed a data base
that substantiates each of the support estimates for PLS. This
data base provides us with the means to show traceability to each
defined value used in our estimates for support, failure
predictions, manpower, task times, spares, and repair.
The overall scope of this task has been to drive the design
from an operations standpoint. This requires the operations team
to develop functional flows to identify requirements and resources
(manpower and equipment) for each activity associated with ground
operations, mission planning, flight operations, recovery
operations, and supportability. Based on the flows, a series of
trades and operations scenarios is developed to determine optimum
operational characteristics. The design team approach to meeting
the task objectives are illustrated in Figure 4-1. Our
recommendations in developing subsystem layouts, selections, and
preferred operational characteristics have been coordinated with
the PLS design team. The design team has been addressing
operations driven requirements in defining an optimal design
approach.
Detailed manpower estimates were developed for the ground,
flight and mission support tasks. These data indicate that the PLS
can be supported economically with a minimum amount of support
personnel. This is mainly due to the airline approach to
operations and the simplicity of design associated with the PLS.
The use of a standard flight to Space Station Freedom also reduces
the flight/mission planning complexity associated with an orbiter
operation.
In evaluating the PLS, our goal has been to design a safe,
durable, low life cycle cost system. To achieve this, many new
features that have been learned from past manned spacecraft and
aircraft experiences and "lessons learned" from Shuttle are
incorporated in the PLS design. Fast turnaround requires
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Figure 4-1. Team Approach to Design for Operations
accessibility and compliance with strong maintainability features.
Our layout of subsystems has benefitted from the overall
maintainability philosophy and the design architecture of the PLS.
The development of detailed staffing levels was accomplished
by our on-site support teams at KSC and JSC. These data include:
i) hands on technician levels, 2) support personnel requirements,
and 3) management staffing levels. We used the appropriate STS and
airline estimating factors for ground operations. Since the flight
and mission operations task is basically STS unique, we applied our
knowledge of this factor and reduced the support requirements
according to complexity of vehicle, and simplicity of mission.
The following sections provide further insight into our
efforts to determine operations requirements for PLS. They provide
an overview of the operating scenarios, task analyses, procedures
definitions, support estimates, implementation philosophy with
assumptions, staffing requirements, trade studies, and system
analyses dealing with fleet sizes and attrition associated with
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ground operations, mission/flight operations, and supportability
(logistics).
4.1 OBJECTIVES
The objective of this task has been to identify operations
scenarios and support systems that enable the development of an
operationally efficient Personnel Launch System (PLS). Design
requirements and innovative low-cost operations and support
concepts have been defined and used by the engineering design team
in their selection of an optimal subsystem complement for the PLS.
The principal objectives of this task were to: i) define traceable,
realistic, complete, simple, and low cost operations scenarios, 2)
establish procedures and support requirements for each operational
phase selected, and 3) define operational flows, logistical re-
quirements, and support methodologies and techniques both by
procedure and by subsystem. The study has provided credible data
that come from existing manned-space experience and technical
resources. Within the report structure, verifiable data and
rationale in the selection of the operations processes are
identified.
As illustrated in Figure 4-2, we have identified four specific
areas that reduce support requirements for any vehicle. The
selection of airframe and power plant (A&P) type personnel to
perform turnaround operations at KSC has shown that we can reduce
the head count by not having a large mixture of certified
personnel. The A&P technician is a highly qualified airline/-
aircraft mechanic that is certified to perform any maintenance that
may be required on a vehicle. They are also responsible for the
safety and operation of the vehicle. Our design for operations
requirements for PLS have established certain constraints on the
design. These are: easy access to the subsystems and equipment
within each bay of the vehicle, embedded fault isolation and health
monitoring, and a simplified structural inspection method.
Our analyses provided operations support data in the area of
man-hour estimates from STS flows, staffing levels, flight/mission
operations and scenarios, logistics spares and repair estimates
(including GFE system requirements) and the facilities needed to
support the PLS. These data supported the development of specific
requirements for mission operations, ground refurbishment/-
turnaround, preflight, launch, flight, and PLS/crew recovery.
These data have also been input into a data base for future
retrieval. Most of the format is either in Excel (tables and
spread sheets), Draw (Briefing Charts and facility layouts),
Project (timelines and schedules), and Microsoft Word (Text).
4.1.1 Functional Analyses
Functional allocations were developed to specify each
operational function. This was accomplished using functional flow
block diagrams (FFBD) that led to the development and definition of
requirements for ground processing, launch, mission, recovery and
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Figure 4-2. Cost Effective Operations-Driven Design is Key to PLS
Program Objectives.
attrition. The FFBD's (See Section 3.0) define the steps in the
operations and logistics support scenarios to a sufficient level to
identify the requirements for each reference concept during each
operations phase. In support of this activity each discipline
listed below participated in the development of the operations data
base.
Rockwell's Logistics function provided support data
(spares, repair, GSE, training, publications, and support
requirements) to lower functional flows and in the development
of operational goals and requirements.
Rockwe11's Manufacturing/Facilities function provided an
assessment of facilities to support launch, recovery,
servicing, and testing operations (including operational
flight tests at KSC).
Pan Am World Services provided airline maintainability
quantitative goals/requirements, maintenance concepts and
related design ground processing guidelines. They also
developed the performance trending application for PLS.
Rockwell's Space Operations Company (RSOC), in Houston
Texas, provided mission and flight engineering support data,
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personnel levels, training simulators, and facilities data
that were needed for development of the flight data files and
crew activity plans. We also developed timelines using STS
GFE system capabilities (modified from the existing data bases
on mission and flight operations data). The data supported
the development of flight and crew timeline allocations for
mission operations, ground preflight and launch, flight, and
recovery.
Rockwell/KSC supported the development of booster ground
processing flows (using the Titan IV as a candidate),
facilities impact requirements, and support system
requirements (such as, launch control complex, ground support
operations for fueling, etc.). They also reviewed the
conceptual designs to determine ground impacts.
Specific inputs from the reference vehicle concepts, study
ground rules, and the requirements established by NASA Langley
Research Center (LaRC) were used during the study process. Data
from Task 1.3 (Subsystems), and 1.7 (Technology Assessment)
provided information of the maintenance requirements, reference
subsystem, and technology assessments when determining the
operations and support functions and requirements. Manufacturing
requirements, and evolving technologies (i.e., items that require
new/modified support concepts) were also used in development of the
functional flows.
The returns on investment and a reduction in operational risk
for each functional area can include reductions in costs to
develop: 1) monitoring and support equipment, 2) personnel training
on complex systems, 3) quantity of monitoring personnel, 4) the use
of commercial off-the-shelf hardware (with off-the-shelf buffers
that can be programmed), and 5) use of commercial on-board aircraft
system architectures (with delta requirements for space
application). This method of analysis leads to the development of
standardized ground support systems, ease of fault isolation,
reduction of procedures, and reduction in training)
4.1.2 Traceability of Requirements
Our current approach for developing and tracing requirements
are outlined in the following example. This example defines how
requirements can be traced back to the original guidelines that
drive the PLS design to meet the specific mission requirements
established for a selected scenario. The key factor in controlling
costs, reducing support personnel and resources, and eliminating
excessive design activities can be determined through a series of
steps that drive lower level functions and subsequent requirements.
An example of this approach would be the PLS Guideline for
Autonomous Operations. In evaluating this guideline, the first
functional requirement on vehicle operations is to require that the
vehicle operate without the control of ground/mission support
personnel during ascent, orbital operations, descent, and landing.
This means that the large cadre of personnel used on the Shuttle
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orbiter during a mission could be eliminated or drastically reduced
(the exception would be for Range safety, flight design, crew
activity planning/training, ELV monitoring, proximity operations at
Space Station Freedom, ground operations for landing and
turnaround, supportability to handle spares and repair inventories,
training, and certification of personnel to support PLS).
Within the requirement, the ground function for processing the
vehicle should be considered less costly since on-board equipment
must be available to "status" the vehicle. The use on health-
monitoring and a process for annunciating the status will identify
more functions and requirements to be developed or levied against
the guideline.
Impact on Ground Processinq: From the ground processing standpoint
the method to monitor and verify repairs plus determining system
status or "flight readiness" can be accomplished through an
automated system (Sun Work Station with appropriate buffers). If
the vehicle design has a signal port (hard wire or comm) that can
interrogate the PLS computer and health-monitoring networks we
could eliminate the need for multiple types of equipment. This
levies a requirement for providing the port as part of the PLS
vehicle design:
Requirement: The vehicle shall provide a signal port that
provides data on system status and health-monitoring of all
designated subsystem. (designated subsystems could be those
that are considered active - electrical, pressure,
temperature, electronic, mechanical, latching, actuating,
quantity, leak, etc.). This assists us in the development of
ground operations costs associated with an automated network
to handle the requirement.
Impact on Mission operations: From the Mission/Flight support
standpoint, the method to monitor the flight could use the same
ports (if they were communications type). This eliminates the
multiple paths that are used to down-link data and it also allows
use of the same automated station to perform monitoring of the
vehicle status (if required, or if an anomaly is annunciated and we
need to track it.). This levies an additional requirement for the
system design:
Requirement: The vehicle shall be capable of down-linking
flight data on vehicle health during ascent, orbit, descent,
and landing.) This assists us in the development of mission/-
flight operations costs associated with a simplified
monitoring network to handle flight anomalies/ and operations
(if required).
_mpact on Loqistics: From the logistics support standpoint, the
method to perform fault isolation could use the same ports. This
eliminates the multiple diagnostic paths that are used to perform
test and checkout similar to the Shuttle orbiter capability. This
levies an additional requirement for the systems design:
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Recruirement: The vehicle shall be capable of fault isolating
failures using embedded diagnostic circuits that monitor input
and output ports. This assists in reducing the amount of
diagnostics equipment when monitoring anomalies.
4.1.3 PLS Operational Features
In brief, our design concept provides operational benefits
from its relative simplicity. Table 4-1 illustrates the
operational benefits of our preferred design concept. The use of
electrical-mechanical actuators, and non-toxic propellants reduces
the incidence of maintenance risk for complex systems similar to
orbiter. We have also developed requirements that meet the autonomy
guidelines set forth in the PLS contract. Our "design for
operations" philosophy leads us to an operations policy that
reduces manpower requirements for ground, flight, mission, and
logistics support. We have also been active in supporting the
safety requirements to assure safe operations and robust flight
capabilities that reduce the complexities associated with a manned
space vehicle.
Table 4-1. Features and Benefits of PLS Operations Concept.
Design Features Opc_tions Benefit
Smail/Simple
Eleclricai-mechanicai Actuators
Fewer parts count
Design & Maintenance
No Hydraulics
Reduced Maintenance
Non-toxicPropellants Parallel Launch Operations
Reduced Hazaxds
Built-in-test & Health Monitoring
Accessibility
Small, Certified Turnaround Crew
Design for Operations
Robust System Design
ScheduMM_intcnance
Parallel Maintenance Operations
Less Time Required to Process
Economic Utiliza6on of Skills
Reduced Logistics Costs
Flexible Operations at Minimum
Risk
Standardized Missions & Procedures
Safe Abon Modes
Reduced Flight Planning
Simple Flight Operations
Crew Survivability for all
Credible Situations
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4._.4 0peratinq Scenarios
Operating scenarios were developed for the basic NASA-defined
system concepts and study ground rules. Lower level functional
flows were then developed for each operation. The resulting
requirements were then identified and allocated to each function,
from either top-level system requirements or self-imposed
requirements to meet resource/system/personnel needs, consistent
with meeting the operational objectives. These data were built on
STS, ELV, launch/support/mission operations, logistics, and airline
experience. The data were used to develop system/operational
requirements, operations scenarios, and documentation associated
with operations management, logistics, maintainability,
reliability, training, facilities, transportation, and services.
The data also support the development of manpower/resource life
cycle cost estimates as the costing analysis required.
The first efforts associated with the development of our
operations concept was to develop a series of functional flow block
diagrams (FFBD's) that would capture the operational functions
associated with the PLS. The addition of the DDT&E blocks
associated with "capabilities development" and operational flight
test (OFT) verification provided the important links to the pre-
production and operational periods that are necessary ingredients
in our "design for operations" philosophy. In order to simplify
the diagram, the management and support blocks do not have input
and output lines since they support every facet of the program. As
Figure 4-3. Functional Flow Block Diagrams Enable Development of
Operations Scenarios.
described below, Figure 4-3 illustrates the final FFBD that has
been developed for the study at this time.
The DDT&E block represents all the activities associated with
planning a Phase C/D program. It also includes the flow through of
a DDT&E flight test article for operational verification and the
evaluation of the ground and orbital flight capabilities.
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The "operations capabilities development" analyses were very
important to the initial study since they drove the production,
test, operations, logistics facilities, res0Urce acquisitions, and
documentation processes. Early identification of the operations
facility requirements assisted us in defining facility cost
acquisitions and determining life cycle costs to support each area.
The management function includes the support of all scheduling
and program activities that impact each area within the flow. Cost
and schedule reporting, action item status, and program direction
is contained within the block.
The mission support block includes the flight design, crew
planning, and ground mission support (prelaunch and flight)
activities during launch. These flows were used to derive detailed
requirements for the DDT&E and operational phases.
The support material/equipment block covers all logistics
support activities including the logistics support analysis (LSA)
tasks that are required to determine the logistical and operations
support criteria for PLS and includes spares, repairs, and
logistics management. The remainder of the chart is a typical
functional flow that follows space system launch processing, flight
operations, turnaround, and post flight analyses.
One of the driving factors for operations is the
identification of support requirements based on a set of estimates
from the Reliability and Maintainability (R/M) study effort. A
short description of the analyses is provided in the following
paragraphs for continuity.
4.2 GROUND OPERATIONS
This study requires an understanding of the complex
relationships that the PLS ground processor has to a number of
supporting contractors, and NASA overseeing organizations.
Figure 4-4 illustrates this interface and the multiple support
paths that are required. An ideal arrangement from the PLS launch
site perspective would be a flight ready booster provided on a
commercially contracted basis. The base operations services and
limited Shuttle support provided to the PLS would both be shared
with other launch programs. After the initial OFT period of pre-
operational testing and training the PLS manufacturer could
interface with the ground processing contract through an on-site
launch site services office. The relative size of the NASA program
office and the KSC and JSC staffs should be much reduced from what
is required for Shuttle.
The ground operations activity was conducted by two teams:
i) Pan Am/KSC doing the airline type flow processing analyses,
estimates of manpower (technicians, staff support, manage-
ment), timelines, support equipment analysis, facilities
analysis and trades, and
4-9
CCAFB
,IW41, LOCC
A EI"R $UPPORT
(HDQRS) PLS pROGRAM OFFICE
PERSONNEL TBO
NASA (KSC) PLS GROUND PROCESSING &
ENGRG IdGMT
NASA_SC)
&
MISSION
& CREW MG_
TITAN PLS
MANFACTURER MANFACTURE
LAUNCH SITE SITE
SEHViCEJ SERVICES
lU NEW PERSONNEL _
TITAN IV FI.S ORBITER
BOOBTER & ADAPTER
MANUFACTURER
MANUFACTURER _ CCAF1 AND KSC /
BASE OPERATIONS LIMITED CROSS UTKJZATK)N /
CONTRACTORS OF $HUI"rLE PROGRAM
(EMEROENCY SERVICES, ASSETS
(SPECIALIZED BACK SHOPS)/INFRASTRUCTURES OPt)
o
- M NEW PERSONNEL NO NEW "_M_NNEL_
Figure 4-4. Launch Site Management Concept.
2) Rockwell Space Systems Division, Cocoa Beach Florida, doing
Titan IV analyses, determining search and rescue (SAR)
requirements, and determining Launch Control Center impacts in
the area of facilities and software impacts. Detailed ground
operations data that define each of the activities conducted
by the ground operations teams are presented in Reference 4-i.
One of the key factors in our processing approach is to
utilize the airline approach to ground processing. The
certification concept of the Shuttle is to re-certify all systems
prior to re-flight. Our concept is to certify the PLS system
during Operational Flight Testing (OFT) and to then use the airline
approach to maintain the vehicle in a flight-worthy status. This
process verifies only those systems that have had routine and non-
routine maintenance performed on them. Basically this means that
the PLS is "released for service" after maintenance and not
subjected to a full certification process again.
Air Transport Association (ATA) specifications should be
adopted and used for technical documentation. This allows a common
standard system identification process for drawings, manuals, work
documents and other technical data. The PLS manufacturer provides
maintenance, overhaul, repair, parts, and nondestructive inspection
(NDI) manuals in accordance with ATA Specification i00
(Reference 4-2).
Maintenance and inspection requirements should be in
accordance with a maintenance specification controlled at the
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launch site with NASA concurrence. This document will constantly
change based on actual operating experience,_ Trend analysis would
play a major role in these adjustments. Cbmputer based work
instructions consisting of work cards support by detailed,
accurate, complete manuals. Emphasis is placed on using highly
trained and experienced A&P technicians. This improves quality and
allows more responsibility and accountability at the source of the
work.
The operations scenario is illustrated in Figure 4-5. This
scenario shows one of several options we have developed to enhance
ground support at the launch site.
Figure 4-5. PLS Ground Operations Scenarios.
A PLS Deservice and Pyro Safing Facility (DP&SF) has been
identified at the landing area to avoid introducing unnecessary
hazards into the Horizontal Processing Facility (HPF). The hazards
include pyrotechnic devices on the landing gear doors and a
parachute system that must be safed. The HPF, including support
shops and office areas are the focal point for all scheduled and
unscheduled maintenance. The PLS is moved on a transporter to the
launch area where it is integrated with the PLS adapter and booster
(Titan IV used for this analysis). The Adapter Processing Facility
(APF) is located in a "safe" area to preclude the shutdown of
Shuttle operations and other projects during hazardous processing
activity.
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Abort and contingency landing variables include the options
for the PLS to land at any airport (after reaching appropriate
velocities and altitudes) or aborting at sea (during early flight
period). Ferrying PLS between contingency landing sites and the
KSC launch site can be accomplished by a C-5 or C-17 transport
aircraft (using current NASA guidelines for mold-line). No landing
site convoy is required by PLS due to its simplicity and the use of
flight crew personnel to safe and monitor the PLS after landing,
whereas the Shuttle orbiter requires an extensive support team and
support equipment.
A thirty-one day processing flow (forty-three calendar days)
has been defined for PLS. This minimizes the level of technical
personnel to handle rapid turnarounds. Eight flights per year with
three vehicles would not require special teams to support
refurbishment of PLS. These data were developed using PLS design
characteristics, R/M maintenance estimates, and Shuttle experience
in determining manpower and resource requirements• Figure 4-6
illustrates the flow used in developing the manpower and resource
requirements.
I AIRLINE AIRCRAFT HISTORICAL DATA
AIRLINE AIRCRAFT DATA BASE
B_B%M AND COMPONENTS
U_R
I. MAN-HOURS/FLIGHT HOUR
¥
I PLS REQUIREMENTS
• MAINTENANCE MAN-HOURS/FLIGHT HOUR
CUSTOMIZED TO PLS DESIGN
• MAINTENANC_ MAN-HOURS FOR
72 HOUR MISSION# (182 MH)
I KSC LAUNCH SITE INPUTS
• REVIEW STS OPF STANDARD FLOW
TASKS AS APPUCABLE
• IDENTIFY LAUNCH SITE CONCERNS FOR
EACH SYSTEM OR COMPONENT
lilTL _
I APPLY LAUNCH CORREGTION (1298
Mh
BA_qlCO ON STB PROCESSING EXPERIENCE
p. MANHou.sTOTAL
.oR.zoNTALPROCESS.NO MH]
J ESTIMATFD MANHOURS FOR LANDING &POST LANDING ACTIVITIES:
• PC61TION GSE AND PERSONNEL
• SNIFF CHECK
I • OFFLOAD CREW & PASSENGERS
• TOW TO DESERVICING AREA
' • DESERVICE PROPELLANTS. SAFE PYROS
1_ UAN_K_
-4
ESTIMATED MANHOURS FOR mAINTENANCE
INSPECTION. SERVICING
• HORIZONTN_ PROCESSING FACIUTY
1481 IdAN_RS
ESTIMATED MANHOURS FOR PAD
• _=JUNSPORT TO PAD
• UFT & kL_TE
• INIEGRATION TESTING
• PLS PROPELLANT LOAD
• ORDNANCE INSTN..LATI(_N
• COUNTDOWN&LAUNCH
772 MANHOURS
TOTAL 23_7 MANHOURS
EXCLUDING ADAPTER
& BOOSTER PROCSSING
Figure 4-6. PLS A&P Technician Man-Hour Development.
Technician man-hour estimates were developed using a series of
analyses that identified the specific tasks associated with PLS and
relating them generically to Shuttle type processing. The
estimated maintenance, inspection, and servicing man-hours for the
HPF were developed using an actual historical airline/aircraft data
base (747 systems, subsystems, and related hardware maintenance
estimates with a factor for space system reliability added). The
airline data base was used to develop requirements for each
component or line-replaceable-unit (LRU) within the PLS systems
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based on history of similar components. Other requirements (space
application only) were identified by considering STS orbiter
standard flow tasks similar to PLS. Figure 4-7 is a summary
compilation of the man-hours identified for hands-on processing of
the PLS. Total hands-on personnel, staff support, management, and
office personnel requirements have been estimated at 162 for PLS.
Further detail of how these quantities were identified are
described below.
ATA ATA SYSTEM TITLE
NO.
21 AIR CONDITIONING
23 COMMUNICATIONS
24 ELECTRICAL POWER
25 EQUIPMENT AND FURN.
26 FIRE PROTECTION
27 FLIGHT CONTROLS
26 FUEL SYSTEMS
31 INSTRUMENTS
32 LANDING GEAR
33 LIGHTS
34 FLIGHT DATNMGT
35 OXYGEN
38 WATER/WASTE
52 DOORS
53 FUSELAGE
55 STABLIZER
56 WINDOWS
57 WINGS
56 THERMAL CONTROL
72 ENGINES
AIRLINE DATA BASE
MIH PER M/H PER
FLT HR 72 HRS
1
0.4126 29.71
0.2508 18.06
0.0806 5.80
0.1326 9.55
0.0476 3.43
0.1752 12.61
0.6882 6 35
0.0034 0.24
0,2024 14,57
0.0305 2.20
0.2147 15.46
0.0328 2.36
0.0601 4.33
0.0432 3.11
0.0278 2.00
0.0050 0.36
0.0045 0.32
0.0290 2.09
0.4668 33,61
0.2216 15.96
NOTES:
LAUNCH
SITE
ADJUSTMEN1
193
24
101
561
Ol
221
lO41
20 I
178 I
51
Ol
16!
8;
32
64
16_
64!
32
232
132
ASSUMED
FOR
PLS
1+2
223
42
107
66
3
35
110
29
193
7
15
18
12
35
66
16
64
34
266
148
PLS USING
SHUTFLE
METHODS
546
56
159
270
41
257
129
5O
230
17
162
54
54
299
4O9
84
168
226
1650
195
TOTAL I I 182.12t 1299 I 1481 I 5056.00
I REFLECTS PROCESSING IN HORIZONTAL PROCESSING FACILITY ONLY
2 STS ORBITER OPF PROCESSING REQUIRED APPROXIMATELY 39,000 MANHOURS FOR STS-31
3 PLS REQUIREMENTS ARE FOR A TYPICAL 72 HOUR MISSION
Figure 4-7. PLS Maintenance Requirements Development.
Facilities identification, sizing and usage information has
been developed and is included in Section 4.2.4. These facilities
represent a resilient capability at KSC. More than four vehicles
can be processed at the Horizontal Processing Facility if the need
should arise. The De-servicing and Pyro Safing Facility is in use
less than two days per flight and no major issue has been
identified to preclude meeting launch and landing requirements.
The launch pad becomes the major driver and programmatic issue for
meeting launch rates that have been identified in the PLS
guidelines. It is understood that the Titan IV launch complex can
not presently handle the PLS flights as identified in the manifest.
However, our analyses have identified launch pad requirements for
any ELY. Our main concern was to identify resources needed to
process and provide safe operation for the PLS vehicle and crew.
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4.2.1 Task Analysis
The following paragraphs further define the processing methods
and discusses the development of flow timelines, resource
identification, facilities utilization, and personnel assessments.
A set of timelines and operations flows were developed for
PLS. Some of the key results were: i) ground processing flows
indicate the ground processing team can meet launch demands with a
small cadre of support personnel, and 2) estimates indicate PLS can
expect a tenth less maintenance than the orbiter. The R/M estimate
was developed from the current Shuttle orbiter in-flight anomaly
data base and our PLS estimates from the MAtrix model using
modified aircraft and space related data). The low amount of
projected maintenance is mainly due to the PLS being smaller,
lighter, and less complex.
The PLS maintenance requirements were developed using
representative Boeing 747 maintenance and resource data. We also
developed PLS system and line-replaceable-unit (LRU) maintenance
requirements. These requirements formed a basis of both PLS design
specifications and ground processing maintenance requirements.
These requirements, developed by Pan AM from the 747 data base in
terms of man-hours per flight hour, were converted to man-hours for
a typical 72-hour PLS mission.
The launch site team reviewed the requirements from the
airline data base and added man-hour adjustments based on Shuttle
processing experience and the unique requirements of space flight
systems. The sum of the requirements from the airline data base
and the launch site adjustments from the expected PLS maintenance
requirements for a typical 72-hour mission. This represents
maintenance, inspection and servicing done in the horizontal
processing facility.
The PLS uses an entirely different and simplified approach to
ground operations. Experience gained from manned space operations
are combined with airline concept operations to provide an optimal
approach. By using on-board and ground automated systems, plus the
use of state-of-the-art software and hardware designs, the PLS can
be processed with a minimal amount of personnel and resources. Our
approach is not to decertify the PLS after each flight but to
perform processing similar to the airlines where they require re-
certification only of repaired systems. The use of airframe and
power (A&P) mechanics for performing PLS processing can reduce
overall costs. This is accomplished by maintaining a small work
force of highly trained personnel to perform all tasks on the PLS
(maximizing the use of cross trained personnel to perform multiple
tasks). On the other hand, large quantity of specialist personnel
are required to qualify for Shuttle maintenance and testing.
Table 4-2 illustrates the simplified ground operations process that
reduce overall operations costs associated with this effort.
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Table 4-2. Ground Operations Approach.
PLS PROCESS TYPES OF FUNCTIONS
Airline Maintenance Procedures
Airline Maintenance Program
Automated On-Board Checkout
Highly Trained A&P Technicians
(Reduced Staffing)
Local Controlled
Maintenance Program
Maintenance Manuals
ATA Specifications
Work Cards
AIRINC Specifications
Zone Control
NDI Manuals
Repair Manuals
Overhaul Manuals
In-service Limits & Tolerances
Full Use of Maintainability
Departure from OMRS Concept
On-board Health Monitors
Automated Test Equipment
Local Testing (not Firing Room)
cross Trained
Four Basic Skills
Cross Utilization
Use of Automation
Full Utilization of Trend
Analysis
Full Utilization of Operating
Histories and Anomalies
Based on the these data, we have developed the processing
times by A&P technician, with an expansion to cover landing and
launch activities. Table 4-3 identifies these processing times
required for a PLS turnaround. The 31-day period represents the
active time for accomplishment of work. The actual (elapsed) time
is 43 calendar days. We have identified special areas that the A&P
personnel will support beyond the "normal A&P activities" that they
can perform. These are avionics, electrical, thermal protection,
and mechanical system. Each person could handle the special areas;
however, in order to maintain higher proficiency, we have
designated these areas of expertise. Detailed data used in the
development of these data can be found in Reference 4-1.
Figure 4-8 identifies the typical booster interfaces that must
be understood for any vehicle that supports PLS operations. We
have chosen the Titan IV as the candidate because of the known
interfaces provided for the Centaur upper stage. The illustration
identifies the expected or estimated reaction times for failures
which have occurred over the past 20 years or which can be
anticipated as a failure mode. The PLS goal is to have a reaction
time of at least 2 seconds. This requires that an on-board
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Fable 4-3. Thirty-One Day Turnaround Estimates of Manpower.
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automatic system make the abort decision. For those failures which
are shown to be less than 2 seconds, it may be possible to modify
the booster system to detect some of the short duration anomalies.
In the event of an abort condition the crew has two methods of
abort based on the type of failure. If a Titan IV type abort
exists the PLS can be separated using the Launch Escape System
(LES). A PLS failure could cause the crew to escape by the slide
wire system or down the umbilical tower.
Simple PLS launch preparation is desired to provide the crew
and passengers with the least amount of stress. The Mobile Service
Tower (MST) is withdrawn from the launch pad at about T-3 hours. A
minimum sized PLS ground crew can make their final configuration
and operational checks after the MST is cleared. The crew and
passengers are loaded and the hatch is secured at T-I hour. The
Umbilical Tower is configured for launch in the remaining time.
The Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) plug is not inserted until just prior
to launch time. A relatively safe environment exists until SRM
ignition.
4.2.2 Procedures Definition
The procedures required to support PLS scheduled operations
and maintenance (O&M) tasks are identified in Figure 4-9.
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Figure 4-8. PLS/Booster Interfaces.
Reference 4-1 provides complete definition of O&M task requirements
in the context of total system requirements including
contingencies. As shown in the figure, ATA system numbers and
titles are used to identify inspection and maintenance procedures
required to be performed in the PLS facilities. Other required
procedures are to be developed in accordance with ATA I00 so that
the complete set will be in conformance. We consider ATA 100 to be
an existing national asset and a fundamental element in the PLS
program. This concept is explained in the following.
ATA 100 was developed, and has been continuously improved, by
airline operators over the past several decades. It is imposed on
every new airliner and provides commonality that permits an A&P
technician to navigate efficiently through operation and
maintenance documentation for any vehicle. This commonality of
documentation has permitted airlines to pool their resources
through the ATA to focus efforts on continuing development of a
single technical data specification. An even more important result
of commonality, combined with universal acceptance, is that it
permits contractors, subcontractors, vendors, suppliers, and
operators to efficiently communicate technical data to each other.
This is significant since operations cannot be efficient unless
communication of technical data is also efficient. Since efficient
operations are a prerequisite to airline profitability, airline
operators not only voluntarily comply with the specification, they
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Figure 4-9.
Tasks.
Procedures Required to Support Operations & Maintenance
also contribute the efforts of their top maintenance professionals
to support continued improvement of ATA i00. As a result, it now
embodies the highest level of operations expertise in the World.
In addition to airline operators, airline accessory and
component suppliers are accustomed to working with ATA i00 and know
how to satisfy its requirements. As stated in the introduction to
ATA i00:
"Material supplied by accessory or component
manufacturers shall cover all their equipment in
accordance with pertinent sections of this specification.
In addition to component maintenance manuals required by
this specification, manufacturers of customer furnished
equipment shall prepare documentation following the
standards of this specification as applicable which will
describe the equipment, tell how to install it, show how
to check it for proper operation after installation, and
provide procedures and troubleshooting guides for
maintaining it in service."
One of the more painful lessons learned from many previous
space projects is that, lacking timely imposition of understandable
requirements, subcontractor and supplier documentation will be
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provided in a variety of formats and qualities. Some will be
almost useless, or even misleading, and some will be individually
excellent. However, even the individuallylexcellent documentation
will generally be unique and not readily correlatable with other
documentation in the same program. This situation results in
inefficient and therefore relatively large maintenance staffs
because technicians must specialize in a narrow set of equipment or
subsystem elements in order to remember data that should be readily
available through documentation.
Proper timing of the imposition of requirements is also
critically important to ensure that designers of new equipment will
be responsible for provision of 0 & M documentation as well as
design documentation. This approach will assure that 0 & M is
appropriately considered during the design process, and that
documentation is prepared up front by those most capable of
preparing it. Up front preparation is even more important since
the advent of CAD/CAM/CAE technology because timely imposition of
requirements across the board will assure that 0 & M documentation
for the entire system can be electronically prepared, stored, and
intelligently accessed as a subset of the system data base.
4.2.3 Launch abort warninq time measurements.
The determination of launch abort warning time raises several
questions:
I. What indicators are required to provide at least a 2 second
warning of launch escape?
2. How does the crew and vehicle escape system get the warning
signal?
3. What is the role of health monitoring system in launch
escape?
Responses to these questions are addressed below:
Question i- Required indicator. The Martin Marietta Corp.
Advanced Programs, Denver, Colorado, organized a telephone
conversation to discuss the hazardous conditions which could
develop on the TITAN IV. The telephone conversation included
representatives from the following disciplines: Propellants,
Avionics, Electrical, Guidance and Control. The following
information was obtained:
TITAN IV Catastrophic Hazards:
Countdown Phase. The conditions at the TITAN pad were
considered relatively safe and stable up to T-31.7 seconds
when the transfer of power is made from ground to the TITAN
on-board systems. The pad work crew actually departs the pad
at about T-30 minutes. At T-20 seconds, the on-board
destruction system is armed.
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The real potential for a PLS abort begins at T-1 second
or at SRM/Core Stage 0 ignition. The major possibilities for a
catastrophic event lie in the propulsion and control systems.
No danger exists until engine ignition followed by subsequent
lift-off (150 milliseconds).
Lift-off/Ascent. From ignition through ascent, potential
conditions which could drive an abort exists. As mentioned
above under the countdown phase, the major potential for
catastrophic failure lies in the propellant and control
systems.
SRM, This type of failure may present a warning only in
milliseconds if it is structural, or, in adequate time if the
failure is a slow degradation. Within the last 20 years,
TITAN IV 34D experienced one SRM case failure at T+8 seconds.
The time to destruction was in milliseconds - insufficient
time for a PLS escape.
Liquid. This type of failure should be detectable through
instrumentation and allow adequate time for a PLS escape if
conditions so warrant. A liquid failure may cause shutdown of
an engine(s). This situation may not be catastrophic but may
jeopardize the success of the mission. Within the last 20
years, TITAN 34D had a propellant failure characterized by a
low thrust indication. There was, in fact, a large leak. The
vehicle remained stable but the propellant pump ceased
operation resulting in the shutdown of an engine.
Core Break-up. The TITAN IV has an inadvertent separation
self-destruct system (ISDS) which senses TITAN structural
break-up and starts a sequence which terminates in destruction
at 20-30 milliseconds after initiation. The PLS could not
escape without more warning time.
Actuators. Thrust actuators control the flight path of
the vehicle as well as the loads on the structures. These
actuators are commanded by guidance and driven by hydraulic
systems. A hydraulic failure or mechanical failure in the
actuator could result in a catastrophic event.
A vehicle at high velocity and high load pressure (MAX Q
BAR) which experiences a sudden change in trajectory or
initiation of a tumble could end in a catastrophic event. The
PLS could not stand the stress. The warning could be in
milliseconds. Hydraulic systems or mechanical failure could
be the cause. If one or two actuators failed, guidance might
be able to compensate. Under those conditions, the PLS may be
able to escape if conditions dictated that path.
Of the 14 TITAN 34D's launched, two have experienced a
catastrophic failure. One of these was a hydraulic failure
resulting in a loss of control: it instantaneously diverged
from the planned flight path. Failures like this may not be
survivable.
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Other Failure Modes:
Avionics. Avionics failures are not likely to cause a
catastrophic event but should allow time for abort
preparation, planning, and execution should conditions warrant
- given some flight control.
Guidance, Navigation, and Control. A failure of this
software/control system could cause a catastrophic event.
Monitoring of the TITAN IV should provide warning but whether
this is adequate for sufficient time to escape depends on the
individual failure.
SRM Instrumentation Power Failure. This type of failure
indicates that SRM instrumentation measurements are unusable.
This may not alone indicate a catastrophic event.
Ouestion 2- Escape warnina. This action is answered by Figure
4-8, data taken from the Titan IV User Handbook (Reference 4-2),
and telephone discussions with the Martin Marrietta Corp., Denver,
Colorado. Figure 4-10 represents the derived data. The interface
between the PLS and the TITAN is through a connector at the 2492
skirt. This is used by the Inertial Upper Stage (IUS). From this
connector, cable would be routed to a hardware connection point
where all TITAN measurements are obtainable.
When the crew is on board the PLS and the PLS systems are in
operation, the PLS on-board computers could monitor TITAN health
through telemetry obtained through the interface described above.
Expert Systems can rapidly analyze conditions which are off-
nominal, identifying faults and predicting degradation of TITAN
systems, mission completion probability, PLS survivability and the
need for abort from the period of time beginning at T-40 seconds
and extending through the ascent phase. If an immediate abort
becomes necessary, without human intervention, the PLS software
would sound the crew alarm and execute the abort sequence. If an
abort is imminent, the PLS software will sound the alarm and
provide time for crew preparation before executing the abort
sequence with manual override enabled.
Question 3- Role of health monitorina system. The role of the
health monitoring system in the Launch Escape System is to:
• Detect out-of-nominal TITAN IV conditions.
• Analyze True Conditions - Look at all measurements which
would support or refute the detected condition.
• Determine the threat of the condition to the crew, PLS,
mission and command the appropriate action for the current
phase of the mission profile.
• Keep the crew & ground informed via telemetry, crew
instrumentation/displays, and warning indications of TITAN
health and out-of-nominal conditions.
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Figure 4-10. PLS Abort Assessment - Titan IV.
• Display expert system information or several levels of data
strata down to an individual measurement for individual
selection.
• Execute the appropriate abort sequence software if an abort
is necessary.
• Track the TITAN ascent GN&C for nominal computation during
lift-off to TITAN separation. Deviations would dictate a
possible abort condition. A possible solution to a TITAN IV
Guidance problem might be for the PLS to become a back-up for
TITAN (this was used in Apollo).
The responses to the launch abort question indicate that: i)
the need to execute an abort of the PLS using the abort motors may
only be for T-40 seconds through the ascent phase, 2) systems which
could cause catastrophic events which might not be survivable are:
structural - SRM/Core break-up; control - GN&C, control actuators,
hydraulic failures, and 3) warning time varies with the type
failure. The most catastrophic occur in milliseconds but these
failures are rare. The NSTS lives with the similar possibilities.
The PLS can monitor TITAN systems and detect other failures and
make an escape, and 4) more instrumentation can be added to the
TITAN.
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Figure 4-11. Technician Manhours Estimated for Maintenance Actions
on Each System.
4.2.4 Detailed SUPPOrt Estimate
Our estimate of the range of technician hours expected for
maintenance actions on each system are summarized in Figure 4-11
for the ground operations and processing analysis. Following is an
explanation of the analysis on which Figure 4-11 is based:
• Basic maintenance manpower requirements for each system
were estimated using ATA 100 standards. These estimates were
then adjusted upward to account for relatively high
operational complexity of PLS due to the launch site
operational environment and the uniqueness of manned
spacecraft. The values derived in the estimation process are
summarized in Figure 4-7.
• The range of technician-hour requirements was then
estimated by applying an uncertainty factor of ± 20% to these
launch site adjustments. The rationale for this method is
that since the amount of the adjustment is an indication of
PLS relative operational complexity, the range of processing
man-hours required should be proportionately greater for those
subsystems with large adjustments. This step of the process
is summarized in Figure 4-12.
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ATA
SYSTEM TITLE
ATA MAN- LAUNCH SITE "+ 20 % "- 20 % PERCEIVED _ MIN
HOURSPER ADJUSTMENT _RTAINTY UNCERTAINTY VALUE VALUE VALUE
72 FLT HRS MAM'IOtJI_
21 AIR CONDITIONING 29.71 193 231.8 154.4 222.71 261.31 184.11
23 COMP,BJMCATIONS 18.06 24 28.8 19.2 42.06 46.86 37.26
24 ELECTRICAL POWER 5.81 101 121.2 80.8 106.81 127.01 88.61
25 EQUIPMENT & FURN. 9.55 56 67.2 44.8 65.55 76.75 54.35
28 FIRE PROTECTION 3.43 0 0 0 3.43 3.43 3.43
27 FUGHT CONTROt.S 12.61 22 26.4 17.6 34.61 39.01 30.21
28 FUEL SYSTEMS 6.35 104 124.8 83.2 110.35 131.15 89.55
31 INSTRUMENTS 0.24 20 24 1 6 20.24 24.24 16.24
32 LANDING GEAR 14.57 178 213.6 142.4 192.57 228.17 156.97
33 LIGHTS 2.21 5 6 4 7.21 8.21 6.21
34 FLIGHT DAT/VMGMT 15.46 0 0 0 15.48 15.48 15.48
35 _ 2.36 1 6 19.2 12.8 18.36 21.58 15.18
3 8 WATER/WASTE 4.33 8 9.6 6.4 12.33 13,93 10.73
52 DOORS 3.11 32 38.4 25.6 35.11 41.51 28.71
53 _ 2.11 84 76.8 51.2 66.11 78.91 53.31
55 STABILIZER 0.38 16 19.2 12.8 16.36 19.56 13.16
56 WINDONS 0.32 84 76.8 51.2 64.32 77.12 51.52
57 WINGS 2.09 32 38.4 25.6 34.09 40.49 27.69
58 71-1ERMALCONTROL 33.61 232 278.4 185.6 265.81 312.01 219.21
72 ENGIhES 15.96 132 158.4 105.6 147.96 174.38 121.58
Figure 4-12. Range of Manpower Values Expected for Maintenance
Actions on Each System.
The skill level of all PLS technicians is required to be
extremely high. As a minimum, each must be a licensed A & P
Technician, must have completed certificated formalized A&P
training at a nationally recognized institution, and must have a
minimum of 5 years experience directly related to maintenance of
subsystems used in the PLS. This skill level is necessary to
enable efficient operations through self-certification of work and
cross utilization of technicians. Thus, individual technicians
will certify much of their own work across functional areas (e.g.
de-servicing and safing, inspection and maintenance, and
integration and launch). This approach, combined with built-in-
test (BIT) capability, permits a small staff of highly qualified
A&P Technicians to support a range of launch rates up to i0 or 12
flights per year using a one-in-flow, five day week, single shift
approach. Figure 4-13 demonstrates this capability, and shows that
above i0 or 12 flights per year manpower requirements would start
to increase rapidly, and a two-in-flow or multi-shift operation
would be considered for implementation.
A 31-day (43 calendar days) processing flow was developed.
This flow accommodates 8 launches per year using a single eight
hour shift, five days per week. The flow was developed from the
maintenance manhours developed for the airline data base
supplemented by Shuttle experience. Figure 4-14 identifies the
overall flow concept and identifies requirements for major
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Figure 4-14. PLS Processing is Accomplished Effectively in 43
Calendar Days (One Shift Operation).
facilities and support systems.
facilities will be required:
Based on this flow, three new
1. PLS Deservice & Pyro Safe Facility (D&PSF) (See
Figure 4-15),
2. Horizontal Processing Facility (HPF) (See Figure 4-16),
3. Adapter processing Facility (APF) (See Figure 4-17).
The facilities are further defined in Reference 4-1. In
addition, significant Titan Launch Complex (LC-40/41) modifications
will be required to accommodate PLS as a Titan IV payload, as
indicated in Figure 4-18. Recognizing, of course, that another
launch system such as ALS may be used. Reference 4-1 also provides
pertinent information on modification and use of existing Titan IV
facilities and operations. An additional major support system
which will be required is the Emergency Egress, and Search and
Rescue system.
NOTE: Although the ELV analysis was accomplished on a Titan IV
vehicle, we believe that the functional interfaces to any ELV
would be basically the same. The primary function within this
task was to derive requirements against the ELV to assure safe
efficient operations.
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Figure 4-17. PLS Adaptor Processing Facility.
The Horizontal Processing Facility (HPF) contains four bays
consistent with the baseline fleet size of four vehicles. This
facility design provides flexibility to start with one bay fully
outfitted for processing one-in-flow, and expanding to two bays for
two-in-flow if launch rates start to exceed I0 or 12 per year. In
addition, adequate capability is provided for a variety of
configurations to accommodate such potential requirements as surge
storage of ready vehicles, or long term contingency major
maintenance, without choking ongoing critical path operational
flow. It would be possible to defer some front end costs by
constructing the facility in phases, starting with 2 bays and
adding additional bays as needed.
The De-servicing and Safing Facility (D&PSF) provides a remote
PLS de-fueling and pyrotechnic safing location. It is also a
readily available shelter for SSF crew and equipment down load
during inclement weather. Due to its relatively low utilization, a
NATO aircraft type shelter with support space provided in a 256 sq.
ft. trailer is seen as adequate for this requirement.
The Adapter Processing Facility (APF) is remotely located to
provide for "clear area" processing and checkout of the adapter.
PLS/booster separation motors are processed in this facility.
4.2.5 Implementation
PLS will be operated within the KSC organizational framework
and will be supported by the base support infrastructure, however,
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Figure 4-18. Launch Pad Facilities.
operations in the D&PSF, HPF, and APF will be completely off-line,
separate from and independent of other flight programs at KSC.
Figure 4-19 illustrates the launch site organizational team for
PLS. It does not include the base support organization. This
independence is critical to implementation of the A & P Technician
concept because the concept is not fully compatible with any other
space flight program at KSC. Operations in the above three
dedicated facilities offers the most opportunity for dramatic
improvement in efficiency through use of the A & P Technician
concept. The ratios of management to technician levels are further
defined below.
The PLS functional area which will not be separate and
independent from other programs and which may interfere with
efficient operations is the Titan IV integration and launch area at
Launch Complex (LC 40/41). Figure 4-20 shows the baseline Titan IV
processing flow which requires 27 weeks. PLS uses Titan IV as a
reference baseline because Titan is a relatively mature system, its
interfaces are well understood, and processing data are available.
However, because Titan has several users competing for limited
launch opportunities, scheduling problems are likely. The PLS
approach to minimizing these problems is to simplify interfaces
thereby minimizing Pad operations and providing flexibility to fly
on alternate vehicles or from alternate launch pads. While
Titan IV uses LC-40/41 as the baseline, the analyses indicates
there is a variety of launch vehicle options which could
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Figure 4-20. Titan IV Processing Flow.
accommodate PLS in the future. These range from Titan IV launched
from LC-39, to future transportation system elements (e.g. ALS or
Shuttle-derived Liquid Rocket Boosters) launched from LC-39 or a
new site. The simple-interface approach projected here will
enhance system flexibility to take advantage of the full range of
launch vehicle options.
4-30
4.2.6 Staffina Levels
During the study, various levels of manpower were evaluated
that would be required if we varied the turnaround times. Using a
flight rate of 8 flights per year and varying turnaround time, we
found that 31 days (direct-hands on time) was an optimum point to
meet the launch schedule and minimize the manpower loading. This
came from Figure 4-13 on the "knee" of the curve.
Technician staffing was developed from the definition of
processing flow. The flow considered elapsed time for maintenance
tasks and skills required. Matrices were developed showing
manhours per skill required by processing line items and processing
days. Summing the manhours per skill per day provided the number
of technicians required per day for each of the four skill levels
identified previously. The concepts of using four basic skills,
highly trained A&P technicians and some degree of cross training
provides an efficient approach to maintenance and inspection tasks.
An allowance of 12 percent has been included to account for sick
leave, vacation, and holidays. It is also expected that when not
actually needed for processing, technicians would either be
enhancing their skills though training, or would be performing
minor repairs in the shops.
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Figure 4-21. Launch Site Staffing.
Figure 4-21 shows the overall PLS Launch Site organization and
staffing level for flight rates up to 10 or 12 per year. The core
of the staff is the 22 A&P technicians required for inspection and
maintenance. Other staff positions are derived from the nature of
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the project (e.g. Director, Ground Operations). Staff size was
estimated by a bottoms up approach, and was cross checked with
support staff to technician ratios of other programs such as
Shuttle. The small total staff required for PLS relative to other
programs such as Shuttle is a direct result of the small number
(22) of technicians required. For comparison purposes, the ratio
for each staff classification compared to the Shuttle is shown.
The STS figures shown are pre STS-51L. Many of the ratios are
quite similar. Where major differences occur, they are because of
differences in function or because certain minimum personnel are
needed regardless of total staffing.
4.3 FLIGHT OPERATIONS
Our operations analysis approach for mission and flight
operations for PLS was to develop a standard system for preparing
documentation and processes that can be used on all flights for PLS
Design Reference Mission (DRM-I, SSF crew rotation; KSC to SSF and
return). We have baselined our data to reflect the STS mission
elements that drive costs and manpower. From this data base, we
have extracted flight and mission specific tasks that relate to the
PLS and developed a distinct flight and mission planning scenario.
Our approach was to: 1) maximize standardization of flight systems,
missions, groundrules and constraints, mission rules, procedures,
and processes and products, and 2) build and utilize a knowledge
base for flight crews, ground support personnel, and automated
systems. The knowledge base buildup requires the following
criteria to be in place for cost effective operations.
1) Flight Crew
Re-fly dedicated crews for "tour of duty"
Minimize simulator time to certification
Maximize auto-land capability
Provide refresher training for "off-tour" veterans
2) Ground Support Personnel
Subset of shuttle ascent/entry teams
Core set of mission managers (rotate flight crews)
On-call support during docked operations (after arrival
and before departure)
3) Artificial Intelligence
Use vehicle information
Use ground system data bases
Stream line support requirements
We assessed current NSTS Mission Operations to determine which
processes, methods, and products used by the NSTS would be
necessary and applicable to the PLS. PLS flight operations program
control documentation has been outlined, along with flight and
mission documentation. Flight Design analysis requirements have
been outlined, along with post-flight evaluation needs. This work
has led to an understanding of how to develop the PLS mission
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operations capability. We developedpreliminary staffing levels
and cost estimates also as a result of this work.
4,3.1 Task Analyses
In our study of flight and mission operations planning
activity, we followed the STS documentation process, as a point of
departure. From this analysis process we then tailored the PLS
requirements based on its mission uniqueness. The STS requires
that the flight documentation process be repeated every flight due
to the unique mission requirements associated with each flight.
The re-configuration requirements for each payload impacts the
flight software requirements and also drives the amount of flight
planning documentation. Figure 4-22 illustrates the approach we
used in developing our data base. As illustrated in Figure 4-23,
the amount of savings that can be seen for the PLS is quite
significant; this is based on the DRM-I mission to Space Station
Freedom and return. Any changes to the mission requirements would
impact operational costs due to consequent changes to the re-
configuration and flight requirements.
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Figure 4-22. PLS Flight Operations Study Approach.
Mission and flight operations timelines were developed using
the NASA JSC flight design and crew activity plan software tools.
These data were used in assessing the overall requirements
associated with crew planning, mission support, and flight data
recording and processing. One of the key items that must be
addressed in later studies is the use of existing NSTS and SSF
mission support during flight for PLS. This can reduce overall
sustaining costs and management systems that are necessary to
maintain a full time team for PLS. The flight design trajectory
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Figure 4-23. NSTS Contractor vs PLS Flight Operations Support.
tape was used for the DRM-1 timeline. The first DRM-1 results
indicated that a long mission first day (18.5 hours for crew) could
exist if the launch vehicle inserted the PLS in a 50 by 100 NM
orbit with a phase angle of 40 ° . Since that run, a reduction in
phase angle to determine an optimum mission (approximately a 15
hour day) was evaluated. Also, in cooperation with the Martin Titan
Commercial vehicle team, the latest Titan envelope was defined: it
indicates that a Titan can provide a 85 by 90 NM insertion orbit
and a capability for a lift weight of more than 45,000 ibs. Using
these data, new timelines can be generated to assess first
day/hours more accurately.
Detail analyses of each function in Figure 4-24 was
accomplished to "size" the manpower requirements for PLS. It was
also used to determine what requirements were needed to support
PLS. The overall mission planning requirements for STS
(Figure 4-25) were tailored to meet the operations flight test
program, and finally to meet a fully mature PLS operations program.
These data were then used to determine manpower and resources
needed to meet PLS mission planning requirements. One major item
to note is that the payload driven mission requirements for STS are
not required for PLS. The schedule depicted in Figure 4-26
identifies the final size of a mission plan cycle of seven months.
Post flight evaluation for the NSTS is performed on each
flight to evaluate actual performance vs. predicted performance to
verify margins and refine analytical tools. The PLS post flight
evaluation is required for OFT and then the effort can be reduced
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Through Functional Flow Analyses.
once the operational data bases are complete. The primary function
for PLS post flight analysis will be to resolve anomalies and in-
flight accuracies. Figure 4-27 illustrates this philosophy.
4.3.2 Procedures
Procedures identified for the
PLS flight and mission segment of
this project were classified into
three basic categories:
• Program Management and
Control Procedures
• Mission Support Procedures
• Flight Support Procedures
Proqram manaqement and control
procedures. The initial Program
Management and Control documents
were identified and a development
I-_ . _--_--'¢. _--"
OFT FLIGHTS
/
/
Figure 4-27.
Evaluation.
PLS Post Flight
schedule prepared which started the process 30 months before the
first operational flight test (OFT) flight date and called for
completion at 13 months before the flight. This set of documents
cascades down from the project "Baseline Operations Plan" which
establishes the roles and responsibilities of the PLS flight
operations team.
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Figure 4-26. PLS-I Mission Plan.
Mission suooort procedures. The PLS Mission Support
Procedures are a living set of documents that provide the
guidelines for conducting PLS missions. The basic document set
consists of:
• Groundrules and Constraints
• PLS Operations Data Books
• Control Center Console Hndbks
• PLS Readiness Plans
• Mission Rules
• PLS Systems Hndbks
• PLS Training Plans
These documents are reviewed on a flight-to-flight basis to
verify any changes to the mission requirements or PLS flight or
ground systems which have been addressed and incorporated into the
mission operations baseline.
Fliqht support procedures. The flight support procedures for
PLS missions are contained in the PLS flight data file. This set
of documents was derived from the NSTS flight data file inventory
list. The procedures required to execute the PLS design reference
mission have been identified from the NSTS list and the initial
development support estimated for the first flight and recurring
maintenance for the subsequent flights.
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Documentation reuuirements. The flight operations and
missions data/documentation required for PLS consists of the
following plan and documents:
• Baseline operations plan • Configuration mgmt plan
• Flight design hndbks • Crew activity planning hndbks
• Flight procedures mgmt plan • Control center readiness plan
• Ground procedures mgmt plan • Software mgmt plan
• Operational data mgmt • Training records mgmt
• Flight data file production hndbks
Our estimates used the STS Flight and Mission support data and
networks to formulate the PLS estimates. The major reduction in
manpower requirements was for Flight Design re-configuration
criteria. The STS flies each flight in a unique configuration.
This requires extensive modification to the flight software to
support the payload community. PLS does not have this requirement
for the reference mission (to SSF and back). By standardizing
flight and ground procedures, a verified baseline can be used to
initiate each flight with a minimum of changes to cover I-loads,
and day of flight data. The use of automated tools for
modification and production of flight design and crew activities
reduces the overall support costs considerably. The establishment
of an overall configuration management function that control all
PLS program activities reduces the current conflicts in data that
STS often experiences. Establishment of common data bases across
PLS will also reduce support costs experienced in the areas of
maintenance, logistics, launch and recovery, and flight operations.
We have identified a set of minimum flight documents which
include! ascent checklist, post-insertion checklist (includes
rendezvous and docking/berthing), deactivation/activation
checklist, entry checklist, emergency landing, crew activity plan,
Que cards, malfunction procedures, star charts, contingency abort
procedures, contingency de-orbit preparations, systems data book,
and medical checklist. The mission documentation will consist of
mission rules, console handbooks, PLS operational data, PLS systems
handbook, PLS training plan, and flight readiness plan. This set
of data becomes the baseline set that each mission is built on.
Modifications are required only when the performance of the PLS is
changed. Changes to accommodate the specific mission are
considered minimal compared to the STS (see Figure 4-23). As
illustrated in the figure, the STS requires much more flight design
data due to its unique flight to flight mission requirements and
the reconfigurations necessary to support the payloads.
The PLS design reference mission (DRM-I) analyses covered; i)
a three-day nominal mission, 2) a two-day alternate mission, 3) use
of KSC as prime site for return (with alternate return sites at
Edwards, Northrop, Guam, and Hawaii), 4) launch window and vehicle
assessment (using Martin Titan Commercial data for performance
parameters), and 5) determination of rendezvous sequence and entry
g-load assessment.
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4.3._ Mission operations assessment
A function-by-function analysis of the NSTS flight operations
process has been performed. A cradle-to-grave approach was taken,
from mission authorization through post-flight evaluation. NSTS
contractor support levels were determined. PLS operational
assumptions were applied, and the NSTS processes were adapted for
both the PLS Orbital Flight Test (OFT) and mature operations
environments. We have estimated the OFT Flight Design template to
be 13 months and the mature operations template to be six months.
NSTS Mission Operations orchestrates all facilities,
equipment, personnel, and processes required to accomplish pre-
mission planning and real-time support. Among the pre-mission
planning tasks are trajectory analysis, consumables analysis,
mission procedures, flight rules, ground and flight software
upgrades, data base management, and flight crew and flight
controller training. The major real-time mission support tasks are
actual troubleshooting, procedures and timeline support and
updates, in-flight maintenance support, medical support, and search
and rescue coordination. We found that all of these processes are
necessary for PLS operations. However, the resources devoted to
most of these items can be significantly reduced in a mature PLS
program because of the relatively limited scope of its mission.
The development of operations requirements from a flight and
missions standpoint that impact design include: i) use of embedded
diagnostics that annunciate faults to crew (and ground if
requested), 2) a method to monitor fuel and consumables for loads
assessments, 3) standardization of resource monitors that provide
operational information in actual values (in pounds, time,
distance, etc.), 4) minimizing flight-to-flight re-configurations
requirement to reduce manpower and tasks (flight software/I-loads),
5) optimized designs to ease upgradability in hardware, software,
and testing, 6) maximize performance with robust system designs to
handle established margins (based on alternate DRM's that do not
impact PLS envelope).
Figure 4-28 illustrates the flight and mission support
operations development schedule that is required for the Ist PLS
launch. This schedule represents the "operations capability
development (OCD)" and "operational flight test (OFT)" program
activities. Each element has been costed separately in order to
determine projected costs for DDT&E WBS elements. The template for
OFT has been set at 13 months, and for PLS mature operations at 6
months.
4.3.4 Key Mission Operations Assumptions
Key to the flight design effort is the understanding of boost
vehicle performance characteristics. The Titan IV was used as the
test case for our analyses. Newer flight performance data have
been developed by Martin Marrietta for the Titan IV upgrade that
indicates that we now can have more margin in the PLS to support
flight and rendezvous operations to SSF. By using GPS rendezvous
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Figure 4-28. Flight Mission Operations Planning Schedule.
and tracking capability, we gain approximately three hours of time
to make rendezvous. This projects a day of launch crew day of
approximately 15 hours versus the projected time of 18 hours for
the initial rendezvous sequence. Continued studies on the Titan IV
to reduce launch processing time are underway and will be used in
new assessments of the PLS and the Advanced Launch System (ALS)
booster requirements.
PLS operations will differ greatly from the NSTS. Based on
these differences, we have formulated seven key assumptions. They
are:
i. Payload-specific activities are eliminated because the
DRM-I payload always consists of 8 passengers and associated
baggage.
2. In-depth flight design analysis will be accomplished
during OFT. Testing will verify DRM-I capability and define
operational limitations. Only minor variations due to SSF
orbital parameters will be allowed during mature operations.
3. There will be no flight-specific onboard avionics
reconfiguration because they will be baselined during OFT.
4. There will be no flight-specific ground software
reconfiguration because it will be baselined during OFT.
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5. The DRM-I timeline is to be standardized, with only minor
variations in time allowed due to SSF orbital parameters.
There will be no variations in content.
6. Standard Groundrules & Constraints and Flight Rules are to
be developed during OFT. There will be no effort to optimize
each flight to obtain the last "inch, pound, and mile" of
performance.
7. Because of the above items, the Flight Data File and all
training can be minimized, simplified, and standardized.
4.3.5 PLS_Mission Operations
PLS Flight Operations includes launch and maneuvering into the
SSF orbit, attached operations, and return to Earth. Launch
includes liftoff, ascent, orbit, and rendezvous and docking with
SSF. Attached operations include crew transfer, system statusing,
vehicle loading, and crew briefings. Return includes undocking,
separation from SSF, de-orbit preparations, entry, and landing.
DRM-I will be either a two or three day mission, with launch
and nominal landing at KSC. Rendezvous and docking with SSF will
be accomplished on the first day, at about nine hours after launch,
with the crew sleep period to begin three hours later. Note that
the greater navigational accuracy offered by the Global Positioning
System is necessary to achieve this goal.
4.3.6 Fli_ht Operations qo_Is
One of the major goals of the PLS is to design for flight
operations. Just as the vehicle itself will be designed for ease
of maintenance, the PLS infrastructure must be designed to
facilitate the operations. In order to accomplish this, it is
necessary to integrate operations with SSF, NSTS, and the ELY while
minimizing those interfaces where practical; and by maximizing the
use of pre-planned procedures and tools. Flight Crew and Flight
Controller procedures should be standardized to the maximum
practical extent. By this we can simplify and minimize the human
element in Mission Operations activities.
Expert systems will be developed and used extensively in
preflight analysis and in the Mission Control Center. Initial
qualification training and techniques and procedures development
for Flight Crews and Flight Controllers require high fidelity
integrated simulations starting at least 6 months prior to the
first OFT flight. However, once trained and certified, crews can
be assigned for specified operational tours, and then will form a
cadre of instructors to train their replacements. This approach
stabilizes the workforce, thus minimizing training requirements
during mature PLS operations while maximizing the experience base.
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4.3.7 Petailed SupPort Estimates
The flight operations detailed support estimates for the PLS
study were developed for the operational capability development
project phase, for the OFT flight phase, and for the PLS mature
operations phase of the project. Figure 4-29 identifies the
schedule for developing the functional plans and documents needed
to support flight and mission operations development efforts.
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Figure 4-29. Program Control Documentation Development.
4.3.8 Fliqht Operations Capability Development
During the flight operations capability development phase,
support estimates were prepared to cover the labor and materials
associated with the design and development of the following flight
operations systems:
• Flight Design System
• PLS Dynamic Simulator
• PLS Scheduling System
• PLS I-G Trainer
• PLS Training Aircraft
• Crew Activity Planning System
• PLS Control Center
The development schedules were prepared using system software
design, test, and integration as the pacing item for the ADPE based
systems. The I-G trainer and PLS training aircraft development
focused on long-lead items and modifications cycle, respectively,
to determine the development schedule.
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The required operational facilities were identified to
complete the flight operations capability development. The
facilities required are:
• Flight Design System Facility • PLS Control Center
• PLS Computer-based Trng Facility • PLS Simulator Facility
• PLS Training Aircraft Facility • PLS 1-G Trainer Facility
• Crew Activity Planning System Facility
All facilities are required to support computer based systems
except for the support to the PLS training aircraft. The facility
estimates were based on square footage and environmental
requirements.
OFT Fliqht Operations. The preparation cycle for the PLS OFT
flights is estimated to be performed over a 13-month template. The
support estimates addressed the following functions:
• Flight Design & Trajectory Data • Crew Activity Planning
• Flight and Mission Documentation • Computer-based Training
• PLS Aircraft Training • PLS Simulation Training
• PLS I-G Training • PLS Real Time Support
These activities for the OFT flights were estimated at the
levels to support a project development phase and provided full
time mission support during the OFT flights. It was also assumed
that the OFT phase would validate the operations concept and
support the creation of the flight operations data base.
PLS Mature Operations. The preparation cycle for the PLS
mature operations flights is estimated to be performed over a 6-
month template. The mature operations preparation cycle has been
streamlined in terms of function durations and support levels.
Reuse of flight and ground products is anticipated with only minor
updates required on flight-to-flight basis. The support estimates
for PLS flight operations functions were developed and submitted
for inclusion and basis of estimate for the PLS life cycle cost.
Estimatinq Fliqht and Mission Resource and Manpower
Reauirements. In order to establish credible requirements, our
flight and mission analyses were accomplished within the guidelines
established in the functional flow block diagram for flight
operations (Figure 4-30). We have developed estimates of manpower,
software, facilities, and support networks based on functional
requirements. These analyses indicated that we required 13 months
(serial time) to develop and operational flight test (OFT) template
and 6 months to maintain a PLS template during mature operations.
DRM-I was assessed from a nominal and alternate mission
requirements. This was accomplished using the PLS guidelines and
assumptions. Titan IV performance was used to determine the PLS
flight time to Space Station and return. Figure 4-31 illustrates
the timeline that is developed for the data set. The revised orbit
data indicate a reduction of three hours rendezvous time using
improved booster data.
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Figure 4-30. PLS Flight Operations Process.
Figure 4-31. 72-hour Mission Timeline.
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One of the major reductions in PLS flight and mission
operations documentation development is the use of standard mission
data sets for training and flight. This can be accomplished once
the crew training has been completed during operational flight test
program. A major reduction in PLS versus STS manpower is possible
since the PLS has a mission specific task of going to SSF and not
the unique tasks associated with new missions and payloads every
flight.
Our mission control operations support concept is summarized
in Figure 4-32. From this philosophy we have derived the
processing documentation requirements for each mission support
position. This concept reduces
the support costs that impact
real-time operations support
activities.
Post flight cost elements
include the associated resources
needed for: operational
capability development,
operational flight test, and
mature operations. The basic
software and hardware system
development along with the
development labor and facility
costs were addressed. Other
factors were system
lease/maintenance costs, spares,
maintenance and operations (M&O),
and training of the operations
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personnel. Common support and non-productive costs were addressed
for all program phases.
4.3.9 _mplementation
PLS flight operations implementation and assumptions were
derived using the NSTS process as a starting point and evaluating
each shuttle flight operations function for PLS applicability. The
PLS flight operations concept features a management and
organization approach which has a dedicated flight manager assigned
to each specific PLS flight. It is the flight managers'
responsibility to initiate and monitor each mission in terms of
baseline requirements and work authorizations for each functional
support area.
Real-time support requirements for the PLS in the area of
mission support are identified in Figure 4-33. The on call
positions are for those periods that the PLS is at the Space
Station. During flight operations, each position will be supported
full-time.
Within each functional area there will be a lead individual
assigned to supervise the activities and product deliveries for
each specific flight in production. Functional "teams" will be
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Figure 4-33. PLS Real Time
Support Requirements.
assigned to flights on a rotating
basis. This is also true for the
flight crew and mission support
personnel. The functional areas
include:
• Flight Design
• Crew Activity Planning
• Flight/Mission Documentation
• Training
• Real Time Support
• Facility M&O Support
• Common Support
• Sustaining Engineering
This approach allows the optimum
support level to support the flight
rate over the life of the project. It
is expected that increased efficiency
and experience gained will allow
incremental steps in the flight rate to be supported with the
baseline support levels.
4.3.10 Staffinq Levels
PLS flight operations production templates were developed for
the OFT and mature operation flight cycles. Based on the function
duration as reflected in the template and the man-year estimates to
perform the tasks, staffing levels were derived and provided to the
cost analysis team as the basis-of-estimate for the life cycle
costs. NSTS resource allocations were used as references to
determine the ratio of engineers to technicians for the PLS
staffing. Except for the real-time support to the OFT flights and
specified control center position support to mature flight
operations the PLS support was conducted on a one shift per day,
five day per week schedule.
The PLS flight operation staffing levels are summarized in
Reference 4-1. It explains the rationale for PLS staffing
estimates, and provides a recommended NASA role consistent with PLS
operating concepts. Table 4-4 identifies the headcount estimates
based on the functional tasks associated with flight and mission
operations.
The staffing levels for PLS flight operations have been
estimated using a bottom-up approach based on a function-by-
function analysis. The specific functions were deemed applicable
to the PLS DRM-I scenario• As alternative DRMs are addressed a
review of the functions should be accomplished to identify
adjustments necessitated by additional mission requirements•
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Table 4-4.
Control.
Headcount Estimate for Flight Planning and Mission
Functional breakdown
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4.3.11 Trade Study - Automation of FliuhtlMission Plannina
(Trade T7)
The mission planning trades centered on the options associated
with the ground network that interfaces with the flight and crew
planning activities. The primary objective was to trade use of
increasing levels of automation in the mission planning activities.
We evaluated the STS operational resources and planned automation
efforts that would have PLS application. Figure 4-34 identifies
the STS/PLS resource assessments that were analyzed.
The flight design and crew planning activity were two
candidates for automation. This is due to the similarity in the
software packages and the need to verify the data between each
plan. The interface between these packages mainly deals with
trajectory data and which occurs by transmittal of a magnetic tape
referred to as a "Super Tape". If these systems were to reside on
a common host computer systems, certain benefits could be realized
in terms of data management, maintenance and software lease costs.
Figure 4-35 illustrates the existing and candidate configuration
for modifying the current automated mission planning process.
The automation of the PLS flight and crew activity planning
data is highly recommended. However, the cost associated with such
an effort is considered to be high (approximately $5M for
development and integration). Further study of this area is
required since the use of commercial packages was not evaluated.
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Figure 4-34. STS/PLS Resources Assessment.
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Figure 4-35. Mission Planning Automation.
Although one of the major factors in this study that dealt
with subsystem design of the PLS on-board equipment was not
addressed here, it was addressed by the flight and crew planning
teams during the timeline analyses. These data were used in the
development of guidelines that define operational constraints
against the flight architecture. It is our plan to document these
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requirements during the continuing studies currently planned.
Traceability of requirements in this area should lead to a robust
system with good margins to minimize flight Software re-
configurations for each flight.
4.4 SUPPORTABILITY
The primary objectives for the logistics analysis activity has
been to provide supportability data (spares, repair, manuals,
maintenance training, depot support, transportation, warehousing,
and support equipment) to the design and costing teams. These data
included spares quantities, GSE listings, off-equipment
training/certification requirements, repair estimates, depot
support personnel requirements, and predicted repair quantities
based on our spares and repair models.
4.4.1 Task Analysis
The logistics support concept has been determined by first
examining the factors that drive logistics. Off-line maintenance
drives the logistics support requirement from a maintenance aspect.
Three types of resources are required; i) spare vehicle LRU's and/
or maintenance consumables, 2) support equipment, and 3)
technicians. There is also a fourth but intangible resource
consumed and that is time. In determining support resources: i)
warehousing, 2) support equipment spares, 3) test equipment for
support equipment, 4) personnel training, and 5) operations/-
maintenance instruction, times must be evaluated for turnaround of
repair resources. Figure 4-36 illustrates this baseline off-line
maintenance support concept. Spares, support equipment, and
manuals are the significant drivers on life cycle costs. These
data represent a major support base of material that can be
analyzed by varying missions, flights, vehicles, and
maintainability features.
During our analysis we have examined the logistics program
costs for the following eight items:
Depot Support Equipment Organization Maintenance
Depot Maintenance Depot Manuals
Organizational training Depot Training
Warehousing Management
Packaging, Handling, Storage, and Transportation
The factors that we used in the assessment included:
Vehicle Description - crew size, weights
Operations Description - number of vehicles, operating
hours/years, power on times
R/M Factors - reliability, MTBR, MTBM, MH/MA,
sufficiency levels
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Figure 4-36. The Baseline Support Concept is Based on Examination of
Support Drivers•
Depot Factors - turnaround times, mean time to repair
Logistics Factors - transportation, LRU types, Manuals
From these data, spares and repair costs were developed in detail.
One of the driving factors used in our analysis is the
estimated failures and removal requirements after each flight. Our
estimates also include ground power-on time since that was the
major contributor to unscheduled maintenance on the Shuttle
orbiter. In our current processing cycle, projected PLS ground
power-on times are brief enough that they do not contribute
significantly to the PLS spares estimates. This is mainly due to
the simplicity of PLS design and the short turnaround requirements
at the horizontal processing facility. Figure 4-37 illustrates the
variableness of the ground power-on-time on PLS. As illustrated,
ground power is not significant on our predictions for spares
requirements with a 50 to 100 hour value. We used a baseline value
of 200 hours ground power-on time. This provides a margin to the
spares estimates since we do not have a firm subsystem and assembly
design•
The use of the Rockwell developed MAtrix model for determining
spares has provided us with a more realistic approach than what has
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Figure 4-37. Predicted PLS Spares as Functions of MTBR and Ground
Power-on Time.
been used historically for space vehicle applications. Spares
predictions using MTBF in lieu of MTBR increases the spares
forecast considerably (up to 1.5 times over real value). The use
of traceable failure data to similar systems, with a space rating
applied, assures us that the values are within a high confidence
limit (greater than 85 percent).
The Logistics function has been an active member of the
concurrent engineering team during the PLS conceptual design
analyses activity. Contributions have been made to: 1) influence
design by development of requirements and examination of subsystem
configurations, 2) improvement in spares forecasting using MAtrix
modeling, 3) identification of logistics drivers, and 4) defining
off-vehicle ground operations/processing through support system
assessment using various analytical approaches.
Our support concept is directly traceable to program goals of
reduced operations costs and ground operations simplicity. To
facilitate achievement of the program objectives, logistics support
requirements need to be developed/imposed on the system design
early.
An implied support infrastructure implies that: 1) a
maintenance and operations program will require minimal
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activity on the vehicle, 2) automation of current processes
reduces maintenance time and the associated administrative
activities, and 3) it takes advantage of multipurpose ground
support and test equipment to reduce the range and depth of
required support.
A reduced initial support investment implies that: 1) the
system will utilize existing assets, where practical, and 2)
the burden of building a large depot repair capability and or
spares stock be eliminated by employing repair warrantee
concepts.
A reduced maintenance demand implies that: 1) we will
depart from an operational concept of re-certifying every
system of the vehicle prior to each flight, and 2) take
advantage of proven hardware with known reliability
performance to reduce maintenance requirements.
No launch delays for normal maintenance implies that: 1)
establishment of repair time requirements, regardless of
repair location will decrease risks associated with launch
schedules/windows, and 2) vehicle systems and subsystems will
be designed to ensure achievement of repair time requirements.
4.4.2 Procedures Definition
Some of the key findings in the technical documentation/manual
development area for logistics have been: 1) maintenance
documentation costs can be most effectively reduced by introducing
automation when the systems developed and produced, 2) maintenance
technical manuals are dynamic documents which require timely
coordination to ensure current hardware and component configuration
are available to user, 3) estimated cost of changes to technical
manuals can be reduced 70 percent if baseline data are digitized,
and 4) costs of technical manual development can re reduced if
design engineering and manufacturing data are digitized and in
reusable formats. (DoD reports the cost of manuals at $600 to $1200
per page without automation.)
It is recommended that the PLS program formulate a strategy
for mandating use of neutral digital exchange standards and
technologies whenever data and documentation are developed/produced
for the project. The program should avoid program unique hardware
and software solutions for documentation production, shortage, and
distribution where possible. By focusing maintenance documentation
development through a thorough task analysis process and by
optimizing repair level analysis techniques, major reductions in
costs can be realized.
4.4.3 Detailed Support Estimates
Our primary goal has been to provide supportability data
requirements (spares, repair, manpower, transportation,
warehousing, training, etc.) that can be derived for logistics
support and cost those to the appropriate WBS level. The level of
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Figure 4-38. Logistics Support Analysis Requires Detailed Planning.
detail varies by subsystem; therefore, we started with a top down
analysis and later defined those elements that required more
detailed data to define the support parameters properly.
Figure 4-38 depicts the types of data that end up in a fully
operational support system. We have provided a spares and
reliability/maintainability model that captures their intent. The
development of detailed supportability estimates requires that the
logistics function be an integral part of the design team. The
specific task activity was to define support requirements for all
phases of operations including, 1) unscheduled maintenance, 2)
spares quantification, 3) ground support equipment, 4) task times,
and 5) staffing levels. Logistics also provides support to ground
operations, maintainability, and cost functions.
The data synthesis included identification and definition of:
• Initial Spares Lay-in
• Off-equipment Repair
• On/off Equipment Consumables
• Recurring and non-recurring GSE
• Recurring and non-recurring MSE
• Recurring and non-recurring ATE
• Recurring and non-recurring Off-Equipment Manuals
• Recurrlng and non-recurring Warehousing
• Recurring and non-recurring Transportation
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• Recurring and non-recurring Off and On Equipment Training
Detailed technical data
and analyses based on the
reliability estimates and
support requirements have been
provided during the study
(quarterly reports and cost
reviews). Specifically
preliminary spares,
technician, technical data,
training, and ground support
equipment assessments were
performed. These documents
provide a representative
example of the reports that
were generated on each
supportability aspect to date.
Detailed assessments of
spares requirements and repair
actions have been evaluated
for infant mortality, ground
power-on-time, and mission
duration. Figure 4-39
illustrates the expected
failures of PLS systems due to
ground power-on time Upper
diagrams) and a comparison to
the STS-based experience. It
becomes evident that the low
times shown for PLS (based on
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Figure 4-39. Ground Power-on Time
Drives Expected Failures.
the 14 day HPF time) do not
compare to STS. The STS, once again, has a unique mission
requirement and the amount of configuration changes, payload
integration changes, and an overall requirement to re-certify all
systems prior to flight drives the ground power-on-time higher than
a normal airline would.
An evaluation of predicted failures over a number of flights
is shown in Figure 4-40. The main issue with the PLS is to
determine what systems are going to cause maintenance impacts and
then determine how to make a design change recommendation that can
reduce the failure values, or identify a method to support the
system effectively.
In the detailed analysis effort considerations have been given
to supportability. For instance, the dominant vehicle design theme
has been to "design for accessibility". This reduces maintenance
times, GSE requirements, induced failures (due to design
complexity), and reduces manpower/personnel requirements. Use of
"built-in test (BIT) and health monitoring" adds to the benefits
attributed by accessibility by further reducing the skills and
training requirements for fault isolation. Imposing a processing
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characteristic of "no post-flight decertification" of the total PLS
reduces the requirement for technical data, spares, maintenance
consumables, GSE, and significantly reduces processing turnaround
times.
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Figure 4-40. Expected PLS Anomalies After 29 Flights.
4.4.5 Implementation
Management of the logistics organization would basically
remain within the KSC infrastructure and support organization.
This is mainly due to the methods for handling logistics over the
life of any program. The key to economic support policies is to
merge all functions that are common into one organization and then
use the resources that are available on an as-required basis. The
documentation of spares and repair data is accomplished during
DDT&E with a minimum amount of changes that would not be covered
under the standard change control process.
Analysis of the spares requirements for PLS reveals that the
mean-time-between-removal (MTBR) factor drives the spares
acquisition process if the value is off by more than 15 percent per
vehicle quantity. Since the spares data use actual aircraft
failure rate information (modified for space applications), we
believe that our values have a high correlation ratio to actual
data and that the MTBR would not vary over 10 percent.
Figure 4-41 indicates that the quantity of vehicles (2.5, 3,
and 4) each have a different impact on the spares requirements.
The reason that the four vehicle spares quantity is lower than the
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three vehicle spares quantity
is due to the safety spares
calculation. With a four
vehicle inventory, safety
spares becomes insignificant
and therefore they are not
required to assure a PLS
flight. This also indicates
that the recommended initial
spares and recurring spares
for operations support are not
too sensitive to turnaround
times and that the flight rate
can be supported by the
recommended spares. The final
values of spares can not be
determined until the design
has been completed at critical
design review, however, the
LRU values contain the support
materials to effect a repair
as predicted. The shop
replaceable units (SRU's) are
a part of the overall value.
VARYING MTBR ±10%HAS MINIMAL IMPACT
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Table 4-5. Traceable Design Guidelines Lower Life Cycle Costs and
Increase Availability.
I_sign Feature Quantitative Go_ Rationale
Mean-firm-to-repair
Maximum Maint_nanc. Tttm
I)c_nt Fault I::Mtection
Critical 1 Failures
All Other Failures
Percent Fault Isolation
3 Hours
6 hours
100%
Directly Related to Launch
Directly Related to Launch
95%
Assures Attainment of
Safety, Availability, and
Life Cycle Cost Goals
95% of Detectable Suptxn'ts MTI'R Objectives
Failures to 1 LRU and Assures Attainment of
Within 1/4 hour Availability & LCC Goals
False Alarm Rate 1.5 % Support 98.5% Overall
Availability Goals
Table 4-5 identifies the design guidelines that were imposed
on the design team during the study. This helped us to assure that
the PLS vehicle design could be assessed against some primary
operations support drivers. One of the key requirements for fault
isolation leads the design team to embed diagnostic capability into
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each subsystem. It also meets the autonomy guidelines for the PLS.
The false alarm rate value assures us that the design will not have
ambiguous test networks that require multiple test paths in order
to determine the subsystem failure. The STS has experienced a
false alarm rate of approximately 30%. This type of value leads to
excessive test and analysis time and can actually increase
maintenance due to the unnecessary removal of good assemblies.
4,4.6 Staffina Levels
The logistics manpower has been included in the ground
operations estimates. Manpower and resources necessary to perform
DDT&E functions are included (as support personnel) in the overall
manpower estimates. With the PLS using aircraft type subsystems
the support packages for these items should be readily available.
This would mean a minimal amount of effort would be required to
acquire the data in the standard DoD formats. With the assumption
that the PLS program is to use MIL-STD-1388-1 & 2 as the developing
document for the support packages the task of converting the data
is not costly.
4.4.7 Trade Study - Automated Processinq Data Manaqement {Trade
This trade determined the automated processing data management
techniques that can be implemented in the repair of a space vehicle
such as PLS. Briefly, the study identified a cost effective
strategy for introducing automated technical documentation products
into the ground processing environment.
Five factors were addressed in the study: i) changes at KSC,
2) maintenance documentation attributes, 3) levels of automation at
DoD applications, 4) cost, and 5) recommended strategies.
The principal finding was that introducing an integrated
automated data management process into the ground processing
environment is cost effective. However, even larger costs savings
can be achieved if data standards are incorporated early in the
technical documentation development process. This includes the
development of a management information system that handles all
project data from the Phase A inception through the fielding and
operations activity.
The primary recommendation is that the PLS program develop a
technical documentation acquisition strategy and an automated
processing data management system strategy that are compatible with
each other and complies with national standards for neutral data
exchange. Further work is needed, in order to develop specific
recommendations for incorporating the findings of this study into a
more detailed acquisition strategy for the PLS Program.
Maintenance documentation for the PLS is the key area of study
because maintenance documentation represents a significant portion
of the technical documentation that will be delivered. In
addition, investigating this subset of technical documentation in
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some depth will provide results that will be applicable to other
subsets of technical documentation that will be delivered for the
PLS program. Application of automation to maintenance
documentation has also been the subject of significant efforts by
the Department of Defense (DoD) and DoD contractors in the area of
military aircraft, vehicles, and ground systems. As a result, the
PLS program can benefit by incorporating the results of these
efforts into an automated technical documentation strategy.
Introducing increased amounts of automation in the ground
processing environment should be cost effective. The Shuttle
Ground Operations Efficiencies/Technologies Study (Reference 4-4)
incorporated extensive analysis resources in identifying issues,
conducting trade studies, and identifying high payoff
recommendations. In their list of "Shuttle Lessons Learned
(Applicable to Future Vehicles)", the following findings apply:
"Analysis indicates the greatest improvements in current operations
can be gained via redesign of Shuttle program Data Management
System (SPDMS) to conform to TMIS and associated systems.
Potential Savings -- $3.0B plus increases of up to 30 percent in
launch rate (based on FY85 rate of eight per year)". In other
words, if the Shuttle program Data Management System was automated
and integrated incorporating neutral data file and transmission
standards instead of the isolated mainly paper-based system that
currently exists, then the quoted savings could be realized. (TMIS
is a NASA information system that incorporates these features.)
Similar findings were contained in a technical memorandum
entitled "Reducing Launch Operations Costs" that was delivered to
Congress by the Office of Technology Assessment in September 1988
(Reference 4-5). It contained an estimate that "an integrated
paper-less information management system could reduce the time
spent in launch operations by one-half". Also included were
recommendations to minimize custom hardware and software and to
standardize the architecture of onboard and ground systems
including code. These recommendations were specifically identified
for inclusion in a future launch system.
As a result of the above and other studies, many of the
important data bases at Kennedy Space Center are in the process of
being automated. This effort, the Shuttle Program Data Management
System, has the goal of connecting many currently existing but
isolated data bases. The above effort is important to the PLS
program because the final system implemented for the Space Shuttle
program will likely be a prototype of a similar system into which
PLS technical data will flow. So, while the Space Shuttle program
must incur extra costs to transform information into a form that
can be readily used in a digital network, the PLS program can avoid
this costly step. If technical data developed during the PLS
program is delivered in a digitized format that can be readily used
in a digital network, then baselined technical information would be
readily available in an integrated automated information management
system.
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The PLS program should adopt a technical documentation
acquisition and ground processing information system strategy that
consists of four principal ingredients:
(1) Insert automation requirements early in the system
acquisition process.
(2) Insure data are digitally reusable and transferable.
(3) Avoid custom hardware and software.
compatibility with national standards.
Insist on
(4) Insure technical information developed during the program
is directly useable by an integrated automated information
management system during ground processing.
4.5 SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
4.5.1 Fleet Sizina
Fleet sizing for the preferred three vehicle PLS fleet
assumed: i) a SSF crew stay of 180 days and a flight interval of 60
days, 2) initial SSF operations is supported by the Shuttle every
90 days, 3) complete crew change out would exceed Shuttle
capability (eight per mission), 4) SSF operability requires crew
overlap, and 5) Lunar/Mars personnel transferred on dedicated
flight until crew is complete.
The SSF crew size of 24 is expected between 2007-2020. The
duration of stay is 180 days with a total personnel exchange of 48
during a given year. This equates to 6 flights with a launch
interval of 60 days to transport 8 SSF personnel each flight. The
flight crew is a separate quantity of people. This also equates to
a total of 141 PLS flights through the year 2020.
4-5.2 System Attrition
In-flight aborts of the PLS vehicle do not necessarily denote
loss of vehicle e.g.: mission abort. Catastrophic vehicle loss
represents a small fraction of the total number of aborts, and
approaches zero. However, a number of PLS failures, occurring
singularly or in combination with others, may cause mission abort.
That is, one or more required functions may not be available for
use when needed. Should this happen, the PLS simply would safely
return to earth for subsequent repair and reuse.
PLS loss also may occur as a result of catastrophic failure of
the Titan IV Launch Vehicle. The most recent projections for Titan
IV Launch Reliability range between 0.96 and 0.98. The PLS should
be capable of escaping from all but a no-warning Titan IV explosion
occurring on the launch pad or in flight. A Titan IV no-warning
explosion is considered to be a very unlikely event. Accordingly,
it is unlikely that a PLS loss will occur at a rate greater than 1
per 1,000 launches.
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4,5,3 _s_imated Repair Turnaround
The estimated repair turnaround analysis was performed in
detail. Upon review, it was determined that the repair turnaround
time (RTAT) was not a significant driver to the PLS program. This
is mainly due to the low flight rate, the number of supporting
vehicles to meet flight rate, and the number of system components
that require repair during any given repair period. This is also
due to the improved reliability of system components, and the
method used to derive actual LRU failures that require intermediate
or depot support.
4.5.4 Vehicle Impacts Due to Fliqht Rate
The current quantity of recommended vehicles to support the
PLS program allows for attrition and resiliency. The need for
additional vehicles to support other missions was not evaluated
during this reporting period. However, the use of a dedicated
vehicle to support a unique mission scenario could be handled with
the resources currently planned for PLS (if no attrition occurs).
4.5.5 Facility Capabilities and Resiliency
The current facilities planned for PLS would allow for growth
to six vehicles (with shared work bays). The current plan is to
use two bays to support turnaround operations and to use the
remaining two bays for maintenance and staging.
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5.0 HARDWARE/SOFTWARE DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS/DESCRIPTIONS
The philosophy for PLS subsystem design is to support the
requirements and objectives of the manufacturing and system
operations functions. Traditional spacecraft design criteria, such
as weight and performance, do not have the same relative importance
on the PLS program as do life cycle cost, ease of manufacture and
minimum ground operations. As a result, the subsystem concepts
selected justifiably depart from conventional spacecraft design in
some cases in order to achieve the desired or mandated subsystem
characteristic. All subsystem concept selections meet the
technology readiness guidelines of the PLS program.
5.1 CONFIGURATION AND SUBSYSTEMS DESCRIPTION
The Personnel Launch System defined in this report performs a
single reference mission: to transfer eight Space Station
personnel to and from Space Station Freedom. Two PLS crew members
operate the spacecraft. The design of the vehicle and its
subsystem selections and arrangements are driven by the low cost of
ownership requirements.
5.1.1 PLS Vehicle General Arranuement
The vehicle is sized to fit within the payload envelope of the
STS Orbiter (with fins folded) to comply with a non-groundruled STS
delivery option. The vehicle will transport a crew of two and
eight passengers to Space Station Freedom in the DRM-I, three day
mission. The internal arrangement of the subsystem components and
personnel integrates the requirements of subsystem function,
structural load path efficiency and allowable center of mass range.
With the preferred set of subsystem concepts, the vehicle has a dry
weight of 17,335 pounds, a landed weight of 20,705 pounds and a
launch weight (with booster adapter and escape system) of 41,420
pounds.
Figure 5-1 presents the general arrangement drawing of the PLS
vehicle. The locations of the major subsystem components are shown
along with the significant dimensional data for the vehicle. More
detailed descriptions of the separate subsystems are found in
subsequent sections of this document.
5.1.2 Mass Properties
The mass properties of the major vehicle elements and
subsystem components are given in Table 5-1. The weight data are
derived from exact data available for off-the-shelf components to
approximations developed from historical parametric relationships
based on physical characterization, such as component area or
volume or performance capabilities such as power output or input.
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Figure 5-I. PLS Lifting Body General Arrangement
Table 5-1. Mass Properties
•WING GROUP
TAIL GROUP
BODY GROUP
THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM
LANDING GEAR
INTEGRATED PROPULSION
PRIME POWER
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION
ACTUATORS
AVIONICS
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL
PERSONNEL ACCOMODATIONS
RECOVERY & AUXILIARY SYSTEM
DRY WEIGHT (LBS)
PERSONNEL & PROVISIONS
RESIDUALS
LANDED WEIGHT (LBS)
ADAPTER & LES
PROPELLANTS & CONSUMABLES
LAUNCH ESCAPE WEIGHT (LBS)
ALS ADAPTER
LAUNCH WEIGHT (LBS)
[;)ESIG N WEIGHT
1,739
62
2,907 - LARGE TRANSFER TUNNEL
1,555 - SIZED BY AEROTHERMAL ANALYSIS
829
1,138 - JP4/H202 CONCEPT
2,720 - RECHARGEABLE Ag-Zn BATrERY PACKS
999
123 - ALL EMA
956 - ADOPTS ASCM TECHNOLOGY
1,478 - ACHIEVED WITHOUT RADIATOR
1,195
17,335
2,415
955
"20,705
9,778
34,550
6,870
41,420
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The placement of the subsystems within the PLS vehicle are
done so as to achieve the required center of mass location of 53%
to 56% of vehicle body length at both the full and residual
consumables conditions.
5,1,3 Launch Escape System and Booster Adapter
A launch escape system is provided to achieve assured crew
safety over as much of the mission profile as possible. The system
provides the capability to separate from the launch vehicle when on
the launch pad or during ascent flight. The preferred system
consists of three solid rocket motors attached externally to the
conical booster adapter as shown in Figure 5-2.
OPERATIONAL SCENARIO
• VHMS DETECTS OFF-NOMINAL LAUNCH VEHICLE CONDITIONS, ASSESSES
THREAT TO CREW, VEHICLE OR MISSION AND COMMANDS APPROPRIATE ACTION
• LES DESIGNED FOR 8G THRUST (WITH PRELIMINARY TVC) WITH STABLE
POWERED FLIGHT AND THRUST TERMINATION
DESIGN DATA
THRUST = 276,000 LB
ISP = 260 SECONDS
MOTOR WT = 1300 LB EACH
Figure 5-2. Launch Escape System
5 1.4 Winq, Center Fin and Control Surfaces
To satisfy the requirement for compatibility with the STS
payload bay and for aft compartment maintenance access, the PLS
wing fins must have a folding feature. The folding fins also
enable transport in C-5 or C-17 cargo aircraft (Figure 5-3). The
auto-flight guidance avionics system provides redundant control of
the flight control surface actuators, with manual over-ride
5-3
Latch Pin
C-17 Envelope .... Fwd Hing:F.c.jlting .... .=:_.___.._..,_.<.
C-5A Envelope t __ _ ____'_'_/ }
• :_ ! _/j _ i_'__ ' _ Latch
Figure 5-3. The Folding Wing Feature Permits Transport in Large Cargo
Aircraft.
capability. The wing folding actuators are manually operated only:
they use external power on the ground and internal power on-orbit.
Only the autocontrolled actuators are paired in single redundancy
with self monitoring/self healing control circuitry.
All actuators are low power electro/mechanical systems. The
auto-flight guidance BITE test includes actuator BITE interface
with the position indicators on the flight display panel. Position
status data are also sent to the control master communication
system computer for ground communication and command feedback, as
well as to the onboard maintenance system (OMS) computer for
maintenance update.
Structural and Mechanical Concept. The fin folding
requirement is expanded in the PLS design to a geometry which adds
fin root bending strength, more subsystem access and the
possibility of improved aerodynamics. Rather than hinge the fin
near the fin root along a line parallel to the vehicle centerline,
the movable section of the fin also includes part of the fuselage
upper/outboard skin (as shown in Figure 5-4,) , so that in rotating
the fin to a stowed position a sizable subsystem access area is
also opened. The hingeline of this concept runs outboard, aft and
down rather than just aft so that i) a triangular access area is
revealed, 2) the fin folds to a compact, inboard and aft position
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Figure 5-4. Folding Fin Arrangement
and 3) the upper elevon and pitch RCS thruster locations are not
disturbed.
Two of the major frame extensions (from cabin pressure vessel)
act as the carry-through structure for the fin. The aft carry-
through frame (aft bulkhead) reacts the fin rear spar loads through
the fin aft pivot fitting (Figure 5-4). The forward carry-through
frame transfers the fin front spar loads to the cabin compartment
via the fin latch. The forward-inboard fin pivot, which defines
the diagonal fin hingeline, is located inboard at the frame/cabin
attachment. Since the high fin root bending moment is reacted by
the latch on one side and a large root fillet radius on the other,
the design has better section properties than the short coupled,
latch-and-hinge alternative. This can either lead to reduced
weight or increased fin stiffness.
The design also has non-structural benefits. The large fillet
radius in the fin root area may reduce interference drag between
the fin and the adjacent upper fuselage surface. Because the
motion of the fin and fuselage at joining is nearly translational,
a simple labyrinth seal can be used rather than the more complicat-
ed rotational seal which would be required with a rotating-type fin
folding concept.
The wing fin structure is a conventional dual-spar, multirib
design using the same graphite polyimide materials as that of the
heatshield since the TPS materials and method of attachment for the
fin is the same. The difference in the wing application is that
the lower wing surface uses the honeycomb material for moldline
stability while the upper wing cover can be a single skin (multi-
ply) for the upper cover based on TPS installation requirements and
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blast pressure reaction. The single skin is easier to form into
the airfoil curvature and easier to install using blind fasteners.
The two structural surfaces are separated by a conventional
arrangement of bonded-in spars and frames of the same graphite
polyimide material. For the ribs and spars, graphite polyimide
sine-wave corrugations or a truss configuration for thermal stress
reduction is assumed.
The static load conditions assumed for the wing design task
are: liftoff, abort, Max q-alpha and Max q-beta, descent loads and
TAEM maneuvering. The dynamic load conditions are: vibro-acoustic
pressures, blast overpressures (transient excitation) and buffet
(potential excitation due to unsteady aerodynamic flow). Aero-
thermal temperatures are applied to the structure for ascent and
descent heating environments. Figure 5-6 defines the governing
blast overpressure characteristics.
The governing load case for the PLS wing fin design is the 10
psi blast overpressure occurring from a catastrophic booster
explosion. This pressure will create a bending moment on each fin
of approximately 1.4 million in-pounds. This moment must be
reacted by the wing structure and transferred to the PLS cabin
structure without failure if the vehicle is to be controlled for
subsequent parachute deployment and recovery.
The cross-section, shown in Figure 5-7, is used to estimate a
nominal stress level in the wing skins in reacting the 10 psi
overpressure load. Given the average 4.8-inch structural depth and
imposed bending moment, the stress level in the wing covers is
estimated to be 28,000 psi which is significantly below the
material limit of 44,000 psi at non-reentry temperatures.
The blast load reacted by
the fin must be transferred to
the cabin through the hinge
and latch structural
attachments. The fin folding
concepts is such that the
least loaded attachment is the
latch. It is designed to
react only lateral and
vertical loads. The
forward/inboard hinge is the
highest loaded point because
it transfers lateral and
vertical loads as well as
reacting all of the bending
moment transferred forward by
the fin through the torque box
nature of the fin root design.
AFRSI Blanket
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Figure 5-7. Wing Cross-section
The aft hinge point is nearly as highly loaded as the forward hinge
and also reacts lateral and vertical wing loads.
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Figure 5-6. Explosive Overpressure Characteristics
The hinge or latch pin diameters were calculated based on the
reactions at each of the three attach points. Assuming steel
material and a factor of safety of 1.4, the diameters of the three
attach points sized by the blast overpressure load case are 2.38,
2.12 and 1.0 inches for the forward hinge, aft hinge and latch pin
diameters, respectively.
To summarize, based on the dimensions and thermal environment
of the selected representative point on the fin surface, it is
concluded that there is adequate depth between the wing moldline
surfaces to accommodate the ceramic tile thickness required and
enough remaining depth between the structural skins to react the
extreme fin bending loads.
5.1.5 Primary Structure
The body group is defined as the crew cabin/primary structure
including the extension frames which support the lower heatshield
and define the subsystem bays plus the lower heatshield structure
itself (Figure 5-8). A representative section of the crew cabin
and a model of the heatshield structure were structurally analyzed
for loads cases defined by PLS mission phases.
The crew cabin is based on a 76-inch diameter cylinder which
is a fundamentally efficient pressure vessel shape. The cylinder
is stiffened by 3-inch deep ring frames spaced every 17 inches and
by six longerons. The basic cylinder shape is modified by the
necessity of a flat floor in the cabin and a moldline slope of six
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PRIMARY STRUCTURE; WELDED ALUMINUM, CYLINDRICAL SHAPE
<+L_
GR/PI HONEYCOMB, DIRECT BOND TILES
Figure 5-8. Primary Structures Are Crew Module and Heatshield
degrees going aft. The material (2219 aluminum) and welded
construction of the crew cabin are very conservative with well
established design life characteristics. The extension frames are
placed to correspond with the location of the personnel seating
structure inside the cabin. In this way both structural design
elements work together as an efficient, integrated unit. The
extension frames attach and react airloads from the lower
heatshield and define the size of the side access panels.
The heatshield employs a direct-bond TPS tile concept that was
investigated with a prototype demonstration in the CAST program
sponsored by LaRC in the early 1980's. Directly bonding the tiles
to a graphite polyimide honeycomb structure with a similar
coefficient of thermal expansion yields weight savings of up to 30%
compared the present Orbiter technique. Cost savings accrue from
fewer manufacturing processes (including the elimination of the
strain isolation pad) and larger tile sizes.
A typical PLS vehicle cross-section is shown in Figure 5-9 to
identify the key structural features of the body group. The
cylinder-based crew cabin dominates the cross-section with only a
small portion at the top actually forming the outer moldline of the
vehicle.
The beam elements of the design efficiently perform three
functions. The portion of the cross beam outside the cabin reacts
the aerodynamic heatshield loads as a bending moment across the
vehicle. The carrythrough portion of this beam also provides the
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Figure 5-9. Typical Cross-section Identifies Key Structural Features
primary attach point for the passenger seats to react the high
launch and abort loads of the personnel. Finally, the carrythrough
portion works with the longitudinal dual keel to maintain the
flatness of the floor under the one atmosphere internal pressure
for launch (and abort).
Pressure vessel/Crew Cabin Desiun. Because the vehicle
structure is necessarily associated with nearly every other
subsystem, its fundamental design approach affects the
installation, operation and maintainability of every other system.
Since the level of subsystem access was so important to the outcome
of the efficient operations and low cost goals of the PLS program,
the crew cabin design was given the highest priority as the primary
structural element of the vehicle.
To approach the airline level of subsystem access in a vehicle
as small as the PLS is challenging if standard spacecraft
structural arrangements are adopted. Maintainability approaches
are usually at a lower level of design such as a particular access
door design, LRU rack or quick disconnect. To achieve believable
levels of access at the vehicle level requires an accessible,
maintainable design in the overall vehicle design, not just at the
detail level.
The airlines perform major maintenance on an aircraft by first
removing all access panels to completely reveal the subsystems.
The PLS structural concept allows the same level of access to
validate our claim of airline-like servicing during turnaround
operations.
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One structural approach to be taken is to use a near-moldline
conformal pressure shell which is both primary structure and most
of the crew cabin. As a result, the subsystems reside within the
pressurized portion of the shell. Access to these systems is
therefore from the inside, which suggests maintenance complexity
and interference as well as concealment by seats, passenger stowage
provisions and non-structural interior panels. The broad, flat PLS
lower structure (as is conforms to the lower moldline) is
susceptible to extreme deformation when pressurized. This effect
can be reduced by using vertical tension ties installed across the
vehicle interior, but these further hamper access to subsystems.
From a manufacturing standpoint, the complex shape of the shell as
a tight, welded pressure vessel, would not be easy to build. Non-
pressurized cutouts in the shell would be required for the landing
gear and the propulsion system which would involve complicated
bulkheads, subsystem penetrations, and weight penalties.
Another structural approach is to employ a floating conformal
pressure vessel inside the outer primary structure. This design
has the same access-through-primary structure concerns as the
former. In addition, this concept reduces the amount of volume
usability by having this extra structural element. Additional
concerns are the loss of interior volume and difficult
inspectability created by the redundant structures (a compartment
permanently within a structural shell), doors through two
structures which may have relative motion, membranes which are
difficult to penetrate for access and curved walls which reduce
volume utilization. The principal advantage of the floating
structure is that it is easier to thermally isolate.
With the evaluation of the two structural concepts described
above providing guidance, the approach taken on the PLS structural
arrangement is to incorporate features which support the low
operations and manufacturing costs. The process begins by listing
the characteristics of the structure which are preferred by the
different disciplines. The list illustrates that the disciplines
often have divergent desires. The objective of the Design function
is to accomplish the best compromise possible in achieving the
overall PLS program goals. These are a few of the characteristics
desired by different disciplines:
Operations "Inside-Out" vehicle (easy access)
Non-structural doors
Easily inspectable primary structure
Rugged structure (no GSE protection)
Manufacturing Flat or single-degree-of-curvature structure
Minimize parts count and subassemblies
Minimize materials requiring hand labor
Specify conventional materials and joints
Structure Simple shapes with few cutouts
Advanced, high performance materials
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The following paragraphs describe the PLS structural concept
which addresses the design requirements of the separate interests
involved. The specific design features which achieve the desired
vehicle characteristics are:
• As many subsystems as possible are kept outside of the
pressurized volume. This eliminates either doors through
primary structure or undesirable access from within the
interior. This avoids the safety issue of the crew
occupying the same volume as possibly hazardous
subsystems• It also allows a simpler (non-OML) shape for
the crew compartment•
• Constant sections, straight elements and single degree of
curvature are incorporated in the design of the primary
structure• These features reduce manufacturing expenses
by requiring simpler tooling, lower cost materials
and fewer fabrication processes•
• The largest access doors the vehicle geometry will allow
are provided to provide access provisions approaching
conventional aircraft•
• A separate lower surface heatshield structure of graphite
polyimide material and direct bonded ceramic TPS tile is
used to allow complete inspection of the primary
structure and to implement a thermal protection concept
with demonstrated thermal and structural advantages•
Rather than inherit the weight, volume and access problems
associated with the conformal configurations, the PLS design
combines the functions of primary vehicle structure and pressure
vessel into a single structure• The operations issues created by
having most of the subsystems located within the body are avoided
by the having the pressurized compartment sized only to meet the
crew space requirements. This concept permits a much simpler
compartment structure since a moldline no longer needs to be
adhered to. By using constant, circular cross-sections in the crew
cabin, both the design and manufacturing functions are supported.
Since the subsystems are located outside of the pressure vessel,
penetrations through primary structure are largely avoided. If a
requirement for micrometeoroid protection arises,, a double shell
concept can be designed much more easily without having to
incorporate several doors or complex curvature panels.
The thermal advantage of a floating cabin structure (one with
few heat shorts) is captured with a separate, airload-carrying
heatshield suspended from the vehicle primary structure• This
approach offers the option of using a higher temperature material
than the conventional aluminum alloy of the primary structure,
since the method of attachment allows differential expansion• The
use of direct-bond tiles to a graphite polyimide heatshield has
been demonstrated with an STS Orbiter body flap segment for the
CAST program of the early 1980s. Since the composite material has
a practical use temperature of 550 degrees F, thinner TPS tiles can
5-11
be used and the pressure vessel can be slightly larger for given
moldline constraints. Since the tiles and the composite have
similar coefficients of thermal expansion, the direct bonding
technique can be used to eliminate the strain isolation pads and
carrier plates of other systems. The belly heatshield has
stiffening features such as frames and stringers since it reacts
the reentry airloads and transfers them to major frames extending
from the crew cabin primary structure. Although doors in the
heatshield for the landing gear cannot be avoided, the few
heatshield attachments to the compartment and major frames are
accessible from above, making the heatshield a fairly clean,
monolithic structure.
The remaining moldline surface contours not defined by the
compartment top or the monolithic belly heatshield, are created by
large, secondary-structure doors supported by the major frames
extending from the crew cabin. Located under these doors are
virtually all of the vehicle subsystems. They are attached either
to the exterior wall of the pressurized compartment or from the
forward or aft sides of the major frames.
Since the vehicle is required to have a forward c.g. location
for aerodynamic stability, the main landing gear is located forward
and attached to the substantial forward wing carry-through frame.
This not only provides a more desirable landing gear placement, but
creates more volume in the rear for the propulsion system hardware.
The gear is enclosed in a non-pressurized box which extends forward
to the next major frame.
The structural efficiency of the flat cabin floor (whether
honeycomb or machined plate) is compromised by the attachment of
conventional aircraft seats with seat legs. Additionally each seat
must withstand high bending loads between the seat cushion area and
the seats attachment to the floor structure. The PLS design
eliminates seat legs and attaches the forward edge of each seat to
internal sections of the major frames. This accomplishes three
design objectives; it simplifies the design of the cabin floor, it
eliminates the weight of seat legs, it provides a longer, more
tailorable seat vertical stroke for crash load attenuation, it
allows the seat bottom to move upwards to permit a seat position
for deconditioned passengers, it produces a very short load path
between the seat passenger load and its introduction into a dual
center keel structure.
The configuration selected employs a simple, cylinder-based
crew cabin as the primary structure. This pressure vessel provides
the volume necessary for adequate habitability for the short PLS
mission. The remaining volume between the crew cabin and the outer
moldline is devoted to subsystem installation. Because the crew
cabin is the primary structure, large access panels can be provided
above the external subsystem bays to maximize both manufacturing
access and ground turnaround access. The heatshield, suspended
from the primary structure by the extension frames is thermally
isolated from the crew cabin. Prior to heatshield installation,
the exposed structure provides subsystem access during
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Figure 5-10. NASTRAN Finite Element Model of Crew Cabin
manufacturing and, if removed, permits complete pressure vessel
structural inspection during major maintenance programs.
Pressure Vessel/Crew Cabin Analysis. A 3-D NASTRAN finite
element model of the PLS vehicle was formulated with a
representative stiffness for both in-plane and out of plane
behavior. The model consists of 2-D plate elements for the
pressure vessel shell, floor and longeron webs. Beam elements are
used to model the lateral frames, external trusses that transfer
the heatshield bending loads, and the pressure vessel ring frames.
Figure 5-10 shows the finite element model for the PLS vehicle.
The pressure vessel is a 0.05 inch thick aluminum shell
stiffened by 3 inch deep rings spaced every 17 inches. The cabin
floor structure is a 1 inch thick aluminum honeycomb panel attached
to the dual keel longeron elements and to the interior carrythrough
portion of the exterior frames. The lateral frames that hold the
seats for the crew are aluminum truss structures that provide
stiffness against the loads carried through the structure by the
external truss system.
The vehicle was analyzed for four loading conditions:
.
2.
3.
4.
Cabin Pressurization:
Overpressure Blast:
Re-entry loads:
Thrust loads:
14.7 psi internal pressure.
i0 psi external pressure.
From the heatshield FEM results.
8 G thrust environment.
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The finite element model was loaded with 14.7 psi uniform
internal pressure simulating the cabin pressurization loading
condition. The resulting maximum deflections are:
1. Floor 0.22 inches
2. Longerons 0.18 inches
3. Shell 0.07 inches
4. Ring Frames 0.015 inches
'\;
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Figure 5-11. NASTRAN Model Analysis - Cabin Pressurization (Deformed
Shape)
Figures 5-11 and 5-12 present the deformed shape and the dis-
placement contours for the cabin pressurization load case. Note in
Figure 5-11 the effect of the rings on the deformed pattern. Figure
5-13 presents the stress contours for internal pressure load case.
The principal stresses are as follows:
1. Floor 8000 psi
2. Longerons 13,000 psi
3. Shell 10,000 psi
4. Rings 13,000 psi
For the blast overpressure load case, a dynamic forcing
function is modeled as a 10 psi uniform external static load. A
dynamic load factor of 2.0 was used for this load case. Structural
•deformations due to the blast overpressure are as follows:
1. Floor negligible
2. Longerons negligible
3. Shell 0.1 inches
4. Rings 0.012 inches
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Figure 5-13. NASTRAN Model - Crew Cabin - Internal Pressure Loads
The deformed shape and displacement contours for the
overpressure load are presented in Figures 5-14 and 5-15,
respectively. The stresses on the shell can reach levels as high
as 3400 psi in compression (Figure 5-16). However, note that due
to the external loading on the shell, stability considerations will
probably govern the failure mode of this load case. Preliminary
hand calculations yield possible buckling of the shell in the areas
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Figure 5-14. NASTRANModel - Crew Cabin Overpressure Loads (Deformed
Shape)
I II
Figure 5-15. NASTRANModel - Crew Cabin Overpressure - (Displacement
Contours)
between the rings. For more exact results, the buckling eigenvalue
problem has to be taken into consideration.
For the re-entry load case, the heatshield reactions (from the
preceding heatshield analysis) are imposed on the extension frames
of the vehicle. Truss tip deflections as high as 0.12 inches are
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Figure 5-16. NASTRAN Model - Crew Cabin Overpressure - Compression
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Figure 5-17.
Shape)
NASTRAN Model - Crew Cabin Reentry Loads (Deformed
observed. The remaining structural deflections are small.
Figures 5-17 and 5-18 present the deformed shape and the
displacement contours for the vehicle, respectively. Note the
interaction between the external truss assembly and the internal
load carrying members. Stress contours are shown on Figure 5-19.
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Figure 5-18.
Contours)
isplacement
Figure 5-19.
Contours)
NASTRAN Model - Crew Cabin Reentry Loads (Stress
For the 8 G abort thrust load case, due to the difference
between the locus of the centroid and the c.g. of the vehicle, the
thrust load imposes a bending moment on the structure with the
primary load carrying members being the longerons. A stability
analysis will eventually be required since lateral buckling of the
longerons is possible. Generally, the deflections from the abort
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thrust are small. Stresses reach a maximum of about 5000 psi at
the fixed (aft) end.
This preliminary analysis of the primary structure (lower
heatshield and pressure vessel) shows that the proposed approach of
separating the structural functions of the airload-bearing
heatshield and the core cabin structure is fundamentally sound. A
complete vehicle, detailed stress analysis will be required in a
later design once a more detailed structural definition is
available.
Suspended Heatshield Desiqn. The structural concept for the
suspended lower heatshield is half-inch thick graphite/polyimide
honeycomb. It is stiffened with upstanding honeycomb frames and
longerons located to coincide with the heatshield attachments to
the pressure vessel. This concept is one of many which could be
employed on the PLS suspended heatshield structure. The following
discussion addresses two of these alternates and compares the
performance and manufacturing characteristics of each relative to
the composite honeycomb.
Skin-Stringer Heatshield option. This alternate is
offered because of a concern over the bondline strength of the
graphite/polyimide face sheets and the honeycomb core due to
the high operational temperature of the materials and the lack
of experience with the nominal graphite/polyimide honeycomb
design.
This concept consists of a thick graphite/polyimide layup
for the lower tile bonding surface with a number of stiffeners
to achieve the required resistance to deflection. Since the
heatshield design is driven by high stiffness requirements,
the thick composite layup must be substantial to produce the
same resistance to bending as the highly efficient reference
honeycomb. Specifically, the layup must be about 0.39 inches
thick to match the half-inch thick honeycomb. This value
translates to a 300% increase in total heatshield weight with
the same number and location of stiffeners as the reference.
Because this large thickness raises concerns over the creation
of voids in the layup, a modified thickness would be on the
order .09 inches. This dimension, however, would mean that
substantially more stiffeners would be required to meet
overall stiffness. Rather than stiffening frames occurring
every 68 inches as on the reference, the single, .09 skin of
the alternate would need stiffeners roughly every 18 inches in
both lateral and fore/aft directions.
Since the tooling for the stiffeners of either concept
requires the design and fabrication separate tooling elements
to support the upright stiffeners, the alternate concept needs
on the order of 60 times as many tooling pieces. With the
increase in the number of stiffeners, the final heatshield has
roughly 20 times the number of inside bays or pockets as the
reference. Therefore, the number of hand-bagged internal
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insulation packages to install on the heatshield is also 20
times as many.
The added weight, increased part count for both tooling
and the final heatshield and the much larger insulation
installation costs of the alternate skin-stringer design,
leads to the contention that the reference honeycomb design is
preferred from both manufacturing costs and performance
considerations.
Isogrid Heatshield option. The isogrid alternative to
the reference resulted from the desire to install tiles on
carrier plates for subsequent fastener attachment to the nodes
of the isogrid. Open isogrid also suggests the possibility of
subsystem access. However, it can be shown that the ideal
isogrid size for the loads on the PLS heatshield is too small
to provide a practical level of access.
A few concepts for making isogrid structure from
composite materials have been put forth, but from a technology
readiness standpoint, this isogrid is assumed to be produced
by machining a thick aluminum plate. The isogrid is most
competitive with, or superior to other structural concepts
when the loading is complex and especially when substantial
torsional loads are applied. Since PLS heatshield is not
primary structure in the reference configuration, only
bending, small shear and no torsional loads are imposed on the
heatshield. The isogrid is not loaded to is full potential
and is therefore less efficient than more simply-machined
shapes like a waffle pattern. Because the aluminum material
has a lower service temperature limit than the reference
graphite/polyimide, the amount of TPS must increase
correspondingly. Although the mechanically-fastened tile
carrier plate concept is easier to remove and replace than the
reference bonded tile design, the added initial cost over the
entire heatshield is not believed to be offset by the
potential savings in a localized repair situation.
The same conclusion is reached with the isogrid option as
with the skin-stringer heatshield design: the reference
composite honeycomb is recommended as the preferred concept.
The selected PLS heatshield is a graphite polyimide composite
structure stiffened by an array of lateral and longitudinal
graphite stiffeners. Graphite polyimide honeycomb is used to
separate the composite facesheets which increases the overall
stiffness and stability of the cross sections. Thermal tiles are
bonded to the heatshield in order to insulate the structure against
2000 degreesF re-entry temperatures. The significant thermal
gradient provided by the tiling system results in temperatures not
greater than 600 degreesF at the tile-to-composite skin interface.
The driving requirement for the heatshield analysis is a
direct function of the state of stress within the thermal tiles
since the ceramic tiles are inherently brittle. Analytical and
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experimental methods have shown that if the flat supporting
structure deforms such that the local radius of curvature is less
300 inches, the resulting stress in the tile will exceed the
ultimate and the tile will probably crack. Therefore, the
governing requirement for the heat shield design is to maintain
radii of curvature above 300 inches throughout the structure.
(Note: This design requirement refers to a flat surface tile
installation. The more fundamental requirement is to limit the
strain exposure on all tiles. This, then, also applies to tiles
which are initially machined and installed on curved surfaces.)
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Figure 5-20. NASTRAN Model - Lower Heatshield Finite Element Model
Figure 5-20 presents the finite element model formulated to
analyze the heatshield. The geometry has been idealized by
linearizing the heatshield's curved taper. All other simplifying
assumptions are made such that the heatshield's structural behavior
is not altered. The boundary conditions are the joint connections
that attach the heatshield to the vehicle interface (extension
frames). The plates have been modeled such that the facesheets
provide stiffness against membrane and bending loads while the
honeycomb provides stiffness against shear loads. Half-inch
polyimide honeycomb along with 8-ply, symmetric graphite facesheets
were used in the analysis.
The loading conditions are as follows:
1. One psi uniformly, distributed re-entry pressure load.
• 600 degreeF uniform re-entry temperature distribution
with the provision that in-plane expansion of the
heatshield is allowed. (Due to the joint designs, the
resulting internal loads are negligible).
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The 1 psi load case is due to the 3 G re-entry acceleration
loading. The actual loads have been approximated as a uniformly
distributed static load. Due to the nature of the load versus
time, the static approximation is adequate. A factor of safety of
1.4 is applied to the results from this load case.
Subdividing the heatshield into four bays, each bay separated
by a lateral stiffener and numbered 1 to 4, Bay #1 being the
forward bay, the deflections due to the 1 psi loading are as
follows:
Bay #1 - 0.005 inches
Bay #2 - 0.15 inches
Bay #3 - 0.50 inches
Bay #4 - 0.979 inches
Figure 5-21. NASTRAN Model - Lower Heatshield Deflections
The deflected pattern and a detailed displacement contour are
presented in Figures 5-21 and 5-22, respectively. The principal
normal stresses vary in the following manner:
Bay #I - 500 psi
Bay #2 - 1700 psi
Bay #3 - 4000 psi
Bay #4 - 5300 psi
Figures 5-23 and 5-24 present the normal and shear stresses
transformed to the principal axes. It is apparent that the heat
shield does possess adequate strength; however, the stiffness is
not adequate as seen from the relatively large deflections
occurring in Bay #4. From plate theory, using moment-curvature
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Figure 5-22. NASTRAN Model - Lower aeatshield - Displacement Contours
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Figure 5-23. NASTRAN Model - Lower Heatshield - Normal Stresses
relations, the mid-span radius of curvature at bay #4 is
approximately 400 inches which meets the 300 inch minimum criteria.
However, the results can be improved by adding another lateral
stiffener in the middle of Bay #4.
Figure 5-25 shows the heatshield finite element model with the
additional stiffener. The new deflected pattern and displacement
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Figure 5-24. NASTRAN Model - Lower Heatshield - Shear Stresses
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Figure 5-25. NASTRAN Model - Lower Heatshield - Finite Element Model
with Additional Stiffener
contours are presented in Figures 5-26 and 5-27, respectively. The
maximum deflections in the aft bay are reduced to 0.484 inches.
The corresponding radius of curvature is ii00 inches which provides
a large margin against tile fracture.
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Figure 5-26. NASTRAN Model - Lower Heatshield Deflections
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Figure 5-27. NASTRANModel - Lower Heatshield Displacement Contours
For the temperature distribution load case, the model was
allowed in-plane expansion, due to the nature of the joints
connecting the heatshield to the vehicle. With this assumption,
the contribution of this load case to the radius of curvature is
zero. However, if the joints do not allow the free expansion of
heatshield, internal loads will develop which will further warp the
heatshield. Figure 5-28 shows the free expansion of the
heatshield.
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Figure 5-28.
Expansion)
NASTRAN Model - Lower Heatshield (In Plane Free
5.1.6 _andinu Gear
The nose gear and main gear are electrically deployed and
stowed by redundant low power electromechanical actuators. These
actuators are driven either by redundant auto-control circuitry of
the auto-flight guidance computer or by manual switch activation.
In an emergency case, the nose gear and the main gear can be
mechanically deployed to "free fall". Gear-Stowed and Gear-
Deployed annunciators are located on the flight panel. Gear status
data are also sent to the onboard maintenance system (OMS) computer
for processing and to the central master communication system
computers for telemetry to ground operations.
The landing gear for PLS is based on current fighter
technology concepts. The nose gear is a conventional dual-wheel
design that pivots aft to deploy. The main gear is a single wheel
concept for each side, also with a down-and-aft deployment motion.
Both the nose and main gear use electric deployment with a pyro
backup. Both designs also use electric braking hardware with the
nose gear using electric steering and the main gear employing an
antiskid feature.
The nose gear is mounted to the forward cabin bulkhead with a
strut rake of eight degrees. The main gear is mounted to the
forward (front spar) wing carry-through frame.
To reduce the gear slapdown tendency of the PLS vehicle, the
main landing gear was moved forward nearly i0 inches from its
initial position on the "reference" configuration. Although from a
c.g. relationship standpoint this location is still too far aft, to
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Figure 5-29. Tail Scrape Clearance at Landing
move it any farther forward would have detrimental effects on the
primary structure, fin and gear load paths, passenger seat pitch
and wing folding design. Also, as the main gear is moved farther
forward, it must lengthen to achieve a satisfactory tail ground
clearance. (The current tail clearance angle is 25 degrees (see
Figure 5-29) which is more than the minimum recommended value of 17
degrees).
Lengthening the landing gear would have serious stability
consequences in addition to increasing the weight of the landing
gear subsystem. A vehicle overturning calculation was performed on
the preferred PLS landing gear geometry, using the following
equation; A=arctan (2hL/W(L-d)), where A is the overturning angle,
w is the track width of the main gear, d is the location of the
c.g. ahead of the main gear, h is the location of the c.g. above
groundlevel and L is the vehicle wheelbase. The results are an
angle, A of 50 degrees at touchdown and 44 degrees during rollout,
both of which are acceptable values.
5._.7 Thermal Protection/Thermal Control System
The trajectory used to evaluate the PLS vehicle re-entry
heating is the same as that used for the Rockwell ACRV lifting body
vehicle. The PLS and the ACRV lifting body configurations are
nearly identical except for two features. The forward half of the
AMLS/PLS has a trapezoidal-shaped cross-section whereas the ACRV is
more rectangular in shape. The other difference is that the lower
trailing edge of the ACRV body is flared upwards whereas the
AMLS/PLS vehicle is straight in this area.
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The entry trajectory is based on a vehicle reentering with a
maximum L/D of 1.3 (Figure 5-30). This trajectory was modified to
include a time-to-touchdown segment to provide a complete thermal
analysis since the original trajectory terminated at an 85,000 foot
altitude. The Space Shuttle STS-5, End-of-Mission flight segment
was used to complete the trajectory.
Aerothermal Analysis. The heating rates were computed for
only the convective component assuming real gas, equilibrium
chemistry. Since the AMLS/PLS vehicle will be reentering the
atmosphere from Earth orbit, the hot-gas radiation to the vehicle
surface will be a negligible contributor to the total heating and
therefore, it was not calculated in this analysis. All heat fluxes
reported here are radiation equilibrium values. Heating rates at
four constant wall temperatures were calculated and are available
for review.
Figure 5-31 shows the locations where the reentry heating was
evaluated. These points include the nose stagnation point, points
along the lower and upper body centerline, points along the vehicle
shoulder and side, a point on the fin leading edge and points on
the lower and upper wing surfaces. Figure 5-31 also shows the
maximum heating rates the surface locations experience during
reentry. Figure 5-32 presents the total heating history of a
selected body point (e.g. the nose stagnation point).
BP No, 11 B.P, No. 12 E.P.N 0_t4 B.p. No. 16
1.2 0.8 26 0.6
.,e..,- / / /
31 8
.e..o. 2 9 6.4 6.4
,.p._._ ,.p.,o.4 Be._.s ,.p.,o.6
MAXIMUM HEATING RATES
ALL VALUES EXPRESSED IN BTU/FT2-SEC
Figure 5-31. Locations For Entry Heating Analyses
The type of thermal protection material needed for the vehicle
can be roughly estimated by assuming the surface temperatures to be
equal to the radiative equilibrium wall temperatures calculated
from the radiative equilibrium heat fluxes. For example, the heat
5-28
_0CC
ill I ill
380003
I I
I
3600C0 _
t
340003
-
%
320000
- _
- _
2.8000C
t
- \
M.- 260000
240000 --
N
j 22000O
2000O0
18000O
160000
_40000
120000
100000
-I I I
80000
0
i I I
LANGLEY LIFTING BODY
i i _ I i i i i i i I i i I I
\
\
\
Ill I II III II] III t II, II I II _
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
I I I_
m
\
1800 200O
TIME CSEC]
Figure 5-30. Reference Entry Trajectory for Thermal Analyses
flux value of 52 Btu/ft2-sec corresponds to a radiative equilibrium
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Figure 5-32. Nose Stagnation Point Heating Time History
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wall temperature of 2900 degreesF which is the limit of high-
temperature insulation (e.g. Shuttle tile). Above this value,
higher temperature materials such as RCC or ACC must be considered.
It is apparent that the vehicle will require some of these higher
temperature materials around the nose area and on wing leading
edges. All other areas can be covered with state-of-the-art
insulation materials. All of the upper surface values are
conservative. Minimum attached flow heating was used for the upper
surface since leeward flow heating is difficult to predict
analytically.
TPS/TCS Descriptions. The flight environment used to size the
TPS materials is based on the nominal trajectory described above.
Most of the materials specified for the AMLS/PLS vehicle have been
certified for i00 missions by the Space Shuttle Program. The High
Thermal Performance (HTP) tile material and graphite polyimide
honeycomb structural material are relatively new to manned space
vehicle design. These new materials will require a test program to
obtain certifiable thermal performance data.
The TPS sizing methodology employed is derived from the Space
Shuttle Program. Twenty four one-dimensional thermal math models
were constructed at the locations shown in Figure 5-31 to simulate
TPS and structure temperature response due to the reentry heating.
The TMMs were analyzed using the Rockwell Multidimensional Heat
Conduction Computer Program, XF0031.
The one-dimensional TMMs used for the PLS analysis ignored gap
heating in the tile gaps because of the reduced tile gap dimensions
using the direct-bond tile concept. The TMMs also ignored the
delta t-bars (the effective heat capacity of nearby structure)
because of the minimal heatsink capacity of the graphite polyimide
heatshield structure material.
Inner moldline (IML) cooling, from Shuttle experience, was
assumed to take place during the AMLS/PLS vehicle TAEM maneuver.
IML cooling is convective heat transfer from the structure to the
air. For the Shuttle, air vent opening during entry occurs at a
velocity approximately 2400 ft/sec which is after peak reentry
heating. For the AMLS/PLS TPS sizing analysis, this same velocity
was assumed for the initiation of IML cooling.
For construction of the TMMs, the AMLS/PLS vehicle was divided
into five representative areas. These areas are the lower surface,
upper surface, side, wing and leading edges. The TMMs define the
TPS and structural characteristics of each area.
The lower surface contains ten one-dimensional TMMs, of which
five TMMs are located along the vehicle centerline coinciding with
aeroheating analysis body point locations. The centerline TMM
configurations are illustrated in Figure 5-34. The HTP-6 tile
material was sized to a maximum bondline temperature of 550
degreesF and the TG-15000 internal insulation was sized to achieve
a maximum aluminum primary structure temperature of 120 degreesF.
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The remaining five lower
surface TMMs are located at the
same vehicle X-axis stations as the
aeroheating body points but are
located outboard of the crew cabin.
The outboard TMM configurations are
illustrated in Figure 5-35. The
MTP-6 tile material was sized to a
maximum bondline temperature of 550
degreesF and the TG-15000 internal
insulation material was sized to
produce a maximum enclosure and
aluminum frame temperature of 350
degrees F.
1-D TMM
]MM 1202 - 1205 & 1215
OML
HTP -6 IILE
(_) R3V - 560
_D GRAPHITE/POLYIMIDE
0 GRAPHITE/POLYIMID£ H/C
To-,sooo
Figure 5-35. Lower Surface
Outboard Thermal Math Models
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Figure 5-34. Centerline
Thermal Math Models
The upper surface contains
seven one-dimensional TMMs
(Figure 5-36), of which four are
located along the upper centerline
coinciding with the aeroheating
body point locations. The AFRSI
insulation blanket material was
sized to achieve a maximum bondline
temperature of 550 degreesF and the
TG-15000 insulations was sized to
produce a maximum aluminum
structural temperature of 120
degreesF.
The remaining three TMMs (Figure 5-37) are located at the
corresponding vehicle X-axis stations of the aeroheating body
points but outboard of the crew cabin, The AFRSI material was
sized for a maximum bondline temperature of 550 degreesF and the
TG-15000 internal insulation material was sized to achieve a
maximum enclosure temperature of 350 degreesF.
The side area consists of three on-dimensional TMMs which
coincide with the aeroheating body point locations. The side TMMs
are illustrated in Figure 5-38. The HTP-6 tile material was sized
to achieve a maximum bondline temperature of 550 degreesF and the
TG-15000 insulation was sized to produce maximum enclosure
temperatures of 350 degreesF.
5-32
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Figure 5-36. Upper Surface
Thermal Math Models
The wing area contains a
single on-dimensional TMM which is
located at the pair of inner and
outer aeroheating body points.
This TMM is illustrated in Figure
5-39. The insulation materials
were sized to achieve a bondline
temperature of 550 degreesF.
The leading edge areas contain
two one-dimensional TMMs located at
the nose stagnation point and wing
leading edge stagnation point.
These areas are high entry heating
locations and require an outer
moldline material of RCC or ACC.
In the nose area, the cerachrome
insulation material was sized to a
maximum structure temperature of
550 degreesF and the TG-15000
insulation was sized to produce a
maximum interior surface
temperature of 350 degreesF. For
the wing leading edge area, the
cerachrome insulation material was
sized to produce a maximum spar
structure temperature of 550
degreesF. The results of the
TPS/TCS sizing analysis are
presented in Table 5-2 which shows
TPS thicknesses and maximum
material temperatures. The
temperature response histories for
each Thermal Math Model are
provided in Reference 5-1.
From the results of the
analysis, two design issues were
revealed. First, the 3400 degreeF
temperature predicted for the nose
stagnation point exceeds the
maximum allowable temperature for
RCC by some 200 degreesF. Either
an ACC material must be certified
for this temperature and
application or the flight
TMM 1206 - 1"208 &" lOOg
OUL • -
*rRS,
_]) RT9 - 56O
_D GRAPHITE/POLYIklIDE
GRAPHITE/F'OLYIk(IDEH/C
 TC-,sooo
Figure 5-37. Thermal Math
Models Outboard of the Crew
Cabin
trajectory must be modified to reduce the stagnation point heating.
A third option is to increase the nose radius of the vehicle to
reduce the nose surface temperature. Full-temperature ceramics are
a long range possibility but NASP applications find it necessary to
use active cooling in their high temperature areas (2800 to 3100
degreeF).
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Figure 5-38. Thermal Math
Models for the Side Area
a direct effect on the TPS
thicknesses. A design entry
trajectory will have to be devel-
oped which encompasses all possible
cross range trajectories (landing
sites) and abort scenarios
to size the TPS for a "worst case"
mission. The design entry inter-
face temperatures are based on the
sun and Earth orientation to the
vehicle, the TPS optical properties
and the PLS on-orbit duration. The
design entry interface temperatures
will have to encompass all possible
orbit operations to determine the
highest temperatures the vehicle
could experience at entry
interface.
This doesn't suggest that the
TPS sized here is marginal. On the
contrary, the results summarized in
Table 5-2, indicate a substantial
design margin on most of the
vehicle lower surface. The
"reference" vehicle design allowed
The second design issue is
really a manufacturing item. The
calculated AFRSI thicknesses for
PLS range from 0.88 inches to 0.08
inches. The AFRSI blankets for the
Shuttle Program are currently being
manufactured in nine different
thicknesses ranging from 1.60
inches to only 0.41 inches. If the
AFRSI material cannot be
manufactured in the thinner
dimensions, then some areas of the
upper PLS surface will receive
insulation with 400% design margin.
The results of the sizing
analysis are based on the
assumption of a nominal entry
trajectory and a maximum entry
interface temperature of 150
degreesF. These two parameters
have
1-D TMM
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Figure 5-39.
Math Model
Wing Thermal
a six-inch dimension between the lower vehicle outer surface (OML)
and the crew cabin lower structural moldline over the entire lower
surface of the PLS for the total of TPS, heatshield and TCS
thicknesses. As Table 5-2 shows, the sum of the tile thickness,
the half-inch graphite polyimide heatshield honeycomb thickness and
the internal insulation thickness at all body points is less (in
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some places, much less) than the 6-inch allowance. This means that
either some growth in TPS/TCS dimension can be accommodated for
more vigorous trajectories or that the crew cabin temperatures can
be reduced from the levels assumed in this analysis.
Table 5-2. TPS Thicknesses and Material Temperatures
!"0 PLS PLS TENP. EXTERNAL INTERNAL NAXI_IIJI4 MATERIAL TENPI[RATUR[
TNM AREA X/L FIG 0 TPS TRICE. TPS THICI(. RCC CERA HTM-6 RTY ML G/P AFRS[ TGIS
1081 RLE 0 2.2 5.&26 1.404 3397 3402 ............... 540 ..... 463
1002 LSCL 0.Z5 2.5 I .TZ3 1.561 .......... 1719 540 120 $41' ..... 5_K,
lZ02 &SOl 0.25 2.& 1,752 1.473 .......... 1719 5/,8 ..... 547 ..... 535
1003 LSCL 0.5 2.5 1.501 1.526 .......... 15/,2 $/,8 120 $47 ..... 5)5
lZ03 LSOi 0.3 2.6 1.53Y 1.509 .......... 1542 546 ..... 546 ..... S35
1004 LSCL 0._ 2.7 1.399 1.504 .......... 1509 548 lZ0 547 ..... 535
1204, LS_ O.Tq_ 2.8 1.43 1.506 .......... 1509 _,8 ..... $41 ..... 538
1005 LSCL 1 2.9 1.357 1.487 .......... 1608 540 120 $40 ..... $35
lZ0_ LSOI 1 2.10 1.386 1.48 .......... 1609 5/,0 ..... 5/,7 ..... 557
1006 USCL 0.1 2.11 0.676 1.108 ............... S&8 348 ..... 1115 343
1206 USO8 0.1 2.12 0,296 2.482 ............... 5/,9 ..... 5/,7 1090 537
1007 USCL 0.25 Z.13 0.588 0.T_5 ............... 550 349 ..... 015 344
1207 USO8 0,25 2.14 0.18 2.56 ............... 549 ..... 548 077 537
1008 USCL O.S 2.15 O.&Z8 1.1 ............... S/,8 347 ..... ?8] 342
lZ08 USOI 0.5 2.16 0.116 2.626 ............... S#,9 ..... S_,7 735 536
1009 USCL 1 2.17 O. 078 2.708 ............... 548 ..... S&6 623 539
1010 UtE 2.18 5.711 ..... 2374 2345 ............... 547 ..........
1011 bll.S 2.19 2.437 ............... 1613 550 ..... SA8 ..........
I01Z SIDE 0.25 Z.20 1.831 1.405 .......... 1863 548 ..... 547 ..... S35
t013 SlOE 0.5 2.21 1.3/,2 1.520 .......... 1681 550 ..... 549 ..... 541
1014 SIDE 1 2.22 0.338 1.991 .......... 046 549 ..... S48 ..... SAZ
1015 LSCL 0.1 2.23 3.119 1.79 .......... ZSG_ 548 ..... $47 ..... 533
1215 LS_ 0.1 2.24 3.266 4.912 .......... 2S04 549 ..... 049 ..... 542
1016 tdlJS 2.19 0.052 .................... 551 ..... 546 608 .....
To summarize the results of the TPS study, the AMLS/PLS
vehicle design has no major TPS technical concerns. The TPS
materials available today are adequate to protect the vehicle
structure from the extreme temperatures of the proposed entry
trajectory.
The AMLS/PLS vehicle design has a few minor TPS technical
concerns to be addressed during the subsequent design phase. The
AFRSI material thickness issue for the upper vehicle surface, the
on-orbit thermal gradient control or assumption, the effect of the
entry interface temperatures and the effect of the structural
thermal gradients during entry are highlighted as important issues
for follow-on assessment.
Avionics Thermal Control Analysis. A fundamental operational
goal of the PLS program is to eliminate the use of cold plates for
avionic component cooling and to adopt a "passive" (heatsink)
cooling concept for all avionics (and other heat generating
equipment to the extent possible). The historic trend of avionics
components has been the general reduction in size, weight and
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especially in power consumption. The PLS exploits this development
by proposing a passive concept which is similar to that employed by
the avionics systems of modern aircraft in unpressurized
compartments. This study was undertaken to verify the feasibility
of this approach and to understand the thermal performance of
representative avionic system components in the PLS installation
environment.
Another contribution to the viability of the passive cooling
approach is the assumption that the PLS will be operated in modes
which are compatible with the passive concept. The heat generation
history of the PLS mission benefits from the low power consumption
(and therefore, heat rejection) of the system during the powered-
down mode which the vehicle assumes when it is docked at Space
Station. Operating the PLS in this fashion potentially puts the
vehicle in the simpler cooling method regime.
In addition to the low heat dissipation of modern avionics and
the mission operation approach, a third factor supporting the
passive concept is the higher heat tolerance characteristics of
modern avionics. Recent studies have shown that there is very
little steady state avionics temperature difference between active
and passively cooled avionics configurations. Modern avionics
temperature specifications for aircraft state requirements of 230
degreesF for 30 minutes which is above the environmental conditions
of PLS as determined by this analysis.
A thermal math model was developed for the avionics boxes
using Rockwell's General Thermal Analysis Program (GTAP). Various
box stacking arrangements were considered and a combination was
selected which is representative of a worst (hottest) case. This
arrangement was analyzed for box temperature history and
temperature distribution.
Avionics boxes are located both inside (principally the
displays and controls) and outside the crew cabin. Figure 5-40
shows the general location of boxes external to the pressure vessel
of the PLS vehicle in an "avionics bay". The electronic boxes are
stacked in such a way so that the box with a higher power
dissipation is next to one with a lower power dissipation. Any
stacking order can be accommodated using connecting cables. Each
box is attached to an aluminum frame which is integrated with the
PLS primary structure. The list of avionics equipment and related
duty cycles developed from the PLS power history analysis and used
in this thermal assessment is shown in Table 5-3.
The following assumptions were made in developing the Thermal
Math Model (TMM):
i. The mounting frame is at the same temperature as the
vehicle structure.
i The vehicle structure acts as a heat sink and can absorb
all the thermal dissipation produced by the avionics.
5-36
\A_,o,_,__,_y/'_
Figure 5-40. Location of Avionics Boxes
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Table 5-3. Avionics Boxes and Related Duty Cycles
Unit Unit Toud _ Launc_ _ lend&Pr_
•"_i _ I_-'_ Subs_mr£mJl=,-_-=" _ Wn:m. I (W=,_.,! 0.17 1.0C 11.50
IMU - UNS 750 2. 33.00 66.o0 100_0 100.o0 100.001 lO0.00
GPS _.r(S-CtumMi. 81bs) 2 12.00_ 242)O 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.0¢
GPS AntmmL 2 20.0O 40J_ 100J_: 100O0 100.00 100.001
lULIrrdar 2 3O.00 6O.00 100.0C 10OO0 100.00 100.00
Ak' OamK Probe 1 72.00 7200 0`00 O.CC 0`00 0.00
AJr Ores AsMrnb_ 1 35.0O 35_0 0`00 0J_ 0`00 0J)0
Hor_ Sensc¢ EbcL 2 11.00 22J_ 100.00 100.0(: 100.0C 100.00
Hodzon Sensor (l-bad) _ 25.00 50,00 100.00 100.00_ 100.0(: 100.00
Starrack_ 1 30.00 3O.00 0.00 0_0 0.00! 0.00
Micmwa_ _ Sysiorn 1: 10.0¢ 10.00 0`0O 0`OO 0.00 0.00
Radar 1 30.0C 30,00 0.0C 0`_ 0J_ 11.0(:
Radar SignaJ Procmsor 1 30.00 30_0 0.0¢ 0.00 0`00 11.0C
'kW.l -"
0.115
0.31 Aumna_
0.51 C¢4insl
0`7"7 Collins
0`00_
0`OO
. 0.28
0.r>4
0`00
0`00
O.O4
0.04
Main _ws(At, C) 2 12¢00 25Z00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 3,.2,4 O_,
_ _) I 111.00 111_ 100_0 100_ 100.00 100.00 1_ O_
]U::3 _ _ 202.o0 4o4..00 100.00 10o.0¢ 100.00 100.00 5,.20 JIAWG
]B,_zzz:r/_ - 2J 111.0¢ 222.00 100.00 100J00 100o0(: 100.00 2.86 JIAWG
]14ai Ea I_ Cmm:4]_ 1! 202.00! 20?..00 100.00 100.00 I00`00_ 0.00 0.28 JtAWG
C._ 4 132..00 52_00 100.00 100.00 0.00 0.0(: 0`S2 JIAWG
Avkmlcs t'EbudLb& MoaJlar)
Badcup HeaJth & Mmitz:dng 1 40.00 4_.00 0.00 0.100 0.00 0.00 0.0C -larnilon Std
Sacm:rs 700 0.10 70.00 100`00 100.0(: 10(1.00 100.00 0.90 Han'_lton SIC
Fva Suppress_n Systeml 1 5.00 5.00 100.00 100.0C 100`00 100.00 0`06
A,ytoaia (Carom. &Trar._nL)
Audm TerTnmaJ - 2 1.00 2.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.0(: 0.03
GPS A.-mnns Switch 1 5.00 5.00 100J_ 100_0 10_00 100.0(: 0.06
Heads_ & Mik_ " 2 5.00 10,00 100.0¢ 100.00 100.00 100.0¢ 0.13
Par_ Display 2 15.00 30J_ 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.001 0.39
S-Band Ant_nrm Swild_ 2 5.00 10J_ 100.00 100.00 100.00 1(:0.00 0.13 Col_
S-Band Tranmor_r ; 2_00 50.O¢ 100.00 10_0(: 100.00 100.00 0`S4
SARSAT Transr_er 1 40.00 40.00' 100.00 100.0(: 0._ 0.00 0.0!
UHFTm ;. 15.0(: 30.00 100_0 100`0¢ 100.0¢ 100.00 0.39
_l**,-,. (D_p. & C--troJ-)
1 5.00 5.00 100.001 100.00 100.00 100.0¢ 0.06
Dis#ay CorSdl_ " 2 25.00 50J_0 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.0¢ 0.64
Dis_ and Seer- _ 1 5.00 5`0C 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.0(: 0.0E
EbcL _ _ Gen. 1 5.00 5.0¢ 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 0`0_
Head-up Ob;_zy _ 40.00 80J00 100n0 100.0C 1000.00 100.00 1.0_
Ughtz, HI "J 40.00 ll0JX) 100.00 0.DC 0.00 100.00 0.93
Low 1(: 5.0C 502)0 100.00 100-00 100.0¢ 100.00 0.84
Switctm_ (i As Req_m,d) 10.B: 0`00 100.00 100.00 100.0C 100.00 0`00
Signal CondlJmer 2: 8.00 16.00 100.00 100.00 100`00 100.00 0.21
Vn,_" R_.T_.-'._- 1 5.00 5.00 100.0(_ 100.00 100.00 100.00 0.06 22.'
.
The avionics boxes are attached to the standard aviation
equipment racks with 6-32 fasteners.
Figure 5-41 illustrates the low heat production nature of the
PLS mission operation. Because the heat generation is low and the
temperature response of the avionics and the structure to which it
is mounted is slow, the heatsink thermal technique is promising.
The avionics characteristics provided by Collins Military
Avionics gave dimensions, connector requirements, operating
conditions and power dissipation. Each avionics box is attached
identically to the PLS avionics equipment racks. The resistance
network for each box is also identical. In the computer model,
all power consumption numbers are multiplied by a factor of 0.15 to
convert them to thermal dissipation.
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Figure 5-41. Heat Production of the Vehicle is Low
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A transient thermal math model is developed by estimating the
conducting mass of each avionics box. The electronic circuits,
etc. may have copper, silver, aluminum and other conducting metals
imbedded in plastic (polymer). Since the attach points are
aluminum and most of the circuit support structure is also
aluminum, an equivalent aluminum mass is assigned to each box.
This is a conservative assumption, since the temperature response
with time will be faster.
The conductance and heat dissipation were estimated, including
the view factors between boxes and the surrounding enclosure. A
thermal math model was then developed by inputting the
conductances, surface areas, heat dissipation and view factors for
the assigned nodes into the GTAP.
A steady state thermal model was run on an IBM 370 mainframe
computer with various enclosure surface temperatures and also with
additional conduction paths to the structure to reduce the box
temperatures to the specified operating ranges.
Peak structural limitations established a temperature of 350
degreesF for the avionics bay as a TPS/TCS design upper limit. A
temperature history of the avionics bay area was developed in the
PLS aerothermal and TPS sizing study and is presented in Figure 5-
42. The upper plot gives the temperature history of the outer
moldline which peaks at about 1600 degrees F for this area of the
vehicle surface. The three plots (traces B, C and D in the middle
of the graph are for the graphite polyimide heatshield bondline
area. Trace "E" represents the temperature history of the inside
surface of the internal insulation (TG-15000) and shows that the
peak of 330 degreesF is approached for only a few seconds before it
begins to diminish. However, when the avionics thermal analysis
was performed, the enclosure temperatures were defined as steady
state temperatures of 250, 300 and 350 degrees F for the cases run.
This approach adds a level of conservatism to the results.
The remaining parameter is the structure (sink) temperature.
A range of 60 to 150 degrees F is used in the computer runs.
Although the maximum design temperature of the crew cabin structure
is 120 degrees F, the lower range is analyzed to broaden the study.
A series of computer runs showed that only in the case where
the initial temperature of the cavity was 350 degreesF did the
avionics briefly exceed their normal permitted steady state operat-
ing limits of 158 degreesF. With lower initial temperatures, the
avionics are not expected to experience the marginal conditions.
5.1 8 Inteqrated Propulsion System
The propulsion system consists of an Orbit Maneuvering System
(OMS) and a Reaction Control System (RCS). The propulsion system
provides I000 feet per second of delta-V capability with another
i00 feet per second for Space Station proximity operations
maneuvering.
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Figure 5-42. Temperature History for the Avionics Bay
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The "reference" propulsion system concept for the PLS is a
hydrazine monopropellant system designed with fail-op, fail-safe
reliability. To support the ease of maintenance and rapid
turnaround program objectives, the propulsion system design
emphasizes low toxicity propellants and safe design approaches.
Alternate P_opulsion Concepts. The propulsion system options
to evaluate in the study are representative of a range of current
propulsion technologies encompassing storable and cryogenic
concepts. The concepts compared are:
I) the reference hydrazine system,
2) a bipropellant concept (MMH/N204),
3) three versions of a JP4/H204 system with different RCS
modes,
4) a cryogenic concept (Methane/LOX).
Each propulsion system incorporates a full 6-degree of freedom
RCS capability.
Hydrazine Monopropellant (Reference).
A monopropellant concept uses about half the hardware of
a bipropellant system which increases system reliability,
reduces ground operations and reduces system hardware and
installation costs. However, the reduced performance of the
hydrazine system results in a weight penalty. Additionally,
the high toxicity of the propellant precludes "simple,
airline-type" operations.
The system concept incorporates a cold gas (GN2), six
degree of freedom system for use during Space Station
proximity operations. The cold gas capability is integrated
with the hot gas pressurization system to reduce tankage and
hardware. (Space Station prox-ops is defined as being within
500 feet of the Space Station). The OMS and RCS tanks have
been integrated to further reduce hardware and ground
checkout.
Thrust levels are determined by scaling present Shuttle
thrust levels to provide an equivalent thrust/weight ratio for
the PLS. The results are an OMS thrust level of 1200 pounds
(with four engines), an RCS thrust level of 80 pounds and a
cold gas vernier thrust level of 2 pounds. Propellant weights
are determined using the rocket equation and the following
performance assumptions: an OMS Engine Isp of 230 seconds
(Rocket Research MR-87a, 3001bf engine), an RCS Engine Isp of
215 seconds (Rocket Research MR-104, 80 ibf engine) and a GN2
engine Isp of 72 seconds.
Gaseous nitrogen is used as the cold gas for this system
concept due to its low cost and ease of servicing compared to
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helium. It is assumed that the starting mass of the GN2 is
the initial wet weight less 25% of the OMS and RCS load since,
before cold gas initiation, it is assumed that the vehicle has
achieved orbit and maneuvered to the Space Station. All
propellant weights listed in the hardware list include a 15%
margin for off-nominal performance, GN&C errors, etc. Tank
sizes are determined using the density of hydrazine at 68
degrees F and adding 25% for ullage. This provides a blowdown
capability in the event of a pressurization system failure.
The GN2 tanks for propulsion and pressurization are integrated
to reduce the number of regulators, tanks and isolation valves
in the system. The GN2 tanks are sized based of a maximum
operating pressure of 4000 psi per current Shuttle design
practice.
The monopropellant, fail-op/fail safe concept (Figure 5-43)
achieves two fault tolerance and continuous abort capability
through dual-redundant feed paths for both the pressurant and the
propellant, redundant thrusters and a limited blowdown capability.
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The hardware for this concepts is as follows:
Component Weiqht _otes
N2 Tanks (2) 200 pounds
N2H4 Tanks (2) 500 pounds
Lines
Regulators (4)
GN2 Iso (i0)
N2H4 Iso (13)
Relief (2)
Fill/Drain (7)
RCS Prim.
RCS Vern.
OMS (4)
GN2
N2H4
49 pounds
8 pounds
22 pounds
46 pounds
4 pounds
7 pounds
(26) 107 pounds
(16) 2 pounds
80 pounds
240 pounds
3842 pounds
5.9 cubic foot volume
73.5 cubic foot volume
5% of Total Weight
Existing Components
Existing Components
Existing Components
Existing Components
Existing Components
Magellan, RR MR-104
Existing Design
RRMr-87a
Dry Weight 1023 pounds
Total Weight 5105 pounds
There are a number of technological issues associated
with the hydrazine monopropellant concept. They are:
im The bladders for the non-spherical tanks may be more
prone to twist and leak than for spherical tanks. Metal
bladders may not be reusable.
• Each mission may require 1.2 million Ib-sec total impulse
from the OMS engines. Present thrusters have
demonstrated only 700,000 ib-sec total impulse. This is
especially a problem with high thrust engines since the
large propellant flow causes degradation of the catalyst
beds.
3. The N2H4 components will require a man-rating program.
MMH/N204 Bipropellant Alternate.
A bipropellant system requires almost twice the hardware
of the reference monopropellant system which decreases the
system reliability and increases ground operations as well as
hardware and installation costs. However, the increased
performance of the MMH/N204 system results in significant
weight savings (about 1300 fewer pounds at launch)• Similar
to the monopropellant concept, the hypergolic's high toxicity
will make simple, airline-type ground operations difficult•
The concept also incorporates a cold gas (GN2), six
degree of freedom system for use during Space Station
proximity operations to reduce tankage and hardware• The
design groundrules are the same as for the reference hydrazine
system. The assumed thrust levels are 1200 ibf (total) for
the OMS, 80 ibf for each RCS engine and 2 ibf for each cold
gas vernier engine. Propellant weights are determined using
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the rocket equation and the following performance assumptions:
an OMS engine Isp of 294 seconds (based on the performance of
the Marquardt Mariner/Viking 300 ibf engine); an RCS engine
Isp of 304 seconds (based on the performance of the Marquardt
Apollo SM 100 Ibf engine) and a GN2 cold gas engine Isp of 72
seconds. Gaseous nitrogen is used as the cold gas for the
prox/ops due to its low cost and ease of servicing compared to
helium. It is assumed that the starting mass for the GN2 is
the initial wet weight less 25% of the OMS and RCS load since,
before cold gas system initiation, it is assumed that the
vehicle has achieved orbit and maneuvered to the Space
Station.
All propellant weights in the hardware list include a 15%
margin for off-nominal performance, GN&C errors, etc. Tank
sizes are determined using the density of MMH/N204 at 68
degrees F with 25% volume added for ullage. This provides a
blowdown capability in the event of a pressurization system
failure. The GN2 tanks for propulsion and pressurization have
been integrated to reduce the number of regulators, tanks and
isolation valves in the system. The GN2 tanks are sized based
on a maximum operating pressure of 4000 psi (current Shuttle
RCS tank design).
The biprop system features the elimination of all check
valves. Shuttle experience has shown that the check valves do
not always accomplish their goal of preventing vapors from
migrating through the OMS system. In addition, ground
operations efforts associated with the checkout of check
valves are very expensive. For the PLS, check valves have
been replaced with normal isolation valves. This allows a
larger procurement of isolation valves, eliminates the small
procurement of check valves and reduces the number of
different checkout procedures imposed on the ground crew. The
primary mode of operation for this system would specify closed
tank isolation valves during on-orbit operations with an
occasional opening for repressurization and OMS burns. This
minimizes the pressurization system exposure to vapors.
The philosophy used in the biprop system is similar to
the that of the monopropellant concept with one exception. In
the monoprop system, tankage pressurant isolation was
accomplished with a single isolation valve. A fail-open did
not affect the system performance and the first fail-closed
still left half of the propellant under pressure regulation
and the other half with blowdown capability. If both tank
isolation valves failed-closed there was blowdown on both
tanks. In the biprop system, this is not acceptable since the
first fail-closed would leave the whole system in a blowdown
condition. For this reason, both pressurization systems in
the biprop have the required fault tolerance.
The fail-op/fail-safe system shown in Figure 5-44,
achieves two fault tolerance and continuous abort capability
through dual redundant thrusters. During nominal operation,
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the two sides of the system are kept separated for faster
fault isolation and to allow easier propellant quantity
determination. In addition, the GN2 used for the cold gas
thrusters is isolated from the pressurant GN2 to eliminate
vapors from entering the cold gas system. If required, the
opening of the isolation valve allows cold gas GN2 to
pressurize the biprop system. The hardware for this concept
is as follows:
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Figure 5-44. Bipropellant Fail-op/Fail-safe Propulsion System
Component Weiqht Notes
N2 Tanks (2)
N204 Tanks (2)
MMH Tanks (2)
Lines
Regulators (4)
GN2 Iso (26)
N204 Iso (13)
MMH Iso (13)
Relief (2)
Fill/Drain (8)
200 pounds
96 pounds
96 pounds
43 pounds
16 pounds
54 pounds
52 pounds
52 pounds
4 pounds
8 pounds
RCS Prim. (26) 216 pounds
RCS Vern. (16) 1 pound
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4.9 cubic foot volume
12.7 cubic foot volume
12.7 cubic foot volume
5% of Total Weight
Existing Components
Existing Components
Existing Components
Existing Components
Existing Components
Existing Components
Apollo SM, i00 ibf Design
Existing Design
OMS (4) 74 pounds
GN2 186 pounds
N204 1600 pounds
MMH 1066 pounds
Mariner/Viking, 300 lbf
Dry Weight 912 pounds
Total Weight 3764 pounds
Technological issues with the bipropellant concept are:
1. The bladders for the non-spherical tanks may be more prone
to twist and leak than for spherical tanks. Metal bladders
may not be reusable.
2. The identified thrusters have not been reused before and
may not have the total impulse required for repeated missions.
JP4/H202 Propulsion Concepts.
Hydrogen peroxide propulsion systems were investigated
because they offer low toxicity and reasonable performance and
may also yield life cycle cost savings compared to
conventional storables. Since the products of the catalytic
breakdown of H202 are water and oxygen, hydrogen peroxide may
also be used in a monopropellant mode for Space Station
proximity operations. This allows the integration of both
propulsion mode tanks (OMS and RCS) into a single propellant
tank with one pressurization system. The peroxide system has
been used safely and reliably on high performance manned
vehicles, most notably, the X-15 (which used peroxide in the
reaction control system) had 195 flights 25 years ago.
Thrust levels are determined by scaling present Shuttle
thrust levels down to provide an equivalent thrust/weight
ratio for the PLS. The assumed thrust levels are 1200 lbf
(four engines) for the OMS and 80 lbf for each RCS engine and
2 lbf for each cold gas vernier engine. Propellant weights
are determined using the rocket equation and the following
performance assumptions based on analysis: an OMS engine Isp
of 277 seconds and an RCS engine Isp of 250 seconds for biprop
operation and 150 seconds for monoprop operation. It is
assumed that the starting mass for the prox-ops system is the
initial wet weight less 25% of the OMS and RCS load since,
before cold gas system initiation, the vehicle must have
achieved orbit and maneuvered to the Space Station. All
propellant weights in the hardware list include a 15% margin
for off-nominal performance, GN&C errors, etc.
Tank sizes are determined using the density of JP4/H202
at 68 degrees F with 25% volume added for ullage. This
provides a blowdown capability in the event of a pressuriz-
ation system failure. The GN2 tanks are sized based on a
maximum operating pressure of 4000 psi (current Shuttle RCS
tank design).
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Due to the large mixture ratio of 7 for this propellant
combination and the resulting difference in propellant
volumes, each side of the PLS vehicle is provided with a fuel
tank and an oxidizer tank. For this reason, three-by-three
tank isolation valves are not needed. Two failures will, at
most, isolate one tank, leaving one tank pressurized for the
deorbit burn.
Three versions of the hydrogen peroxide concepts are
evaluated to define the operational or cost benefits of
different RCS designs: 1) dual mode thrusters, 2) separate
mono- and biprop RCS thrusters and 3) mono- only thrusters).
AMLS H202/JP4
OPTION I
Fail Op -Fail Sale
• ®
Figure 5-45. Hydrogen Peroxide Fail-op/Fail-safe Propulsion System
The JP4/H202 Option 1 (Figure 5-45) concept achieves two
fault tolerance and continuous abort capability through dual
redundant feed paths for both pressurant and propellant and
through redundant thrusters. During normal operation, the two
sides of the system are separated for faster fault isolation
and for easier propellant quantity determination. This
concept features an RCS thruster design which operates in a
bipropellant mode for on-orbit operations and in a monoprop
mode for proximity operations. The advantages of this
approach are low weight and a reduction in the number of
thrusters needed. The disadvantage is higher development
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costs since the engine must be developed and tested in both
modes.
The hardware for this option is as follows:
Component Weiuht Notes
N2 Tanks (2) 87 pounds
JP4 Tanks (2) 88 pounds
H202 Tanks (2) 320 pounds
Lines
Regulators (4)
GN2 Iso (30)
Prop Iso (24)
Relief (2)
Fill/Drain (8)
Rcs (26)
OMS (4)
GN2
JP4
H202
52 pounds
16 pounds
62 pounds
96 pounds
4 pounds
8 pounds
216 pounds
74 pounds
72 pounds
321 pounds
2770 pounds
2 cubic foot volume
4 cubic foot volume
19.9 cubic foot volume
8% of Total Weight
Existing Components
Existing Components
Existing Components
Existing Components
Existing Components
New Design
New Design
Dry Weight 1023 pounds
Total Weight 4186 pounds
The JP4/H202 Option 2 concept (Figure 5-46) replaces the
dual-mode RCS thrusters of Option 1 with separate thrusters
for the biprop and monoprop RCS functions to avoid the
thruster development issue. The hardware for this option is
as follows:
ComponeDt Weiuht _otes
N2 Tanks (2)
JP4 Tanks (2)
H202 Tanks (2)
Lines
Regulators (4)
GN2 Iso (30)
Prop Iso (24)
Relief (2)
Fill/Drain (8)
RCS Prim. (26)
RSC Vern. (16)
OMS (4)
GN2
JP4
H202
87 pounds
88 pounds
320 pounds
55 pounds
16 pounds
62 pounds
96 pounds
4 pounds
8 pounds
216 pounds
32 pounds
74 pounds
72 pounds
321 pounds
2770 pounds
2 cubic foot volume
4 cubic foot volume
19.9 cubic foot volume
8% of Total Weight
Existing Components
Existing Components
Existing Components
Existing Components
Existing Components
New Design
New Design
New Design
Dry Weight
Total Weight
1057 pounds
4220 pounds
The JP4/H202 Option 3 concept (Figure 5-47) uses RSC
thrusters which operate in a monoprop mode at all times. This
creates a simpler system since fewer valves are required to
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Figure 5-46.
Thrusters
Hydrogen Peroxide Propulsion System with Separate
feed the RCS thrusters. The decreased performance of the
monopropellant thrusters results in a weight penalty of about
200 pounds in additional propellant.
The hardware for this option is as follows:
Component Weiqht Notes
N2 Tanks (2)
JP4 Tanks (2)
H202 Tanks (2)
Lines
Regulators (4)
GN2 Iso (30)
Prop Iso (21)
Relief (2)
Fill/Drain (8)
RCS Prim. (26)
RCS Vern. (16)
OMS (4)
GN2
JP4
H202
90 pounds
88 pounds
320 pounds
54 pounds
16 pounds
62 pounds
84 pounds
4 pounds
8 pounds
216 pounds
32 pounds
74 pounds
72 pounds
340 pounds
2920 pounds
2 cubic foot volume
4 cubic foot volume
19.9 cubic foot volume
8% of Total Weight
Existing Components
Existing Components
Existing Components
Existing Components
Existing Components
New Design
New Design
New Design
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Figure 5-47. Hydrogen Peroxide Propulsion with Monoprop RCS Thrusters
Dry Weight
Total Weight
1048 pounds
4380 pounds
Technological issues associated with the hydrogen
peroxide concepts are:
. The bladders for the non-spherical tanks may be more
prone to twist and leak than for spherical tanks. Metal
bladders may not be reusable.
• The identified thrusters have not been reused before and
may not have the total impulse capability required for
repeated missions.
. Hydrogen peroxide has been known to detonate when stored
in a closed container. In a clean system using proper
materials and temperature control this should not be a
problem.
Cryogenic Propulsion Concepts (Methane/LOX).
A cryogenic propellant combination is included to assess
its suitability for the PLS mission and to identify any
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advantages over the storable propellants previously
investigated.
Since hydrogen is roughly 25% more efficient than its
nearest cryogenic competitor, it is investigated first. Using
the rocket equation and assuming an Isp of 420 seconds, the
hydrogen and oxygen needed to perform the PLS OMS function is
calculated to be 1675 pounds. This represents a propellant
weight savings of about 1200 pounds over the lightest storable
concept. Unfortunately, the low density of hydrogen dictates
that 64 cubic feet is required to store the hydrogen needed
for just the OMS burns. This is nearly twice the volume
needed by the entire propellant systems of the other
propellant combinations. The storage of hydrogen in solid
hydrides was deemed to advanced for the PLS program
groundrules. For these reasons, a hydrogen-based system is
not investigated further.
A better cryogenic option is Methane/LOX due to its
relatively high specific impulse of 320 seconds and a methane
density of six times that of hydrogen. The lower carbon
content of methane reduces the coking concerns associated with
other hydrocarbon fuels such as propane. The OMS propellant
weight is calculated to be 2525 pounds which is equivalent to
the biprop, MMH/N204 concept. System volume requirements were
roughly the same as for the reference hydrazine system.
In trying to develop a system schematic for the
Methane/LOX system, a number of technical issues are raised.
While the OMS system was relatively straight forward, a
cryogenic RCS is complex. An all-cryogenic RCS thruster
capable of multiple, short pulses has never been developed.
The greatest problem in developing this thruster is heat soak-
back to the propellant feed lines and the subsequent creation
of high pressure gas in the lines. Since this development is
significant, liquid thrusters are not considered feasible
within the PLS program groundrules. Gaseous methane/oxygen
thrusters have been developed and test fired although none
have been flown. Unfortunately, there is not enough volume in
the PLS vehicle to store the entire quantity needed for OMS
burns and all of the RCS maneuvers. The solution to this
problem is a gas generator, accumulator and heat exchanger to
produce the gaseous propellant. However, this solution itself
presents a number of technical issues and adds complexity and
hardware to the system.
The conclusion reached in the investigation of cryogenic
propulsion options is that none of the cryogenic concepts will
meet the mission objectives of the PLS within volume,
operations of technology constraints, although such systems
offer significant weight savings over the storable alternates.
Propulsion Concept Trade Conclusions. The preferred
propulsion system concept for PLS is the JP4/hydrogen peroxide
alternate which uses the RCS in a monoprop mode (Option 3, Figure
5-52
5-47). The low toxicity of this propellant combination makes it a
preferred system for PLS since it has the potential to reduce
operations costs and concerns. The concept also has reasonably
good performance capability with system weight and complexity
falling between the MMH/N204 and reference hydrazine concepts.
5.1.9 Prime Power and Electrical Distribution System
The prime power and electrical distribution system consists of
the battery, distribution, and power control systems.
The power source is primarily 28 Vdc battery power capable of
sustaining approximately 3 kw total peak load with adequate
redundancy for automatic load control and provision for automatic
priority and load shedding control. Embedded circuitry is provided
for continuous BITE testing supports fault detection/fault
isolation/self healing. A separate, redundant 28 Vdc power source
provides power for the pyrotechnic devices. Power conversion from
28 Vdc to 115 Vac, 400 cycle can either be centrally provided by a
dedicated inverter or by built-in circuitry at the using element
(preferred).
The preferred prime power concept consists of a three-bus,
28Vdc, all-battery system. The tri-bus has a left-hand bus (Bus
i), a center bus (Bus 2) and a right-hand bus (Bus 3) with
provisions for auto-crossover and bus-split between Bus 1 and Bus
2. Bus 1 is the primary power source for the using elements in the
external, left-hand subsystem compartments, Bus 2 supports the
using elements inside the crew cabin and Bus 3 is the primary
source for the using elements in the right-hand external
compartments.
The following are required LRUs:
. An internally redundant bus control unit (BCU) to
provide automatic bus load control, priority control
and load shedding•
• An internally redundant converter to provide 270 Vdc
to using elements.
• An internally redundant static inverter to provide
115 Vac, 400 cycle if required.
The cockpit control remote control circuit breakers (RCCBs)
are located in the vicinity of the batteries.
Power History Development. A detailed power-use history of
the PLS vehicle in performing its nominal DRM-1 mission is needed
to size the power generation system and to determine the required
heat rejection capacity of the environmental control system. The
following analysis discusses the assumptions and processes that
were used to develop the power requirements for the 72-hour Space
Station crew rotation mission (DRM-1).
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Mission operation assumptions were made to aid the development
of the PLS power consumption schedule and to determine LRU and
subsystem component duty cycles:
1. The PLS 72-Hour Mission Timeline will be followed.
•
The PLS power history will include an allowance of ten
minutes of on-board power (independent of the overall
power system design margin) prior to launch to support a
launch hold after GSE disconnect•
•
When the controllers are not required to operate
aerodynamic control surfaces during the mission, they
will be turned off. Controllers will be turned on 1.5
hours before use to allow adequate time for warmup and
fault detection/resolution. Additionally, controllers
will be activated during the final PLS checkout activity
when docked to Space Station•
•
The PLS ECLS system will run at 100% when crew members
are onboard to provide necessary CO2, humidity and heat
removal. During periods of quiescence (when docked at
Space Station Freedom), the system is not required to
operate. The temperature control system will not need to
run at 100% to remove the additional heat produced during
the PLS checkout periods due to the long thermal
transients of the vehicle. This additional heat, which
will raise the cabin temperature only a few degrees, can
be dissipated during the subsequent quiescent time.
. During the final PLS checkout all systems will be
activated to provide assurance that all systems are
functioning properly. This allows the fault detection
and resolution process to function prior to separation
from the Space Station.
•
The PLS guidelines specify that the PLS shall not impact
SSF operations; however, it is unrealistic to expect the
ten arriving PLS personnel to confine themselves to the
PLS volume after docking to the Space Station is
accomplished. It is assumed that for the sleep periods
within the 72-hour mission, the new crew would choose to
occupy the larger SSF volume rather than return to the
PLS. Therefore, the crew is assumed to live (eat,
breathe, generate heat, etc.) entirely onboard SSF while
the PLS is docked.
. Propellant and ECLSS valves require power only when they
are cycled. Redundant valves are used to open lines
after valve failures occur•
•
The JIAWG modules in the PLS computers are used to
compute the power consumption figures for data processing
and health monitoring• (Alternate computer
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configurations exist and may be substitutes for this
assumed system).
• A maximum amount of passive cooling and allowance for
temperature variations is assumed to be incorporated in
the PLS design. This eliminates the large power loads
associated with maintaining tight control of component
temperatures especially during quiescent periods.
I0. The power history does not reflect the self-induced power
requirements of the power generating system itself.
Since the purpose of the prime power trade study is to
make that system selection, the power history impacts of
that selection appear in the prime power trade study
report (See Reference 5-1).
ii. Conservative estimates were made for power consumption
and duty cycles. Therefore, power and energy estimates
tend to be too high rather than too low. This approach
reduces the growth margin as subsystems become more
precisely defined. The estimated growth margin is
approximately 15%, which should accommodate additional
thermal control (cabin fans, heaters and heat rejection
power) and actual hardware power requirements.
The list of PLS power users and duty cycles was developed
using the "reference" PLS subsystem description. Where applicable,
"off-the-shelf" LRU technical data were used to increase the
accuracy of estimates for power consumption and thermal environment
requirements. Technical data were obtained from the following list
of suppliers for the indicated LRUs:
Supplier LRU
Boeing
Draper Laboratories
Garrett-AiResearch
Hamilton Standard
JIAWG
Loral Braking Systems
Marguardt
Moog
Rockwell (Autonetics)
Rockwell (Collins)
OMS Thrusters
Main and Backup Computers
Actuators
ECLSS, Sensors
Avionics Interfaces
Electric Brakes
RCS Thrusters
GN2 Cold Gas Thrusters
GPS Receiver
Communications, Instrumentation
Power and energy estimates are generated for each mission
event on the PLS timeline (Figure 5-49) using the subsystem power
consumption and duty cycle data. The estimates are grouped by
voltage requirement, 28 Vdc or 270 Vdc, and are shown in
Figure 5-50. Loads (power and energy) at each voltage and the
total of both are provided for each mission event. Energy load
totals are also provided for each mission phase and for the entire
mission.
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PHASE Event(s)
Pre-launchASCENT
Launch 1.0
OMS 0.2
TOTAL
ORBIT
TOTAL
DESCENT
Tlme(hrs)
0.17
1.37
Rendezvous & Prox Ops 11.5
PLS Checkout 1.0
Downtime 18.5
PLS Checkout 0.5
Downlime 11.5
PLS Checkout 0.5
Downtime 4.5
PLS Stow & Checkout 3.5
Downtime 11.0
Undock Prep. 1.5
Separation 1.0
65.0
Deorbit Prep. 2.0
Deorbit Burn 0.1
Exo Entry
Arm Entry
Landing
Recovery
0.5
0.5
0.01
1.0
TOTAL 4.11
MISSION GRAND TOTAL 70.48
Figure 5-49. Estimated Power and Energy Requirements
The resulting PLS power history timeline for DRM-I is shown in
Figure 5-51. The data reveal sharp rises in power consumption
during orbital maneuvers, atmospheric reentry and especially during
the landing phase where worst case assumptions are made. These
high peak electrical loads may influence the results of the prime
power trade study due to the large deviation from nominal operating
loads. A secondary high power rate system may be necessary to
augment the main power supply.
The very low power consumption during the downtime at SSF is
achieved by having a backup health monitoring system to check the
status of the critical elements (propellant tanks, batteries, etc.)
and an independent temperature regulator to sense LRU temperatures
and to turn on heaters when needed. Thus, the main avionics and
thermal control systems may be off for most of the time.
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ASCENT
Pre-Launch
Launch
OMS
TOTALS
ORBIT
Rendezvous
PLS Checkout
Time
(hr)
28 Vdc
Power
(kW)
270 Vdc Total 28 Vdc
Energy
(kW-hr)
270 Vdc Total
0.17 3.1 0.8 3.9 0.5 0.1 0.6
1.00 3.0 0.8 3.8 3.0 0.8 3.8
0.20 2.7 2.8 5.5 0.5 0.6 1.t
1.37 4.0 1.5 5.5
Power
(kW)
270 Vdc
0.8
Time
(hr)
Total
3.0
28 Vdc 28 Vdc
25.32.2
0.8
0.0
Energy
(kW-hr}
270 Vdc
9.211.50
Tolal
34.5
1.00 2.1 0.8 2.9 2.1 0.8 2.9
Downlime 18.50 0.6 0.0 0.6 11.1 0.0 11.1
PLS Checkoul 0.50 1.4 2.2 0.7 0.4 1.1
11.50Downlime
PLS Checkoul
6.9
0.70.8
0.0
0.50
0.6 0.0
0.41,4
0.6
2.2
6.9
1.1
Downtime 4.50 0.6 0,6 2.7 0.0 2.7
PLS Stow & Checkout 3.50 3.1 0.8 3.9 10.9 2.8 13.7
Downtime 11.00 0.6 0. 0 0.6 6.6 0.0 6.6
1.50 2.2 0.8 3.0 3.3 1.2 4.5
2.4
72.7
28 VdC
1.00
65.0
Time
(hr)
Undock Prep
Separation
TOTALS
3.2
m
Total
0.8
15.6
Energy
(kW-hr)
270 Vdc
2.4 0.8
Power
(kW)
270 Vdc28 Vdc
DESCENT
3.2
88.3
Total
Deorbit Prep
Deorbit Burn
Exo Entry
Aim Entry
Landing
Recovery
TOTALS
Totals For Mission
ii
2.00
0.10
0.50
0.50
0.01
1.00
4.11
i
70.48
3.0
3.2
6.0
0.3
0.8 3.8
2.8 6.0
1.3 4.7
5.4 7.6
8.5 10.7
0.8 2.3
i
3.4 1.7
2.2 1.1
2.2 0.0
1.5 1.5
10.6
87.3
1.6 7.6
0.3 0.6
0.7 2.4
2.7 3.8
0.1 0.1
2.3
16.8
111.6
0.8
6.2
23.3
Figure 5-50. Power Estimates Grouped by Voltage Requirement
It is recommended that the Space Station Freedom operational
guidelines should reflect the need to provide support for the two
crews (old and new) during the personnel exchange. It is much
easier for SSF to absorb the additional ECLSS load from the new
crew than it is for the PLS to support them for the entire 72-hour
mission duration. The PLS power requirements and mission costs
increase dramatically if there is a requirement to fully support
the new crew during docked operations for handoff.
Alternate Prime Power concepts. The "reference" PLS prime
power system is an all-DC/battery system to support the program
objective of efficient operations. This concept, which was made
possible by the low power consuming nature of the PLS DRM-I
mission, reduces the procurement and maintenance costs associated
with more complicated power generation systems like fuel cells.
The "reference" prime power concept for PLS is a non-rechargeable
set of lithium thionyl chloride batteries. This concept has a high
energy density but is also very reactive and poses a potential
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PLS Power History Comparison
Ag-Zn Batteries vs Fuel Cell
(72-Hour Mission Timeline)
FO/FS Fuel Cell Power SystemPL.S CO
24 36
"lTme, Hours
Oe_t Bum
Figure 5-51. Estimated PLS Power Consumption History
hazard to ground personnel. Since it is not rechargeable, it
represents a recurring flight cost. This trade study was performed
to determine what prime power options are available to support the
PLS program goals of low operations cost and efficient operations
and to quantify the relative desirability of these options.
All of the optional power systems traded were required to meet
the basic PLS mission power expenditure history shown in Figure
5-51. While the average rate of power consumption is relatively
low, the high energy peak requirements at the end of the flight
when all of the auxiliary systems are operating, must also be met.
For the chemical batteries, a number of options are available
for consideration. Figure 5-52 is a trade tree which shows some of
the options that could be investigated. The group is divided into
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Figure 5-52. Chemical Battery Trade Tree
rechargeable and non-rechargeable categories and includes a high
performance fuel cell. The unshaded blocks in the figure identify
the concepts, representative of the different chemistries
available, which were included in this trade study evaluation.
Data on the various concepts were obtained from recent STS Orbiter
upgrade studies and from industry contacts, principally from Eagle-
Picher and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory.
Traditionally power density has dominated the evaluation of
competing power systems for spacecraft applications because of the
importance of minimum weight. For PLS, other characteristics are
increasingly important such as initial cost and servicing
requirements. The following parameters were used to trade the
various prime power system candidates: energy density, power
density, weight, volume, safety, technological risk, temperature
range, refurbishment process, survivability, storage life,
procurement time and subsystem cost. For each of these parameters,
a scale from one to ten was defined based on quantifiable
attributes. This rating definition is presented in Table 5-4.
Using this table, each of the candidate power systems was
scored on each of the parameters. The results of this scoring
process are presented in Table 5-5. Finally, a weighting system
was devised to assign relative importance to each of the prime
power concept parameters. As shown in Table 5-6, this weighting
system places the highest value on safety to simplify vehicle
ground operations. Weight (energy density), ruggedness and cost
are almost as important.
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Table 5-4. Ratings for Power System Candidates
MEANING OF SCALE VALUES
PARAMETER NAME 10 9 8 7 6
Subsystem Energy EDENS _ no ,_ _00 soW-h_b W-h_tb W-4mlb w-hr/Ib W-k_b
PDENS w_ _0WabSubsystem Power
Density
for mo._ (_ to)
Subsystem Weight WT *_ *.500ID Ib
(_ to_ (ue to)
VOL 6 s
_R o_RSubsystemVolume
Rccluircment
(up ,o1 (_ ,m
Hazard to Personnel HZRD _ o, .
TechnologyRisk TECR _ _'yflow.m
Factor
,ppttr..
Subsystem THML ""- .
Tempm'am_ Range _
Ease of Refurbishing REFB ,,_eo. "
iSubs}'stcm
SubsystemRandom _RUGD s_.. .
VibrationSurvivability
SubsystemActive SHLF 2oT= Io,1,
Storage Life _''--I (up')
5 4 3 2 1
40 30 29 tO
W-h:Ab W-h:/Ib W-bz/_ W-_ W-b_Clb
(w m', (_ to) (_ to) Cueto) rue to) (uem) (w m) (_ m)
300 2U0 IG0 SO 60 40 20 10
w_ W/Ib w,_b wnb W_Ib W/tb W,Sb W,_
(,m m_ (_ _) (up m) (up. m) (up m) (u. m) ('tinto) (_ m)
Z_0 2,500 3.000 3.500 .t,000 4,$00 '_._ _.500
b Ib ]b It, Ib I, b Ib
funtol funto) CUDto) fu_ m) (uo m) (uo m) (uoLo_ q'or rnoen)
lO 12 14 16 18 21) 22 24
m-fl cu-A =u-A m_t _*R m-ft _-R a_-A
(w m_ (W to) (_ ,o) (=, _1 (up _) (up to1 tee ,.o) (o. m_)
pmoicm • • • _]F
" • • de_n_y nunqrm.bie
enaax_mblc problem
• for spice _ _v_.L. nc,L,%n|trot D_
Delnyin_nt AVAIL m_ _.
Subsystem Cost $ s._ s,_,,
(W to) (_ to_
net_m w_h _
_f_'b.
u 5_zv',tvetq
s_S_Sd _t_8_(m_or (m.ier
din,strum)
2)qm iln" 1/2 In' lmo. dm)_ Ida), lira" Imm
(upto) (up to) (up m) (w I-) (up m) (up to) (upm) Oap_)
• • • 2..5_ mr.iqualify • • . • 4,5qaa,_y_
(mmor On_w
develxsm) 6evdmm)
(w to) (_, to) (_ _o) (_ m) (_ to) (upto) (m m) (or m_)
The raw numbers calculated from the scoring and weighting
system described above showed that the Silver-Zinc battery option
is preferred for use on PLS. The Ag-Zn concept is desirable from
its low cost and ease of handling. The Ni-Cd battery concept is a
close second but it has peculiar current supply characteristics
that are less desirable. The Fuel Cell option scored very poorly
because of its high cost and operations requirements.
Table 5-7 presents the trade study results in terms of the
percentage each concept ranked in first through tenth place. The
conclusion is the same; that given the relatively low power
consumption requirements of DRM-1, and the desire for efficient
operations, the preferred prime power concept is the rechargeable
Ag-Zn battery system.
Preferred Prime Power Concept. Data on existing Ag-Zn cells
were obtained from Eagle-Picher. An applicable battery pack design
was developed for the PLS power requirements.
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Table 5-6. Weighting System for Power System Trades
PARAMETER
RANKED
NAME IMPORTANCE
(1 to 10)
Subsystem Energy Density EDENS 8
Subsystem Power Density " PDENS 5
Subsystem Weight WT 9
iVolume Requirement VOL
Hazard to Personnel HZRD
Technology Risk Factor TECR 2
Temperature Range THML 6
pability
Ea_ of Refurbishing REFB 4
Random Vibration RUGD 7
Survivability
Active Storage Life SHLF 1
DelayinProcmenmnt AVAIL
Subsysmm Cost $
PARAMETER DEFINITION . HIGH
IMPORTANCE CONNOTES AS
FOLLOWS:
Subsystem Delivers Power Over a Long Time for
the Weight
High Subsystem Power Levels for the Subsystem
Weight
Low Subsystem Weight
6 Low Subsystem Volume Requirement
10 LOw Hazard to Personnel
LOw Technology Risk Factor
Wide TcrnpcraturcRange Capability
Little or No Refurbishing
Random Vibration Survivability With No
Repackaging
Long Active Storage Life
3 Little Delay In Procurement
7 Low Subsystem Cost
Both single and dual fault tolerant power system options were
defined for PLS for different numbers (and sizes) of battery packs.
The concept chosen for the preferred PLS power system is one with
FO/FO/FS redundancy and eight battery packs which weighs 2720
pounds. Six of the battery packs are required to meet the DRM-I
power requirements with the remaining two providing the dual fault
tolerant capability.
Figure 5-53 shows the location of the eight battery packs in
the PLS vehicle (cross-hatch). Note that the four packs at
midships balance a nearly identical mass of parachutes on the
opposite side of the vehicle.
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Table 5-7. Power System Trade Study Results
7lh
81h
91h
lOth
Senslth
/
<.._
Figure 5-53. Battery Pack Location in the Glider
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5._,I0 Avionics
The PLS avionics's five primary functions interface with each
other to a total integrated and autonomous system that provides
navigational autocontrol through all phases of flight. This
capability includes complete uplink/downlink communication and
telemetry, subsystem intercommunication, central health monitoring
and maintenance analysis support. The avionics subsystem controls
the operation of the flight control surfaces and nose/main landing
gear in the auto-mode.
Alternate Avionics Architectures. The "reference" avionics
architecture for PLS is based on the NASA LaRC commissioned efforts
by Draper Laboratories to develop a fault tolerant system for
manned Earth-to-orbit vehicles. This trade study activity defined
alternative architectures and hardware selections to evaluate the
resulting system characteristics. This section summarizes the
fundamental differences between the alternate concepts in terms of
fault tolerance and relative performance. Appendices in the trade
study document (Reference 5-1) present the detailed diagrams of
some of the alternate architectures either defined or evaluated in
the trade study.
Several options for the PLS avionics architectures were
considered. The study incorporated near-term advanced hardware
with the system-level, integrated avionics approach initiated by
the Pave Pillar program, to define architectures which support the
low failure rates, high level of fault detection and isolation and
health monitoring desired by the PLS program. Table 5-8 summarizes
the characteristics of the primary concepts evaluated in the study.
The appendices include definitions of additional architectures
which were considered but which were not formally traded because of
functionality differences.
The preceding architecture analyses are summarized in Table 5-
9. Alternate 4B is selected as the preferred architecture for PLS
because it provides fail-op/fail-op/fail-safe redundancy at a
modest increase in weight and power consumption. The high
performance ASCM computer modules are designed for fault tolerance
and space applications and support the level of self test required
by the PLS program.
preferred Avionics Architecture. Figure 5-54 shows the block
diagram of the preferred avionics architecture of PLS.
Guidance, Navigation And Control.
The guidance, navigation and control subsystem must
generate and update a state vector with known local vertical
alignment by autonomous methods during ascent, rendezvous with
the Space Station, deorbit and throughout the entry and
landing phases. The GN&C system provides stable control
configuration and guidance solutions in all mission phases.
The PLS concept uses a combination of GPS and an inertial
measurement device of medium performance. A horizon scanner
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Summary Characteristics of Candidate AvionicsTable 5-8.
Architectures
CONCEPT
fiEF
IA
2A
2S
3A
4A
®
SYSTEM
FAIL/OP FAIL/SAFE DRAPER
W/NEWLY DEVELOPED AVIONICS
FAIL/OP FAIL/SAFE DRAPER
WIJIAWG MODULES
FAIUOP FAIL/SAFE NASP DUAL CPU
FAIL OPIFAIL OP/FAILSAFE -
HASP DUAL CPU
FAIL OP/FAIL SAFE - UPDATED
SHUTTLE AVIONICS
FAIl OP/FAIL SAFE - ADVANCED
SPACEBORHE COMPUTER MODULE
FAIL OPIFAIL OPIFAII.SAFE • ADV.
SPACEBORHE COMPUTER MODULE
COMMENTS
• 8YSTEM BASED ON DRAPER BIT SYNC TRIPLE VOTING CONCEPT
• SYSTEM NOT DEVELOPED OR PACKAGED - VERY HIGH DEVELOPMENT COSTS
• SYSTEM WOULD BE UNIQUE THEREFORE VERY HIGH PRODUCTION COSTS
• NO DEFINITION OF REMOTES GIVEN
• USE UNIQUE DRAPER TMR CPU'I & JIAWG MODULES FOR EVERYTHING ELSE
• REMOTES CONSOLIDATED TO REDUCE POWER & WEIGHT
• 15S3 BUS MAY HAVE THROUGHTPUT PROBLEMS
• SOME HARDWARE • SOFTWARE NEW - MODERATE TO HIGH DEVELOP. COST
• DRAPER CPU'a UNIQUE - MODERATE PRODUCTION COST
• STANDARD JIAWG CARDS ARE SINGLE CPU W/SOFTWARE VOTE - UNISYS
PROPOSES NEW DUAL CPU CARD
• NEW CARD A NEW SOFTWARE - MODERATE TO HIGH DEVELOPMENT COST
• UNIQUE CPU • SINGLE SOURCE - MODERATE PRODUCTION COST
• SAME COMMENTS AS 2A
• FO/FOtFS PROBABLY REQUIRED FOR MANNED SPACECRAFT
• SOFTWARE VOTING W/NEW SOFTWARE - MOD TO HIGH DEVELOP. COST
• UNIQUE EXPENSIVE HARDWARE • HIGH PRODUCTION COSTS
. OLDER GENERATION HARDWARE W/ItlGHER WEIGIIT & POWER
• RADIATION HARD. SPACE QUALIFIED, DENSE PKG, LOWER POWER COMP.
• FAULT TOLERANT DESIGN W/DUAL COMPUTERS • FAULT TOLERANT OP SYS
• AF DEVELOPING CORE CAROS • OP SYS - LOW TO MED DEVELOP COST
• MULTI PROGRAM CORE CARD USAGE - LOW TO MED PRODUCTION COST
DEVELOP. COST DEPENDING ON PARTS RELIABILITY OUAL LEVEL
• FOIFO/FS PROBABLY REQUIREO
• ACTUAL POWER MAY BE LOWER W/CLOCK OFF TO SPARES
is included to establish and maintain local vertical data.
Redundant air data sensor assemblies account for relative
velocity under variations due to winds. Aerodynamic control,
steering, and braking while on the runway created the need for
redundant interfacing electronics for each of the mechanical
control elements.
The IMU uses state-of-the-art laser or fiber optic gyros,
which use little power and have extremely low drift. The
gyros are aligned prior to liftoff at rates commensurate with
their low drift. The GPS receiver will update the position
gyros at programmed intervals, or can be used as the sole
position sensor if required.
In the event of an aborted launch and the possibility of
a runway recovery, the PLS pilot has basic gyro and
conventional pitot static system (a ram air turbine system
could be used to generate contingency power) in addition to a
radar altimeter and differential GPS navigation sets. The
altitude and vehicle speed at abort initiates the landing
maneuver from an onboard stored data.
5-64
Table 5-9. Avionics Architecture Analyses
CONCEPT SYSTEM
REF
1A
2A
2B
3A
4A
®
FAIL OPIFAIL SAFE - DRAPER
W/NEWLY DEVELOP AVIONICS
FAIL OP/FAIL SAFE - DRAPER
W/JIAWG MODULES
FAIL OP/FAIL SAFE - NASP
W/DUAL CPU (JIAWG) MODULES
FAIL OP/FAIL OP/FAIL SAFE -
NASP W/DUAL CPU
JIAWG MODULES
FAIL OP/FAIL SAFE - UPDATE
SHUTTLE AVIONICS
FAIL OP/FAIL SAFE - ADVANCED
SPACEBORNE COMPUTER
MODULE
FAIL OP/FAIL OP/FAIL SAFE -
ADVANCED SPACEBORNE
COMPUTER MODULE
POWER WEIGHT COMMENTS
NOT
AVAILABLE
984W
910W
1551W
2000W
624W
1014W
NOT
AVAILABLE
129.1 LBS
109.9 LBS
174.9LBS
379.5 LBS
109.1 LSS
174.9 LBS
COMPUTERS 324W & 90 LBS;
REMOTES UNDEFINED
CONSOLIDATED REMOTES
UNISYS CONCEPT FOR CPU
UNISYS CONCEPT FOR CPU
ONLY 5 REMOTES IN
ESTIMATE
ASCM CONCEPT
ASCM CONCEPT
Communications And Tracking.
The communications requirements include telemetry and
voice uplink from Earth, telemetry, voice and video downlink
and GPS reception. Also included are requirements for EVA and
Space Station communications and air traffic control (ATC)
communications and navigation for recovery at a non-NASA
facility. For minimum logistics and low cost, components such
as pulse code modulated (PCM) encode/decode, audio and video
drivers, S-band transponders, UHF/VHF communications and
navigation hardware is chosen from in-production items for
SSF, Shuttle, or other man-rated programs. The small number
of PLS vehicles precludes a large investment in custom
avionics. A shipset of equipment to perform all of the
required tasks can readily be assembled from available
components.
Data Processing.
The data processing subsystem provides, with a high
degree of autonomy, the computational control and function to
support all flight conditions. Embedded sequences support the
requirement for automated test and checkout.
The computer complex for PLS is composed of a modified
version of a fault tolerant concept developed by Draper
Laboratories. The system uses a triple bus with crossover to
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Figure 5-54. Block Diagram of Preferred Avionics Architecture
three processors which allows dual failures with the surviving
components continuing the program. The Advanced Spaceborne
Computer Module is used at each processing node. Each ASCM
has dual self-checking submicron technology (VHSIC II) very
high speed elements capable of operating at 3-4 megaflops (an
order of magnitude faster than the Shuttle AP101 computers).
This kind of computational speed in a small, simple vehicle
like the PLS, allows for considerable overhead in activities
such as all of the health and status monitoring, with work-
arounds such as repartitioning around defective memory
addresses, calling archival storage and restructuring data
pathways. The use of VHSIC modules developed under the PAVE
PILLAR and PAVE PACE programs minimizes development costs and
capitalizes on a very large military development program.
Health Monitoring System Definition.
The objective of the PLS vehicle health monitoring system
is to increase the probability of mission success for the
vehicle, reduce the turnaround time and minimize the
development and operational costs. Elements of the health
monitoring system include: sensors, signal processors,
algorithms, control logic, ground checkout equipment, expert
systems application and maintenance system databases. To
support the PLS program goals, a testability and integrated
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diagnostics effort must be implemented as part of the system
engineering process from the beginning of the design process.
The fault detection/fault isolation process through BITE
at the functional level provides functional operational status
to the central health monitoring control processor.
Historically, the specification and design of BITE and
monitoring systems has been confined to individual LRUs or
isolated subsystems. Where safety or operational necessity
are major considerations, subsystem/BITE monitoring is given
high priority. Commercial aircraft systems (e.g., B-767/757)
have dedicated 56% of memory for maintenance and redundancy
management software compared to the 27% devoted to control of
the aircraft. Such high-end system implementations must be
contrasted with the inadequate BITE provisions in many
existing LRUs. The typical bottom level approach is based on
LRU BITE fault isolation specifications. Sometimes these
criteria are not clearly identified with system level
performance, system interoperability or system environment.
For that reason, it has been notoriously difficult to verify
actual performance against specifications. Typical current
BIT/BITE implementations identify maintenance events that
result in cannot duplicate (CND) rates between 45% to 54% and
Retest OK (D) between 42% and 52%. (Emphasis in the system
design of an integrated vehicle test system and supporting
expert system implementation on the Unit aircraft, reduced
these rates to 27% and 29% respectively).
Crew, technician, and management confidence in the health
monitoring system is crucial. It is necessary to develop a
system-level non-specific, integrated, BITE/monitoring
approach starting with an analysis of the requirements, an
evaluation of current implementations and the development of a
descriptive model. The BITE system must be user friendly with
CRT displays preferred. The BITE user interface and system
must be more reliable than the vehicle operational system.
Test procedure manuals on the vehicle and a test system linked
to the test activities assure simplified operations and assure
full configuration control.
The current trend in technology and requirements for
system status is to provide health monitoring coupled to
dynamic reconfigurability. The trend in fault detection is to
establish a system architecture that can partition and
structure lower elements and use embedded support within the
lower elements. Fault isolation is being driven to "on-chip"
test functionality due to advances in density and performance.
The embedded and distributed test functions are being tied
together with standard maintenance bus systems. Corrective
action trends are putting increased emphasis on mission
impact, with fault tolerant design allowing deferred
maintenance and increased use of portable (on-board)
maintenance aids.
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The next generation of vehicle health monitoring systems
will assure crew safety and operational efficiency at a
minimal cost. The system will be used to prepare the vehicle
for flight, monitor the condition of the vehicle in flight
(safety and maintenance monitoring) support autonomous
operation, perform a post-flight vehicle inspection and
provide data for a reflight history database. (Safety
monitoring is the integration of sensors and their
accompanying algorithms into the controllers so that the
anomalous system operation can be identified and action taken
to either resolve the anomaly or safe the vehicle.
Maintenance monitoring is the accumulation and analysis of
operating data to be used in performing post-flight analysis
and turnaround maintenance).
VHMS Support to Flight Operations.
During the operational flight phases, diagnostics are
required to support five major options:
.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Abort Mission (Destruction Avoidance)
Alter Mission
Complete Mission In Degraded Mode
Reconfigure
Enter Fault Isolation Mode
In the past, realtime vehicle health monitoring systems
have characteristically been BIT/BITE or "redline/GO-NOGO"
systems providing an annunciation of a monitored fault
indication with limited information or data provided for
analysis or prognosis. In redline systems, at the time a
parameter passed a certain level, action would be taken to
prevent damage or possible destruction to the system or
vehicle. With some types of failure modes, there may be
changes in operating parameters or configuration that, if
made, would resolve a particular anomaly and assure full or
partial mission capability.
Current BIT/BITE systems are generating false alarm rates
(85%), cannot duplicate faults (25%), and retest OKs (15%)
which significantly limit confidence and usefulness. Expanded
capability for in-flight system anomaly resolution can be
obtained through the development of an integrated diagnostic
system consisting of sensors, signal processors, algorithms
and control logic.
VHMS Support to Ground Operations.
Deficiencies in current ground processing systems account
for excessively high operations costs, excessive length of
turnaround cycle, excessive failures generated during ground
power-up operations, and inadequate reliability. BITE has had
lower front-end emphasis than operational system elements due
to large development and circuitry costs. Consequently, it
seldom performs to specified requirements. Inadequate BITE
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results in false equipment pulls, cannot duplicates, and
retest OKs. The immediate impact of this inadequacy is an
increase in required spares and maintenance time.
The development of a ground processing system in concert
with a vehicle health monitoring system would be beneficial.
Collection and storage or telemetering of inflight data in a
maintenance database increases the ability to perform vehicle
diagnostics and prognostics. With this information, critical
component inspections and tests could be performed in place,
as needed, as opposed to performing removal inspections and
tests on a scheduled basis. This decreases processing and
turnaround time by eliminating unnecessary maintenance.
Additionally, incidental damage to other components that would
occur as part of a launch processing system would reduce the
"standing army" required to process launch vehicles.
Health Monitoring System Implementation.
The commercial and military approach to vehicle health
monitoring system implementation is to develop a
BITE/monitoring architecture which is not vehicle specific but
which can be tailored and applied to different flight vehicles
from C-17 to LHX. The PLS vehicle will also exploit the
advances gained from programs like Pave Pillar/Pave Pace and
MASA and adopt the databus technologies, LRU BITE
advancements, and developed software.
The PLS health monitoring processor is dual redundant on
the board but not dual board redundant. A master-slave
concept is employed with the VHMS controller polled
periodically by the PLS master flight control computer
complex. Status messages are interpreted by the main computer
complex and remedial action ordered or a crew alarm is
initiated. The defective component is determined by the
resident expert system and an assessment is made whether the
repair is feasible during flight. The results of the
assessment are saved in optical disk memory for telemetry
downlinking or for vehicle post-flight analysis.
Of major significance is the interface at each subsystem.
The health monitoring system must be part of every subsystem,
with the appropriate limit detectors, status registers,
comparators and self-check routines being inherent in the
subsystem design. The monitoring system then polls each
subsystem at a programmed rate (key critical monitors having
priority interrupt ability) and a status message is assemble
for transmittal to the main computer during the master
executive machine cycle. An approach similar to this is used
successfully on the checkout complex for the Block II GPS
production.
Figure 5-55 shows the JIAWG methodology for vehicle
diagnostics and fault coverage. The concept uses three
distinct management levels in the top-down definition; system,
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Figure 5-55. JIAWG Methodology for Vehicle Diagnostics
system element, and module management level. The fault
coverage methodology consists of a combination of common
procedures and tools, with fault metrics derived and verified
by use of design-unique, gate-level models to be compared to
the JIAWG-specified values for compliance verification. The
use of tools such as fault lists, optimized test vectors, and
insertion and comparison mechanisms is implied. Corresponding
techniques are also used for the mechanical LRUs under the
health monitoring system coverage.
For commercial aircraft, an ARINC committee had proposed a
health monitoring capability which uses a central maintenance
computer. The concept (Figure 5-56) features a display unit and
control panel with optional data link via hardcopy printer and
telemetry groundlink. Shared use of multifunction cockpit
display/control units is anticipated unless a separate plug-in,
hand-held computer is used. Printer and ground datalink
capabilities are provided by ground plug-in modules if not on the
vehicle. An air/ground datalink is integrated with a telemetry and
control link to provide additional timely or critical information.
The central maintenance computer has the same modules as the other
vehicle computers to ensure spares commonality. The proposed
connectivity between the central maintenance computer and vehicle
subsystems is via both data and health buses.
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Figure 5-56. ARINC Health Monitoring System Concept
Figure 5-57 is a third approach to implementing a health
monitoring capability. The objective of this system model is to
identify the required functions of existing and future systems.
The BITE/monitoring interfaces are defined in terms of system
resources rather than actual hardware characteristics. The
"Operational" area applies to the preflight, inflight and
postflight operational phases. Its principal function is to
reconfigure the vehicle and alert the crew to failures which are
detrimental to vehicle or mission. The "Diagnostic" area supports
the objective of two-level maintenance to minimize unique GSE.
This approach presupposes that an adequate BITE infrastructure
exists. Like the concept in Figure 5-56, the vehicle
multifunctional controls and displays can be employed in a
diagnostic mode to provide a high level of interactive technician
support.
At this time, no selection has been made. Each approach is
similar to the others and meets the same functionality. The final
selection will be based on the state-of-the-art in health
monitoring systems design in the commercial and military avionics
industry at that time.
D_splays And Controls. The PLS uses advanced flat panel or
"glass cockpit" technology with a heads up display on the pilot's
side of the cockpit. Conventional gyros and air data sensors on
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Figure 5-57. Alternate Concept for Health Monitoring Capability
the co-pilot's side cover major electrical discontinuities such as
a lightning strike or a cosmic ray shower. The panel displays will
be software configured to display the required instrumentation for
the active phase of the flight.
5.1.I_ Environmental Control System
The environmental control system primarily monitors and
regulates cabin air quality (pressure, temperature, humidity,
composition) and the equipment thermal environment to assure that
specified limits are not exceeded. The system uses closed-loop
servo processes and provides sensor initiated status data transfer
to the master communication system computer for data distribution
and to the onboard maintenance system computer to support
maintenance analysis.
ECLS System Description. The selected environmental control
system concept (Figures 5-58 and 5-59) avoids the use of freon,
radiators, cold plates, lithium hydroxide canisters, and other high
power and high maintenance components by implementing a "passive"
approach thermal control. The heat generating equipment is
installed in the vehicle to achieve a heatsink transfer to the
aluminum cabin structure or extension frames. For the avionics
installation, the water loop of the air conditioning system is
routed near the cabin wall to which the avionics equipment is
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ECLS SYSTEM COMPONENTS;
1.02 TANK
2. N2 TANK
3. REGENERABLE CO2 REMOVAL SYSTEM (RCRS)
4.HEAT EXCHANGER/THERMAL CAPACITOR
5. RCRS BEDS
6. WATER LOOP "COLD WALL"
7. WATER BOILER LOCATION
7
Figure 5-58.
Installation.
Selected Environmental Control System Concept
THERMAL CAPAC
CONO HX
AVIONICS
CREW CABIN
VENT
Figure 5-59. Selected Environmental Control System Concept Schematic.
mounted. This "cold wall" ensures the effective transport of heat
generated by the avionics into the cabin cooling system and
ultimately to the water boiler.
The RCRS system replaces the cumbersome lithium canister
changeout for CO2 removal.
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5.1.12 Personnel Accommodations
The nominal PLS mission profile has the personnel in the
vehicle for nine to twelve hours during the ascent/rendezvous
period and approximately nine hours for the return flight. These
two relatively short periods permit a tolerable level of
habitability for the small PLS vehicle. Trade studies were
performed to optimize the cabin volume within the manufacturing and
design objectives.
Alternate Crew Cabin Shapes. The "reference" crew cabin shape
for the PLS vehicle uses a constant circular radius of 38 inches
for the majority of the cabin length. There is a transition length
between the seating areas and the narrow transfer tunnel for Space
Station docking. The total volume available to the crew is about
500 cubic feet. For nominal mission segments lasting only a few
hours, this is acceptable but more room would be better. The
problem, as stated in the evaluation criteria, is "examine
modifications to the reference crew cabin shape and internal layout
for improved human factors acceptability." The approach for the
trade study is to increase the habitability with approaches which
a) minimize the change to the vehicle outer moldline but increase
the cabin cross-sectional area, b) modify the seat location and
aisle width and c) modify the cabin/tunnel transition area. For
each option, an assessment of the manufacturing and operations
impacts is made.
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Figure 5-61. Habitability Effects on Space Vehicle Crews
Figure 5-61 presents data on the relative performance
capabilities of space vehicle crews in terms of interior volume and
mission duration. Table 5-10 lists the pertinent factors and their
relative importance when evaluating a given cabin area for
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habitability. These
criteria will be used in
the evaluation of the
crew cabin shape and
layout options.
The optional cabin
shapes are defined by
offsets from the
reference moldline as
determined from the
baseline computer
geometry. These offsets
are used to calculate
increases to the
habitable volume. For
the options which modify
the location of the
seats, cabin cross-
sections are generated
which show both seats and
passengers plus proposed
ingress/egress paths.
Information is gathered
from human factors
Table 5-10. Habitability Criteria
VOLUME 9UV 999 999
ONIEN'FATIOH VU9 V_V WVV
VISION WVV" UVV" UV
FLIGIIT BUITS VgV _VU VYV
OXYGEN VVV VVi U¥
PRIVACY 9¥ •
MEDICAL VV •
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COLO|_S 9 •
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databases which shows the limits of tolerable volumes by level of
crewactivity and duration of occupancy.
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Figure 5-62. Modified Cabin Wall Radius (First Option)
Modifications To Crew Cabin Radius. The reference cabin
inboard profile is maintained by constraining the upper centerline
to its original location. Additional interior volume is provided
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by increasing the cabin circular radius. A cross-section through
the midpoint of the cabin is shown in Figure 5-62. The increase in
interior volume is at the expense of space available for the
subsystems which must reside between the cabin wall (pressure
vessel) and the outer moldline. Aft of the cabin midpoint, the
integration of the larger cabin radius (58 inches) is easy to
accomplish since the vehicle is increasing in width. On the
forward side, however, the large radius quickly exceeds the width
of the vehicle and radically alters the basic moldline contours.
A second approach to
modifying the cabin radius
involves adding a flat section
to the top of the cabin and
joining it to larger radii (39
inches) on either side. This
adds a small amount to the
total cabin volume without
significantly changing the
cabin shape. Since the top of
the cabin is the area where an
ingress/egress ladder is
installed and integrated with
the cabin structure, the
effect of the flat section
would probably not add
much weight to the vehicle. A
more important impact would be
to the manufacturing effort,
since now the ring frames can
not be produced in one piece
but are divided by,and must be
fastened to, the flat section
of cabin skin. A modification
FLRT TOP CRUIN IILL TIE WItY nl:l.
RLL FLOWS HRVE FOURTEEN-INCH ;1151 E.
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Figure 5-63. Modified Cabin Wall
Radius (Option Three)
of this approach uses the flat section only in the region of the
last row of passenger seats in conjunction with the aisle width
study. This option is shown in Figure 5-63.
A third option adds headroom and internal volume by raising
the centerline vehicle contour and providing a larger cabin radius.
This approach conserves the reference subsystem volume and
increases the cabin area but significantly alters the original PLS
moldline shape. This option is shown in Figure 5-64.
Seat Location And Aisle Provision. The second part of the
trade study addresses the location of the passenger seats. By
moving the seats outboard, a center aisle is created to allow
easier passage by personnel on orbit and especially for rapid
egress during a pad emergency.
The reference structural concept for the cabin interior has
the passengers seated close to the vehicle centerline to shorten
the load path from the seats to the single center keel. This
approach minimized the structural elements for transferring the
launch and abort loads of the passengers and maximized the outboard
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stowage volume and headroom
but made front-to-rear
traverse difficult. The
optional arrangement creates a
fourteen-inch center aisle by
using a dual keel structure in
the center of the cabin.
Headroom is reduced,
especially in the aft row of
passenger seats but the
habitability and rapid egress
capability of the design are
much improved.
Increased Transfer Tunnel
Volume. This option produces
the largest increase in
internal volume with no change
to the reference vehicle
moldline. The objective of
the reference design was to
maximize the subsystem volume
in the aft section of the
vehicle since the reference
monopropellant concept
I
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Figure 5-63. Modified Cabin Wall
Radius (Option Two)
required large tankage. By anticipating a change to a more
efficient propulsion concept, more of the aft area could be
allocated to usable cabin volume.
Rather than use a minimum forty-inch diameter transfer tunnel,
the cabin volume was allowed to increase to the full moldline depth
and a tapered width from 76 to 44 inches. This increased the
available cabin volume by a full 16% to about 580 cubic feet.
Additional benefits of this change are the much simplified cabin
shape resulting from the elimination of the transition section of
the reference cabin. The alternate structure is easier to
manufacture because it is a simpler shape and has fewer elements.
The launch and abort loads from the aft structural interface are
distributed over a larger area and the new shape has much more
direct load paths. The new shape also supports the alternate PLS
missions by accommodating the installation of an internal airlock
in the transfer area of the crew cabin. This design alternate is
shown in Figure 5-65.
This study is unique in that any combination of the layout
options defined above can be incorporated in the final design.
Each provides some benefit to the habitability of the crew cabin
volume. For some options the benefits are small but the impact to
manufacturing complexity, structural integrity of the pressure
vessel and weight growth are not inconsequential. The preferred
concept adopts the designs which offer the larger habitability
improvements with the smaller structural impacts.
The concept for the preferred vehicle retains the original
moldline contours and achieves higher level of habitability by
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Figure 5-65. Modified Aft Tunnel Concept
incorporating a wide aisle in the cabin and the larger transfer
tunnel configuration.
Cabin Interior Layout. Figure 5-63 shows a view of the cabin
seating arrangement, proximity of the top hatch and the large rear
transfer tunnel. The amount of space between passengers is
illustrated in the figure as is the relationship between the
passenger seats and the central keel and carrythrough frames. The
aft tunnel area is provided as a privacy area for personal hygiene
as well as the "cockpit" for the Space Station docking operation•
passenqer Seat Design. In addition to the general safety,
comfort and reliability requirements and the capability to recline
for the return of deconditioned Space Station personnel, the seats
are to withstand the same loading conditions as Shuttle, namely;
I. A 280-pound ground step load over all seat surfaces•
2. A 125-pound on-orbit pushoff load.
• A load of 600 pounds on the seat headrest as a prelaunch
ingress/egress load.
• A load of 840 pounds on the seatback for a prelaunch
rescue•
. Crash g-loads of +20/-3 longitudinal, +3/-3 lateral and
+10/-4 vertical.
The factor of safety on the seat structure is 1.4.
5-78
Launch Poslllon
,. _, /:ii:!!___i!__!'"'OecondlUoned Passenger Position
Figure 5-66. Seat Design Shown in Launch and Entry Positions
The PLS seat design is shown in Figure 5-66 in the launch and
reclined reentry positions. For launch, the angle of the seat pan
is 6-degrees down and the angle of the seatback is 2 degrees
forward per specification. For the reclined position, the back
angle must allow up to 66 degrees aft tilt. To achieve this amount
of angular motion with a seat pitch of only 34 inches, the seat pan
must be hinged at the front as well as where the seat pan and
seatback meet. This concept allows the seat pan to rotate upwards
so that when the seatback is tipped aft, there is clearance above
the next passenger to the rear. The forward hingeline on the seat
pan defines the location of the seat support structure, which
coincides with the interior, carry-through portion of the major
extension frames on the vehicle.
Since the seating concept must provide a five-point safety
harness, the motion of the seat pan means that the harness must be
attached to the seat rather than directly to the cabin structure.
With the seat's proximity to the deep keel and frames in the cabin,
this requirement presents no design concern.
In a crash situation, it is desirable for the seat to be able
to stroke large amounts in the vertical and forward directions to
attenuate the forces of the crash. The forward attenuation can be
achieved by a plastic deformation of the lateral frame to which the
seat pan is attached. The vertical stroke can accommodated by
local failure-in-bearing of the keel and side web material where
the aft edge of the seat pan is attached to these structural
elements. This vertical stroke can be as much as I0 inches without
contacting the feet of the rear passenger. This capability is not
available in seat designs which rely on legs to transfer loads to
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floor structure and provides an extra measure of survivability,
especially in the tail-first water landing scenario.
Rapid Eqress Capability. For on-pad emergencies which require
the evacuation of the PLS vehicle, there is an issue regarding the
ability of the ten occupants to exit the vehicle within a specified
time. The limited cabin volume, close seat spacing and small top
hatch all contribute to this concern.
The total exit time is driven by the bottleneck in the egress
operation. The assumption is made that the bottleneck is the top
hatch which is a 32-inch wide by 40-inch tall oval. (This
assumption is made because the seats described above and other
interior aspects are more easily modified than the hatch size, and
because, since unharnessing by the crew occurs simultaneously, a
queue behind the hatch will probably form.) The opening area of
the hatch is approximately six square feet and the hatch is hinged
at the bottom so it swings downward when opened on the vertically-
oriented vehicle to create a small platform.
A figure of two minutes had been discussed as a reasonable
target for the emergency exit time. To assess the PLS design's
ability to meet this time (as far as hatch adequacy is concerned)
and examination of the similar activity on commercial aircraft is
made. It is an FAA requirement to be able to evacuate an aircraft
within 90 seconds. To derive an exit area parameter, it is assumed
that an aircraft which holds 150 people has two aft and two forward
emergency exits and two over-wing hatches for a total exit area of
Ii0 square feet. This area provides i.I square feet per person,
per minute in meeting the 90-second requirement. Applying this
parameter to the top hatch opening area of the PLS gives and
estimated emergency egress time of 1.8 minutes, or just under the
target. This crude airline comparison is conservative when
considering that the PLS evacuees are trained astronauts. If the
top hatch is correctly sized, then the seat design and location
must assure that an adequate exit path is available to the
passengers. This path must also support the situation in which one
or more of the seated passengers "freezes" in the emergency.
The primary method or traversing the (vertical) crew cabin,
from top hatch to aft tunnel, is by using the ladder attached to
the "ceiling" of the cabin. To enter the vehicle, a person steps
over the threshold of the top hatch and turns 180 degrees to climb
down (or up to the flight deck). Since the top of the cabin slopes
six degrees with respect to the vehicle centerline, the ladder is
not vertical but more naturally inclined. A normal ladder traverse
requires enough room for the climber to swing his thigh through i00
degrees or so. This requires over two feet of clearance between
the rungs of the ladder and the fixed seat structure. Figure 5-67
shows the climber adjacent to the second row of passenger seats at
the level of the hatch opening. The "view looking up" shows ample
clearance with seated passengers. This clearance is provided by
the 14-inch aisle design.
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Figure 5-67. Wide Aisle Supports Egress Requirement.
What happens when the crew members arrive at the hatch in the
emergency scenario? If the mobile service tower has been rolled
back, the Shuttle experience suggests the use of a slidewire to get
to a bunker. The Titan launch pad has a permanent service tower
close to the vehicle. The PLS-end of the slidewire can be attached
to a swing arm, located on this tower, and deployed when the
evacuation signal is given. The design of the PLS-issue partial
pressure suit can incorporate a harness to which is attached a
short length of line and a slidewire carabiner. When the crew
member reaches the top hatch, he pulls the carabiner and line from
its pocket on his suit, clips onto the slidewire and jumps through
the hatch opening. The swing arm is located so as not to preclude
the hatch opening or to require a special deployment sequence.
The following is a possible timeline for the crew emergency
egress scenario: at T=0, the command is given to evacuate the
vehicle. Simultaneously, the swing arm mechanism is activated to
position the slidewire near the top hatch. The pilot is first
through the top hatch and ensures that the swing arm and slide wire
are properly positioned. The commander remains on the PLS flight
deck to serve as a gate keeper. He looks aft into the passenger
area and directs traffic or gives instructions to facilitate the
evacuation process. By T=5 seconds, all passengers have unbuckled
their harnesses. Each rolls to his side and reaches overhead with
his outboard hand to grasp the ladder. At about T=8 seconds one of
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the passengers in the first row is proceeding through the hatch
opening after the pilot. The remaining passengers leave their
seats and climb up the ladder in an orderly, rapid sequence• The
advantages of having the seats close to each other near the vehicle
centerline are that the reach to the ladder is shorter and that a
slip would be easier to recover from. The 1.8 minute evacuation
time estimated above allocates a very generous ten seconds per
passenger for his activity at the hatch opening. In practice, it
would probably be possible to evacuate the PLS in considerably less
time than the two-minute allowance.
5•1.13 Recovery and Auxiliary Systems
Among the groundrules for the PLS vehicle specified during
Task 1 of the AMLS/PLS study was the fundamental requirement to
provide assured crew safety over the broadest range of mission and
flight regimes as possible. This requirement lead to the inclusion
of the LES in the reference vehicle configuration.
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Figure 5-68. Explosive Potential for On-Pad Explosions
Launch Escape System And Abort Definition• An abort condition
which receives much design attention is the case of an abort from
the launch pad. In this scenario, the booster has all of its
propellant and therefore has the maximum explosive potential.
Figure 5-68 quantifies the explosive potential of both the Titan IV
and ALS boosters for the launch pad and ascent situation.
Martin Marietta has provided information on the possible Titan
failure modes which apply to the PLS abort issue• The conditions
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at the Titan pad are considered relatively safe and stable up to T-
minus 31.7 seconds when the transfer of power is made from the
ground to the onboard systems. At T-minus 20 Seconds, the onboard
destruction system is armed. At T-minus 1 second or at SRM/Core
Stage 0 ignition is when the real potential for a PLS abort begins.
The major possibilities for a catastrophic event lie in the
propulsion and control systems. They are not truly a danger until
engine ignition, followed by subsequent liftoff (at 150
milliseconds).
From ignition through ascent, potential conditions exist which
could initiate an abort. As mentioned above, the major potential
for catastrophic failure lies in the propellant and control
systems.
The Titan has two types of propulsion systems, Solid Rocket
Motors and a Liquid Fueled Core Stage. Failure in either of these
systems can lead to a catastrophic event. The warning time is
determined by the type of failure. An solid booster motor failure
may present a warning in only milliseconds if the failure is
structural. If the failure is a slow degradation, adequate time
may be available. Within the last 20 years, a Titan 34D
experienced an booster motor case failure at T-plus 8 seconds and
the time for destruction was in milliseconds -- insufficient
warning time for a PLS escape. A liquid propulsion system failure
should be detectable through instrumentation and should allow
adequate time for a PLS abort if the failure warrants. A liquid
failure may cause the shutdown of an engine or engines which may
not be catastrophic but may jeopardize the success of the mission.
Within the last 20 years, a Titan 34D had a propulsion failure
characterized by a low thrust indication. The vehicle remained
stable but the propellant pump ceased, resulting in the shutdown of
the engine.
According to Martin Marietta, a structural failure of the
booster is thought to be the least likely event to occur. The
Titan has a self-destruct system called ISDS which senses
structural breakup and starts a sequence which terminates in
vehicle destruction a 20 to 30 milliseconds after initiation.
PLS could not escape without more warning time.
The
The booster flight control systems are also a source of
potential failure. The engine thrust vector actuators control the
flight path of the vehicle as well as the loads on the launch
vehicle structures. These actuators are commanded by guidance and
driven by hydraulic systems. A hydraulic failure or mechanical
failure in the actuator could result in a catastrophic event. A
vehicle at high velocity and high aerodynamic loading which
experiences a sudden change in trajectory or the initiation of a
tumble would be destroyed. If one or two actuators failed,
guidance might be able to compensate. Under these conditions, the
PLS may be able to escape. Within the last 20 years, a Titan 3C
experienced a hydraulic failure, then a loss of control and
deviation from the planned flight path.
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Other failure modes include avionics and instrumentation•
These failures are not likely to cause a catastrophic event and
should allow time for abort preparation, planning and execution•
When the crew is onboard the PLS and the PLS systems are in
operation, the onboard computers will be monitoring the Titan
health through the interface connector at skirt station 2492. The
software will rapidly analyze conditions which are off-nominal,
identify faults and predict the degradation of the Titan systems,
mission completion probability, PLS survivability and the need for
an abort. If an abort is required, the PLS (without human
intervention) will sound the crew alarm and execute the crew abort
sequence. If an abort is imminent, the PLS software will sound the
alarm and provide time for crew preparation before executing the
abort sequence -- manual override enabled. The role of the vehicle
health monitoring system in the LES is to:
i. Detect off-nominal Titan IV conditions.
2. Determine true conditions.
• Determine the threat of the conditions to the crew,
PLS vehicle or mission and command the appropriate
action for the current phase of the mission profile.
Figure 5-69 presents the results of the blast overpressure
analysis in terms of distance from the point of booster explosion.
These data are used to determine the amount of warning time
required by the PLS/LES as shown in Figure 5-70. The following are
specified as LES design and performance requirements:
i. Eight-g abort motor thrust capability.
• Abort motor thrust vector control authority
(preliminary requirement).
3. Stable powered flight and thrust termination.
LES Desiqn Concepts. One LES concept places three, large
solid rocket motors within the PLS booster adapter. This concept
is shown in Figure 5-71. The motors are identical and are
installed in a thrust structure within the adapter so that the
nominal thrust vector from each motor is directed toward the
combined vehicle center of mass. When the abort signal is
received, the vehicle and LES separate from the booster and the
lower half of the adapter along the line indicated in the figure.
This additional separation plane achieves three design objectives.
First, from a performance standpoint, the escaping vehicle is not
encumbered by the full adapter weight. Second, the shape of the
retained adapter segment can be tailored to meet certain
aerodynamic objectives. The third advantage is an operational
benefit since the complex, pyro-broken, separation plane can be a
factory joint which leaves only a simple, structural interface at
the rear of the adapter for the launch site field joint. Because
the LES employs a pusher-type SRM configuration (in contrast to the
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BLAST WAVE OVERPRESSURES
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Figure 5-69. Blast Overpressure Analysis
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Figure 5-70. Required Warning Time
Apollo tractor system) the motors must have a steering capability.
Table 5-11 presents SRM design and dimensional data for this
concept.
An alternative concept relocates the same three solid rocket
motors on the belly of the PLS. The objective of this change is to
make available the area immediately aft of the rear docking hatch
on the PLS so it is compatible with anticipated advanced DRM
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Figure 5-71. Launch Escape System - Initial Concept
requirements such as the
attachment of a satellite
service module. This
concept is illustrated in
Figure 5-72. The belly
location is selected
because the three solids
are too large to mount
easily to the outside of
the adapter and because
they appear to work
better aerodynamically
just ahead of the flat
ramp of the adapter
structure. As with the
reference LES concept,
the motor thrust vector
is aligned with the
combined c.g., but in
this case the vectoring
is accomplished with an
angle bias on each of the
motor nozzles. Design
issues that this
placement raises are the
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Figure 5-72. Alternative LES Concept
penetration by the LES
structure through the thermal protection system and the probable
addition of equipment (swing struts, springs, etc.) to assure that
contact with the PLS vehicle is precluded after motor burnout and
separation.
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Table 5-11. SRM design and Dimensional data
I  mmmm
IDelta-V (Ws) -
IMotor Mass Fracffon.
IMotor Density (Ib/ft3) .
Motor Isp (sec) =
Aero "IC factor =
Configuration =
g's=
Vehicle Weight "(Ib) =
Total Sys Weight (Ibs) =
No. of Motors =
Thrust per Motor =
Weight per Motor (Ib) =
Volume per Motor (ft3)=
Burn "13me(sec)=
Total Impulse (Lb-sec)-
IJD ratlo .
0.87 I
108t
260
0.8
PLS
8
21,000:
31,000
3
82,700
2,600
26.01
8.17
2,028,000
3
" Includes Escape SlnJcture Weight
_ !._F_;__-_:_ _._:_ _<_'__._TI'_,_
Dla_i:i:(In)_i_hen ¢jth: _.(ff )
8 75.99
9 60 .O4
1 0 48.64
1 1 40.19
1 2 33.77
1 3 28.78
1 4 24.81
1 5 21.82!
1 6 19.00
1 7 16.83
1 8 15.01
1 9 13.47
20; 12.16
21 11.03
22 10.05
23 9.19
24 8.44
25 7.78
26 7.19
27 6.67!
28 _._0
29 5.7_
30 5.4(
31 5.0(
,/
4
4
A third (and preferred LES design alternate) locates narrower
and longer solids on the outside of the adapter structure as shown
in Figure 5-73. The advantages of this configuration are that
supplementary mission equipment can be attached to the PLS vehicle
inside the adapter and that the smaller SRMs generally are
sheltered from the aerodynamic/thermodynamic loading by the aft end
of the PLS vehicle. Table 5-12 gives motor sizing data for this
configuration. Figure 5-74 is used to illustrate the effect of LES
motor Isp or altitude requirement on the abort system weight.
LES Operation. The separation of the PLS vehicle and LES from
the booster occurs along a line near the midpoint of the booster
adapter. The mechanical separation is accomplished with a
pyrotechnic device such as "super-zip". The firing of the LES
rocket motors is coordinated with the separation sequence to
minimize the rocket blast effects on the booster propellant tank.
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Figure 5-73. Preferred LES Design Concept
To maintain vehicle attitude control during the powered stage
of the LES operation, the thrust vector control system on the
rocket motors (preliminary requirement) is commanded by the PLS
GN&C system. The location of the motors and shape of the adapter
section retained by the LES are selected to support the control
authority requirements of the PLS/LES combination.
The expended LES assembly is jettisoned from the PLS vehicle
as soon as practical. The separation system is the same as used
for the nominal booster separation and precludes post-separation
contact between the adapter hardware and the PLS vehicle.
The recovery system for the PLS vehicle is a conventional
three-main chute cluster arrangement composed of 120-foot diameter
ringsail parachutes, deployed by a mortar-fired, conical ribbon
pilot chute for each main. The parachute system is sized for a 30-
foot per second sink rate. Figure 5-75 presents parametric data
used to size the PLS parachute system. The effects of individual
parachute failure on PLS landing velocity is shown in Figure 5-76.
The best arrangement for the parachute installation appears to
be the co-location of all three chutes on one side of the vehicle
even though this complicates the vehicle c.g. development. The
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Table 5-12. SRM Motor Sizing Data for Preferred LES Concept
Delta-V (Ws) =
Motor Mass Fraction =
Motor Density (Ib/ft3) =
Motor Isp (sec) =
Aero "K" factor =
Configuration =
g's =
Vehicle Weight *(Ib) =
Total Sys Weight (Ibs) =
No. of Motors =
IThrust per Motor -
Weight per Motor (Ib) =
Volume per Motor (ft3)=
Burn Time (sec) -
Total Impulse (Lb-sec)=
L/D ratio =
700
0.87
108
260
0.8
P'..S
8
21,000
31,000
6
41,350
1,300
13.00
4.00
992,400
5
" Includes Escape Struc',ure Weignt
i,ii_iii_!!i_iiiiiiiiiiiii!iiiiiii_!iiii!ii!i_ _ :
4 151.99
5 97.27
6 67.55
7 49.63
9 38.0030.02
1 0 24.32
1 1 20.10
1 2 16.89
1 3 14.39
1 4 12.41
1 5 10.81
1 6 9.50
1 7 8.41
18 7.51_
1 9 6.741
20 6.08
21 5.51
22_ 5.02
,/
location selected at this time (pending confirmation of final
vehicle c.g. calculation) is above the main landing gear on the
port side of the vehicle. The access panel above the chutes is
pyro-separated from the vehicle as required by the chute deployment
sequence. The risers which attach to the hard points on the crew
cabin follow the front carrythrough frame to the centerline of the
vehicle. The two forward riser lines are installed under the TPS
blanket along the top of the cabin to the points where they attach
to the two forward riser fittings near the top hatch. This
configuration (see Figure 5-77) provides a four-point attachment of
the chute cluster to the PLS to control the vehicle suspension
angle and water entry angle.
Upon impact with the water, the graphite/polyimide heatshield
structure will probably fail by fracturing rather than a plastic
deformation failure characteristic of a metallic structure. The
heatshield design consists of bonded-in, hat section, longitudinal
stiffeners and frames which coincide with the frame extensions from
the crew cabin. These longitudinal and cross-ship structural
elements will act as rip stops if a fracture begins as a result of
a hard impact. (The fracture characteristics of Gr/Pi at 500
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Figure 5-74. Effect of LES Motor Isp on Abort System Weight
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Figure 5-76. Parachute Failure Effects on PLS Landing Velocity
degrees F are similar to those at room temperature.) The Apollo
capsule had several crushable "bumpers" between the heatshield and
the pressure vessel on one side to absorb the forces of a hard
landing. In the same way, the PLS heatshield will be sacrificial
in nature to absorb or distribute high impact loads.
The heatshield attachment concept for minimizing heat shorts
is compatible with the desire to isolate the forces of impact. The
few links from the heatshield to the crew cabin will fail during
impact, absorb energy and reduce the transmissibility of forces to
the crew cabin. The design and orientation of these links will not
pose a puncture hazard to the crew cabin in the hard landing case.
The PLS vehicle is suspended from the parachutes so that it
enters the water tail first. For the primary structure, this
attitude presents the smallest, most rugged structure -- the aft
hatch. The aft secondary structure and the externally located
subsystems benefit the cabin impact by absorbing energy.
Subsystems, such as minimum survival ECS, recovery
communications and survival equipment must be located or protected
to preclude damage in a worst case impact. Particular attention
must be given to the design of the canisters which contain the
flotation bags. This equipment must be functional after the water
landing. An assessment of the other subsystem hardware must be
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Figure 5-77. Four-Point Attachment of the Parachute Cluster
made to identify and mitigate possible hazards regarding secondary
damage to the crew cabin.
A significant evaluation criteria on the PLS vehicle design is
the ability of the vehicle to stay afloat in the range of expected
sea states in a ditching scenario. Recovery at ocean locations far
from land will involve waiting several hours for recovery vessels
or aircraft to arrive at the splashdown site. The survival of the
crew requires that the pressure vessel remain intact and seaworthy.
The two areas of design which support this requirement are 1) the
physical characteristics of the configuration which assure
structural integrity of the vehicle during and after the water
impact, and 2) the provision of supplementary flotation devices
which maintain the vehicle condition until recovery is complete.
The physical attributes of the PLS were discussed above. The
pertinent aspect of the structure is the integrity of the pressure
vessel. For flotation, a study of subsystem component volumes was
performed to calculate the amount of flotation provided by the
pressure vessel and subsystems following splashdown. The results
are illustrated in Figure 5-78. A supplementary flotation system
is shown deployed from the aft end of the vehicle. This system
assures that the aft hatch is always above the water line. If wave
or wind action inverts the PLS, the lower pair of flotation bags
again keeps the aft hatch above the water level.
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SUPPLEMENTARY
FLOTATION
SYSTEM
Figure 5-78. PLS Water Flotation Characteristics
5.2 SOFTWARE DEFINITION
The costs associated with the development of software for
advanced space systems represent a large fraction of the total
program cost. This trend is accelerated both, by the high cost of
software and the increased complexity and functionality of the
space systems as higher levels of autonomy and self-diagnosis are
mandated.
A software requirements estimate was made for the PLS to
support the total system life cycle costing task. The estimate was
derived from a set of functionality requirements assumed for the
PLS. The total software estimate is reported for vehicle
requirements and for ground processing requirements.
5.2.1 Vehicle Software.
The vehicle flight software resides in two separate computer
systems, one dedicated to a master communication system and another
dedicated to an on-board maintenance system (OMS). The master
system handles all communication and telemetry between the PLS and
the ground, vehicle and the Space Station and between the vehicle
and TSRSS. The OMS incorporates BITE, BITE access, failure
monitoring and fault detection, a condition monitoring system , on-
board maintenance documentation and provides total integration of
these functions. Both of the computer systems provide redundancy
and fault detection/fault isolation/self healing.
The onboard segment of the PLS software is defined as that
portion of the software which operates totally within the onboard
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data processors of the PLS vehicle. Estimates were developed for
the following components of the onboard software:
i• Guidance, which includes the requirements of ascent, on-
orbit maneuvers, de-orbit and entry, aerodynamic descent,
abort and other contingency flight.
• Naviqation, composed of inertial navigation and Kalman
filter components•
• F_iqht Control, consisting of inertial maneuver, attitude
control and jet selection logic.
• Sensor Processinq, including GPS, Microwave Landing
System, IMU, Star Tracker and Air Data Probe•
o Sequencinq, which controls effector arming, pyro arming,
crossfeed selection, consumables dumping and separation
sequences•
. Utilities for math operations and coordinate
transformations.
. Executive Services, providing context maintenance, data
conversion, interrupt handling and I/O management.
So Communication, including telemetry, forward link,
intercom voice and video.
. DisplaYs and Controls for HUD, dedicated displays, CRT
drivers, caution and warning and hand controllers.
i0. Database Manaqement for user query, application update
and retrieval.
ii. Systems Manaqement for power distribution, environmental
control and consumables monitoring.
12. Redundancy Manaqement, which enables system
reconfiguration.
13. Fault Detection and Isolation, composed of BITE data
consolidation, fault trees and system event monitoring.
14. Fault Correlation and Failure Reportinq, composed of
fault history analysis, a query manager, a report
formatter and a flight data recorder•
15. Maintenance and Inteqration Operations, which supports
ground servicing with a menu manager, on-line procedures
data, testing algorithms and GSE interfaces.
Figure 5-79 summarizes the lines of code estimated for the PLS
vehicle.
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SIZE
CSC NAME (KSLOC) EXISTING MODIFIED NEW
GUIDANCE 38.6 11.58
NAVIGATION 8.4 3.36
FLIGHT CONTROL 13.0 1.3
SENSOR PROCESSING 8.6 0
SEQUENCING 8.0 0
UTILITIES 2.0 1.8
EXECUTIVE 36.0 0
COMMUNICATION 17.2 0
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS 35.0 10.5
DATABASE MANAGEMENT 5.0 5.0
SYSTEM MANAGEMENT 22.4 4.48
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT 8.0 .8
FAULT DETECTION & ISOLATION 30.0 6.0
FAULT CORRELATION & 30.0 9.0
FAILURE REPORTING
MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS 30.0 O
INTEGRATION OPERATIONS 20.0 0
0 27.02
.84 4.2
0 11.7
0 8.6
O 8.0
0 .2
0 36.0
0 17.2
0 24.5
0 0
2.24 15.68
1.6 5.6
1.5 22.5
3.O 18.0
0 30.0
O 20.0
Figure 5-79. Estimated Lines of Software Code
5.2.2 Ground Software
In support of the vehicle flight software, the ground
processing software also resides in two separate computer systems.
A ground communication system handles all communication and
telemetry including commands and a ground maintenance system
compliments and supports the OMS to enhance the total maintenance
process.
Software is required to support the PLS avionics development.
Included in this software is that which is necessary to support the
automated design effort of the flight profiles and envelopes for
the various phases of the PLS mission. This software capability
uses existing software for the Shuttle program to the extent
possible including: rendezvous and docking, separation and
descent, entry and landing, consumables, propulsion, power and
ECLSS. The products developed by this software are a trajectory
tape, a simulator data pack, I-loads, data tapes to specific users
and various reports (e.g. range safety, US Spacecom, crew charts
and flight data file). An automated mission timeline capability is
developed by augmenting current mission timeline techniques from
the Shuttle program to meet the PLS flight rate requirements.
Specific capabilities are to: receive and load flight profile
tapes, perform ascent and entry timeline development, integrate
mission requirements, identify and analyze conflicts, identify
procedure conflicts, perform timeline verification, generate crew
activity products and tailor an operating system.
Additional ground software requirements support the PLS
mission control center to provide realtime mission support and
integrated training for data reduction, software enhancement of
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flight command and control and displays to monitor status during
the PLS flight.
PLS systems simulation software provides the capability for
end-to-end mission simulation for instructors, flight crew,
passengers and flight controllers in a stand-alone or integrate
environment with the PLS mission control center a computer-based,
one-G trainer. The simulation software provides PLS
familiarization, computer aided instruction, mission training and
emergency training.
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6.0 ACQUISITION PHASE DEFINITION
This section documents the acquisition phase definition -
presents planning data for program phases A, B, and C/D. These
data have been developed based upon accomplishing the specific
major activities related to design, development, production, test,
verification, safety, reliability, quality assurance, and
management and control for both hardware and software. The PLS
program master and manufacturing production schedules, including
sub-tier schedules and the manufacturing flow and build plan are
part of these data and are presented in this report.
6.1 PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
One of the contributing efforts initiated early on in the
study was to establish a top level set of program schedules that
would provide a set of key milestones for all tasks, thus allowing
the further development of subschedules unique to the specific
requirements of each task area.
6.1.1 Master Development Schedule
The PLS Preliminary Master Program Schedule, Figure 6-1
establishes realistic and complete schedules for all of the
following activities:
• Engineering • Facilities
• Tooling • Procurement
• Mission Operations • Ground Test
• Flight Test • Production
• Operations Support
The life cycle cost analyses and products reflect the
milestones in this Master Program Schedule. The functional tasks
areas; Subsystem Design, Manufacturing and Verification, and
Operations and Support will each be constrained by the milestone
established by this Master Program schedule.
The PLS Master Program Schedule reflects a number of ground
rules:
i. All production work is based on a two shift, five day weeks
schedule.
2. All production fabrication is support with one welding set
of tooling and line. The one welding line supports two final
assembly lines.
3. The schedules assume that the CAD, CAE, and CAM are in
place and the associated schedule benefits can be realized.
The above ground rules were selected to produce a low cost
fabrication and production operations. The over all schedule was
developed to reduce risk and paralleling of major activities, such
as development and final vehicle fabrication or flight testing.
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Proqram Milestones. The program milestones were based on an
earliest Phase A start date of January, 1992, and a duration of
nine months. The time reduction in the Phase A effort was
considered possible when the results of this study are incorporated
into the initial contract data package. The Functional Flow Block
Diagrams for Production and Operations and Support are presented in
Reference 4-1. The Phase B effort would be performed over a one
and one-half year period to assure that the Phase C/D requirement
documents and end item specifications are complete and mature. The
Phase C/D activity will be discussed in more detail below.
Desiqn, Development, Test and Enqineerina Schedules. With
Phase C/D ATP in April, 1994, the program follows a conservative
set of schedules in all functions until the final orbital flight
test is completed in 2002. All functional program areas are
reflected in the PLS Master Program Schedules (Figure 6-1).
Engineering - The engineering design effort is baselined in a
number of Critical Design Review's (CDR's) between March, 1995 and
January, 1996. The mock-ups necessary to validate and control the
final design will also be developed between ATP and the completion
of the CDR's. All related engineering analysis and required wind
tunnel test to support the design development will be completed
during this time frame.
Facilities - The facilities need for each of three major
areas, Production, KSC, and JSC, are addressed in this section,.
Production: The production facility needs for the final
assembly lines to support the fabrication schedule are
presented. See Section 6.1.3 for additional detail.
KSC: The major new facilities for the PLS program are all
located at launch site. The expanded schedules for each
facility, horizontal processing facility, adapter processing
facility, and deservicing/pyro facility are presented in more
detail in Figures 6-2 through 6-4.
JSC: The facility requirements at JSC for Mission
Operations are more an expansion of existing facility instead
of construction of new facilities. The Mission Operations
support requirements are supported by the schedules. See
Reference 4-1 for additional data.
Tooling - The major tooling requirements for the welding and
final assembly lines are presented. The lead, production and set
up time for tooling was based upon experience with the Sabreliner,
B-IB, X-31 and Shuttle programs. The tooling schedules support the
fabrication need dates.
Procurement - The major material procurements data are
presented alone with the LRU and equipment need date for the major
test articles. The lead times presented are consistent with those
presently being experienced on the Shuttle program.
6-6
............................................................................................................................................................ I|
!
_
 lil!
!
.....................................................= _ 11 .1...t ..............................................
i i irl--! i-"
..........................._--.,,.-.i--t ..........................
............._.:I i_, ....im..................................................................................
 ,lill
= iii!-
:_ i
Ill _ll,
M
,M
U
m
f_
-M
m
u
o
e,-i
@
N
o,=1
J.l
@
I
_D
o,-I
6--7
o0
°M
°M
u
0
f_
I
*,=i
6-8
v-
e-
o
v-
9-
!-
o
_ _ u
.....................................................................................................................o
_....
n
z
p
o
I
M
-,-I
6-g
Mission Operations - The capability to develop, plan and
conduct a mission requires the development of NASA/JSC capabilities
to provide mission design, training and monitoring and control
during the actual mission.
Operation System/Tool Development - The major systems,
Flight Design System, Crew Activity Plan (CAP) System and
Control Center (CC) will be on line and ready to support the
first OFT mission on January 1, 2001.
Training Resources Development - The following functions
will be available to support not only crew training but the
training of flight controllers and instructors.
Training requirements and material development
Computer based training
One G trainer
PLS Simulator
PLS training aircraft
Ground Test - The component development tests are scheduled to
be completed prior to any subsystem installations in any major test
articles. All Avionics Development Laboratory tests are to be
completed prior to Approach and Landing Tests (ALT) and Operational
Flight Tests (OFT) flights, including the flight software.
The sub-system development tests will be completed prior to
the first subsystem installation into a flight test article. The
associated subsystem qualifications testing and completion of
analysis of the results for the ALT an OFT flight will be complete
prior to the schedule IOC fight date.
All test articles in the PLS program have multiple usage and
each is discussed below:
Static Test Article (STA) - After completion of the
required static test to confirm the design loads, the test
loads will continue to be incrementally increased until
failure in major structural areas occur. The static test
article will be used to perform the water floatation tests
after the static load testing is complete. Any damage
resulting from the static load test will have to be repaired
to insure that the crew cabin will maintain its pressure
integrity. A possible future trade would be to determine
which of the two vehicles, dynamic or static would best
satisfy the flotation test requirements, since static testing
will damage the test vehicle.
Dynamic Test Article (DTA) - The dynamic vibro-acoustic
and modal tests will be followed by a Thermal Vacuum Test
(TVT). This vehicle will contain very few subsystems and
cannot be manned during the TVT. The test will allow
verification of the thermal math models and prove-out the
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passive cooling system design with the use of thermal
simulators.
Flight Test - The flight test program is composed of tests of
the parachutes/launch escape system, approach and landing
performance, and orbital flight tests. These tests use the
following test articles.
Boiler Plate Flight Test Articles (BPFTA) - The four
boiler plate vehicles will support all the parachute drop test
and launch escape system test to verify and qualify the launch
escape system, separation system, and parachute design. A
total of 25 three-parachute tests will be performed (some each
on land and water), 23 of which will be drop test and two
launch escape system motor firings and dynamic parachute
deployment at maximum altitude. Some damage is expected and
if need be, some repair will be performed on the boiler plates
to insure the completion of the parachute and launch escape
system test on schedule.
ALT Vehicle - The ALT test program includes full-scale
low-speed tests launched from a B-52. These test include
unpowered subsonic and landing tests. Supersonic drop test
may be possible with some solid booster thrust augmentation,
but were not addressed during this study. The tests are
designed to verify the atmospheric handling qualities, landing
performance, and the guidance and control and autoland
systems.
Orbital Flight Test Vehicle (OFTV) - The orbital flight
tests complete the flight test series by verifying the overall
capability of the full system. The orbital flight tests
comprise six flights, two of which are contingencies to assure
that data from four flights are received. The Orbital Flight
Test Vehicle (PLV-01) will be refurbished and added to the
operational fleet. The mission planning elements to be in
place for the first OFT flight are presented on Figure 6-5.
Mission preparations for this flight are presented on Figure
6-6.
Fliqht Test Proqram. The parachute, PLS vehicle and system
(including the launch vehicle) will be tested and verified during
the following flight test program.
Parachute, Water Impact and LES Tests - The following
qualification sequence for the PLS parachute system was
obtained from Pioneer, the developers of the orbiter drag
chutes. The PLS parachute design is based on a existing
design, which is only sized to satisfy the PLS requirements.
Five bomb drops and 25 full three parachute tests are
scheduled in the preliminary development schedules. The bomb
drops would be with single parachutes and a dead weight equal
to one-third of the expected PLS maximum weight. All
parachute drop tests will be made from a large type air
6-11
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transport, like a C-5 or C-17.
Twenty-three of the three parachute tests will be drop
tested with full up parachute system, motors, drogues, and
parachutes. These tests will use one of four PLS boiler plate
vehicles, which will have appropriate instrumentation for the
drop tests. The boiler plate PLS vehicles will be repaired as
required to complete the parachute test program. To
demonstrate robustness in the parachute system design, two
chute drops, simulating a parachute failure, would be
performed. Water impact tests will be performed in an
appropriate water tank facility following the parachute drop
tests.
Two of the 25 three parachute tests will be part of two
full up Launch Escape System tests, which will include an
instrumented PLS boiler plate vehicle, full booster adapter
and systems, SRM's and parachutes and their systems.
The PLS boiler plate test vehicles will be available to
perform other tests and fit checks as they become defined by
definition of the PLS system follow-on studies.
Approach and Landing Test (ALT) - The ALT program validates
the following PLS system capabilities in a very controlled
environment.
Autoland Performance
Landing Gear and Brake Performance
Low Speed Aerodynamic Control Authority
Cross Wind Landing Sensitivity
C. G. Envelope Sensitivity
Maximum Weight Vehicle Performance
Final Approach Energy Management
The ALT test article will be a PLS flight vehicle with
additional instrumentation and the following non-functioning
systems removed:
Propulsion systems
Docking elements and systems
Portions of the ECLSS and power systems
Passenger seats and provisions
The PLS vehicle will also have a unique crew cabin since it
must interface with a pylon on the B-52 wing. Also one ejection
seat will be installed to provide abort capability below parachute
capability. This vehicle was not considered for refurbishment, but
this question should be addressed during some future trade study.
The PLS design can only accommodate one ejection seat due to
space limitations, two seats would block access to the cockpit by
the crew. Designs to allow moveable or removable ejection seats
would have high design, qualification, and program risk. This
could be a future area where a trade study could be performed.
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The following proposed ALT flight test profiles are presented
for evaluation and are not meant to be final or firm.
Flight No. 1 - Straight in landing with no maneuvering using
autoland, light braking and little or no cross wind.
Flight No. 2 - Maneuvering with autoland, hard braking and
nominal cross winds.
Flight No. 3 - Maneuvering with crew landing, hard braking
and maximum cross wind.
Flight No. 4 - Straight in landing with aft C.G. and crew
landing, hard braking and nominal cross winds.
Flight No. 5 - Maneuvering with aft C.G. and crew landing,
hard braking and nominal cross winds.
The ALT flight test program can take on various configurations
of flight operations per flight. The above complement is just one
set to consider. Once the ALT flights are completed, the ALT flight
test vehicle will be shipped to KSC to provide path finder checkout
of the Horizontal Processing and De-servicing/Pyro facility. The
ALT program will allow the first OFT flight to be manned without
ejection seats.
Orbital Flight Test (OFT) - The OFT program of the PLS vehicle
verifies it is operational by validating the following analytical
models developed to describe flight performance and environment:
Aerodynamics
Thermal - TPS/TCS*
Vibration/Acoustics*
Load*
Venting
Aero/thermal
Those models marked with a "*" are limits the vehicle cannot
exceed in flight since they have been verified by ground testing.
The OFT program also establishes crew confidence in the PLS flight
worthiness design, operations, performance and handling quality.
The test results from each flight may result in changes: to
the control loop lead, lag or gain; to follow-on flight test
requirements; or operational flight limits. Final test results
could also effect the subsystem design, like supplemental or
reduced TPS requirements in local areas.
Each OFT flight will accomplish a number of tests in addition
to collecting data to verify engineering math models. Proposed
flight plans for four OFT flights are presented in Table 6-1.
Special test requirements for ascent, orbit and entry/landing of
each of the four missions are also included in this table.
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Table 6-1. Preliminary OFT Plan.
FLIGHT REGIME
(28.5 DEG INCL)
SPECIAL
FLIGHT TEST
REQUIREMENTS
ASCENT:
ORBIT:
ENTRY/LANDING:
mmmmmmmmm
lint
• MANNED (2 CREW)
• BENIGN LAUNCH
• 24 HOURS
• MIN. CROSS WIND
LANDING AT
EDWARDS AFB
• NO BRAKING
• NOM C.G.
NONE
• OMS/RCS
MANEUVERS
• CROSS RANGE TO
EDWARDS AFB
_700 NM
ORBITAL FLIGHTS"
2nd
MANNED (2 CREW)
24 HOURS
LANDINGS AT
_OWARDS AFB
FORWARD C.G.
ELV INDUCED laa &
OMS/RCS
MANEUVERS
TOP, BOTTOM,
TAIL TO SUN
AERO MANUEVERS
AUTOLAND
3rd
_ANNEO (4 CREWl
F2 HOURS
_OM CROSS WIND
LANDINGS AT
EDWARDS AFB
_-IARD BRAKING
FORWARD C.G.
ELV INDUCED Ioa&_
OMSIRCS
MANEUVERS
RENDEZVOUS
SSF DOCKING
OPTION
AERO MANEUVERS
AUTOLAND
• MANNED (4 CREW)
• 72 HOURS
• AFTC.O.
• NOMINAL CROSS
WIND LANDING AT
KSC
• HARD BRAKING
• MAX WEIGHT
NONE
•RENDEZVOUS
• SSF DOCKING/
BERTHING
• SOLAR SOAK
• SSF RMS
ATTACHMENT
VERIFICATION
• AERO MANEUVERS
• LARGE CROSS
RANGE
• I
• _O ADM_ONAL ORBITAL TEST FUGHTS REQUIRED FOR C_NGF..NC¥
For math model verification, four flights of data are
required. Six flights have been scheduled in the Preliminary
Master Program Schedule, as contingency to assure that four flights
of data are obtained. Test requirements areas presented in Table
6-2 are established by the functions listed in this table. These
functional areas establish the majority of the OFT flight test
requirements.
The PLS test article will be a production vehicle with a
special data and communication system installed and six passenger
seats and provisions replaced by batteries and ECLSS consumables.
These modifications will satisfy the collection of post test flight
data requirements and the 72 hour mission capability. Even with
additional batteries, a power down configuration during sleep
cycles will have to be performed to accomplish a 72 hour mission•
Center of gravity control during the flights will be by
ballasting. Also, all launches should be into a rendezvous
compatible orbit with the Space Station Freedom to provide an
additional abort mode during the test flights. The OFT vehicle
will retain a portion of the data system for finalizing any OFT
open items when reconfigured for operational flights.
Fleet sizinq. Fleet sizing analyses provide the definition of
the fleet size that will have to be produced during the
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Table 6-2. Functional Areas Providing Test Requirements.
THERMAL/STRUCTURE:
THERMAIJAERO:
rrRUCTURES:
PROPULSION:
MECHANICAL:
ECLSS:
AVIONICS:
CREW/PASSENGERS:
MISSION:
POWER:
SUBSYSTEM THERMAL DESIGN, TPS/'rcs CAPACITY
ASSESSMENT, MOLDLINE PENETRATION CONTROL
ASCENT, ENTRY, TRANSONIC HINGE MOMENTS, TPS, LOCAL FLOW
SEPARATION
LOAD & STRESS EVALUATION, SHOCK/VIBRATION/
ACOUSTICAL, VENTING
PERFORMANCE, OPERATIONS, VIBRATION, STABILITY
PLUME IMPINGEMENT, LANDING GEAR BRAKING/STEERING
PERFORMANCE, CABIN TEMP/HUMIDITY SURVEY, FLASH
EVAPORATORS, POST LANDING CABIN CONTROL
GN&C PERFORMANCE, TELE & COMM, DATA STORAGE, TRACKING,
AUTOLAND ANTENNA PATTERNS, ON-BOARD HEALTH MONITORING
ASSESSMENT
ACOUSTICAL NOISE, CABIN ATMOSPHERE, HABITABILITY,
D&C COMPATIBILITY, WASTE MANAGEMENT
DOCKING/PROXIMITY OPERATIONS, CROSS RANGE, MISSION
DURATION, PERFORMANCE, LAUNCH/FLIGHT/ENTRY CONDITIONS
BATTERY PERFORMANCE/STABILITY
manufacturing production run. The traffic and personnel exchange
models provided by LaRC can be satisfied by eight missions a year
with one vehicle. This Section presents the analysis results and
justification for a final fleet size of four vehicles, when
attrition and continuous support are considered.
Assumptions - The resulting fleet size was based on the
following assumptions:
Space Station crew stay of 180 days
Initial Orbiter crew exchange every 90 days
Full Space Station crew (eight or more) change out would
exceed the Shuttle Capability
Space Station operability requires crew overlap
Lunar/Mars personnel transferred on dedicated flights
All crew rotations performed by the PLS when the Space
Station crew size reaches 24
The most efficient use of the PLS is to exchange eight crew on
every flight. With 24 crew at station, six flights with eight
passengers each will exchange the 48 personnel required to keep the
Space Station fully staffed and not exceed the 180-day rotation
requirement. One PLS flight every 60 days.
Traffic model summary - The flight rate build up after the IOC
flight in August, 2002, is presented in Table 6-3. This flight
rate support the personnel traffic model, assuming orbiter support
in the early years, with six eight passenger flights in 2007 for
Space Station crew exchange and two four passenger flights for
Lunar/Mars crews. By 2009, the Lunar/Mars crew requirements grow
6-17
to two eight passenger flights per year. 141 flights of the PLS
occurs by the end of 2020 with the above considerations. Further
analysis to integrate the PLS and orbiter flights in the earlier
year (2002 to 2008) may reduce the number of flights required by
the PLS during these seven years.
Table 6-3. PLS Flight Rate Build-up.
YEARS SSF FLIGHTSILUNAR/MARS PASSENGER TOTAL
(FISCAL) PER YEAR FLIGHTS SIZE FLIGHTS
PER YEAR
2002
(IOC Aug 2002)
2003
2004 & 2005
2006 - 2008
2009 - 2020
4
5
6
6
2
2
2
2
4 - 8
4 - 8
4 - 8
4 - 8
8
TOTAL :
6
14
24
96
141
System Attrition - In-flight aborts of the PLS vehicle do not
necessarily denote loss of vehicle. Catastrophic vehicle loss
represents a small fraction of the total number of aborts, and
approaches zero. The current Mission Success reliability forecasts
for PLS, from the study, is 0.978. At present, no single point
failure has been identified in the PLS design that will cause loss
of vehicle. However, a number of PLS failures, occurring
singularly or in combination with others, may cause mission abort.
Should this happen, the PLS simply would safely return to earth for
subsequent repair and reuse.
PLS loss also may occur as a result of catastrophic failure of
the Titan IV or other Launch Vehicles. The most recent projections
for Titan IV Launch Vehicle Reliability would result in 2 to 4 loss
of mission failures per hundred launches. The PLS should be
capable of escaping from all but a no-warning Titan IV explosion
occurring on the launch pad or in flight. A Titan IV no-warning
explosion is considered to be a very unlikely event. Accordingly,
it is unlikely that a PLS loss of this type will occur at a rate
greater that one per thousand launches. The assumption for vehicle
loss, but not crew loss is one per hundred launches, resulting from
water landing or runway landing damage.
Fleet size - The fleet size is determined by the mission
requirements and realistic attrition estimates.
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One PLS vehicle will satisfy the current traffic model
requirements.
The attrition rate of one vehicle loss per hundred flight,
requires two additional vehicles for the 141 flights by the
year 2020.
One PLS backup vehicle to allow continuous mission
operations under any circumstances.
A fleet size of four vehicles will satisfy both the traffic
model and a realistic attrition rate, plus continuous support. All
four PLS vehicles, in the fleet, would be flown to support the
traffic model to maintain full operability of the fleet. Non-use
of a vehicle has been proven to create problems that are not
understood and result in unexplained anomalies. The traffic model
can be satisfied by four vehicles using a 41 day calendar
turnaround schedule, which is the minimum manpower requirement per
reference 5.
6.1.2 Production
Manufacturing and system validation plans identify the
production requirements, time lines (critical paths), issues/risks,
facilities (requirements and recommendations), major equipment
(including engine test stands, mock ups test beds, iron birds, and
simulations laboratories), testing and test articles, and
integration approaches for the PLS.
Acuuisition Phase, The PLS objective is to design a safe,
durable, low life-cycle-cost vehicle. Obtaining this objective
starts by emphasizing producibility and maintainability in the
preliminary design concepts. The design will be driven by
operations and maintainability requirements and assured by an
integrated system engineering, a total quality management approach
and an integrated reliable & maintainable process.
The first efforts associated with the development of our
operations concept were to develop a series of functional flow
block diagrams (FFBD's) that would capture the operational
functions associated with the PLS. The addition of the DDT&E
blocks associated with "capabilities development" and operational
flight test (OFT) verification provided the important links to the
pre-production and operational periods that are necessary
ingredients in our "design for operations" philosophy. Operations
lower level flows are found in Reference 4-1.
PLS program management has placed operations, maintainability
and producibility in priority position of importance. This system
will be producible within the boundaries of being first
maintainable and operable. The key word is "access"! See
Figure 6-7. The best examples of this are: the removable heat
shield; the exterior systems access panels; and the manufacturing
access opening in the crew cabin. Back-face heat shield removal
during the operations phase of the program is assured by not
installing the heat shield until after all the systems are
installed on the vehicles exterior. Therefore, if the heat shield
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can be installed last it will be able to be removed first, if and
when required. The removable systems access panels provide access
during manufacturing and during operations.
IN WORK - PERFORMING ANALYSES
MANUFACTURING FACILITIES/RESOURCES TO DETERMINE COST EFFECTIVE
• IN WORK - IDENTIFYING ADDITIONAL DETAILS - TEST PROGRAM/
ESTIMATED SQ.-FT. REQUIREMENTS /I i I "'NUFAC*U'O"CO S O E""O!l_t • MAXIMUM ACCESS FOR SYSTEMS
INSTALLATIONS - COST SAVINGS
• IMPROVEDMANUFACTURABILITY /_ _ - t' = _ • MECHANICAL FASTENER/SEAL CLOSURE
MAINTNNAB_ITY_ANDPROVIDES FOR FUTURE . t -" / _ _._ _ IMPROVEDREwMANUFACTURABILITYcABINDESIGN
j _ •" • CYLINDER SHAPELESS COMPLEX WELDMENTS
tFACTURING BREAKS
• REDUCED TOOLING REQUIREMENTS
TRADE SELECTION-2 PIECE HEATSHIELD PASSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL COOLING
• IMPROVED MANUFACTURASlLITY • ELIMINATES REQUIREMENTS FOR
AND PROVIDES FOR FUTURE COLD PLATES
MA_T_ - REDUCES SYSTEMS FABRICATION.
ELECTRICAL POWER - BATTERIES - DC SUBASSEMBLY. CHECKOUT. AND
ASSEMBLY. INSTALLATIONS. TEST
• REDUCES MANUFACTURING & SYs'rBd FUTURE M./t_IT_TY COMPLEXITY
VALIDATION REQUIREMENTS &
COMPLEXITY
Figure 6-7. Producibility Influence on Vehicle Design
The manufacturing access opening in the crew cabin will
provide significant intangible benefits to the PLS Program, as a
similar access opening in the Space Shuttle Orbiter crew module.
Additional benefits can be derived through the mechanical
closure/opening, if and when it would be required to disassemble
the transfer tunnel from the crew cabin. Improved
manufacturability through producibility of design is enhancing
future operations maintainability.
Fabrication of all PLS vehicles and test articles in one
production run is cost-effective for the program, since each
Shuttle Orbiter was built with a personnel turnover rate of 70
percent. Continuous build will require only one facility and rate
tooling setup, a minimum amount of retraining, and a one-time
procurement of items including those with long lead times. Early
planning will assure the operational spares requirements are
included in the production order. The cumulative results of these
actions will result in a cost effective manufacturing program and
would support DRM-I requirements.
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Fast turn around requires accessibility. To comply with that
requirement, most avionic systems and other systems historically
requiring operations attention are located on the exterior crew
cabin structure, within accessible exterior compartments. In
addition to accessibility, the systems will use mature,
state-of-the-art techniques, including self-test. To further
comply with the accessibility requirement, the heat shield back
face structure is a removable two piece structure, as previously
stated. This enhances access and provides the means for lower
vehicle access during manufacture and for field operations
maintainability and inspection.
The electric system is direct current, thus simplifying or
eliminating heat-producing conversion devices. The actuation
systems are electro-mechanical, avoiding APU/hydraulic problems
that have plagued the Shuttle.
Manufacturinq Flow and Build ConceDt. The crew cabin
fabrication illustrated in the Manufacturing Flow and Build Plan,
Figure 6-8, begins with single degree forming of aluminum sheet
stock. This is followed by the necessary machining operation prior
to welding the sub-assembly pieces together. Circular design of
major sections reduced the tooling complexity and reflects the
manufacturing influence on design to minimize production,
operations and cost. The PLS preferred concept incorporates welded
ring stiffeners and mechanically attached frames for operational
maintainability and ease of inspection. The transfer tunnel is
fabricated separately and mechanically attached to the forward crew
cabin, thus allowing easy manufacturing access to the crew cabin
for interior fabrication prior to attachment of the transfer
tunnel. The crew cabin assembly is completed with installation of
the rear carry through frames. The bottom heat shield is not
attached until all the sub-system elements have been installed in
the systems compartments and the systems individually checked out.
These methods of attachment/assembly will also facilitate future
operations maintainability.
Manufacturinq Master Schedule. The Manufacturing Master
Schedule, Figure 6-9, was developed using program-level milestones
that support customer-indicated requirements and an analysis of
integrated task time estimates. The analysis establishes optimum
support for the manufacturing program in all areas, including
engineering, facilities, material procurement, manpower loading and
tooling, and application of comparative measurements of historical
Space Shuttle performance.
System support hardware will be fabricated via a blended
schedule to maintain systems used throughout the vehicle. All
other scheduled bars are major components and hardware groups of
overall vehicle and stand alone with their own flow plans, such as
the crew cabin in Figure 6-10. Final assembly and checkout will be
the point in time when the major vehicle components are mated,
allowing systems integration and subsequent testing. Flow plans
will be established for each major component/hardware group shown
on the master schedule, providing an orderly time phasing for
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Figure 6-9. Manufacturing Master Schedule
Manufacturing production activities. The schedules developed will
serve as the basis for manpower loading, material need, and
facility and equipment usage. Optimum control points will be
established to provide performance controls, change control, and
status information to be measured against the master schedule.
6.1.3 Test and Verification
Manufacturing and fabrication of flight hardware includes the
verification of system operation, both individually and integrated.
The system will be validated during the operational phase of the
contract. The following definitions are being used by the study:
Verification - All tests (and/or checkout) performed
prior to validation of the system
Validation - Certification of the system performed during
the operations phase of the contract (such as space
vehicle flight readiness review sign-off or flight
worthiness-aircraft certification)
Philosophy. The testing philosophy is to achieve system
validation without overkill. The aircraft industry approach to
verification and validation is being closely reviewed to determine
the most efficient and effective manner of achieving validation.
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Figure 6-10. Crew Cabin Flow Plan
Emphasis on development testing will provide assurance of a
sound product and high confidence in a successful qualification
test program. A high-fidelity integration test will lead to a
flight worthy, low-risk system. Flight testing will be
orchestrated to provide evidence that flight boundaries and
requirements can be safely achieved. Guided by lessons learned,
the testing concept developed for PLS supports the basic philosophy
of assuring a safe, durable, cost-effective PLS.
PLS preferred concept sub-system test article requirements are
presented in Figure 6-11 for development, qualification,
integration, and the approach and landing tests.
Facilities. Based upon the information in the work break down
structure, the MFBP's, the recommended test plans, available
make/buy information, and the program and manufacturing schedules,
potential major sites and facilities for manufacturing and test are
identified in Tables 6-4 and 6-5. The level of effort did not
include cost of the facilities/modifications or new facilities
construction. Basic initial facilities area requirements for:
Rockwell International, Space Systems Division: Downey and
Palmdale, CA, and Kennedy Space Center (KSC), FL; North American
Aircraft: Tulsa, OK, Palmdale and E1 Segundo, CA; Johnson Space
Center (JSC), Houston, TX; Edwards Air Force Base (AFB), CA; and
White Sands, NM were determined and are shown in Table 6-6.
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Figure 6-11. Test Article Requirements for System Validation
A successful, cost effective PLS program starts with a design
that has demonstrated it can meet the requirements. The
demonstration process will take the forms of analysis, similarity,
demonstration, and test. Tests and demonstrations require test
articles that support the verification process. These test
articles will range from simple, built up segments to a complete
vehicle demonstrating compliance of a totally integrated system.
Development tests generally will consist of testing
subassemblies, complete assemblies, and major components, providing
confidence that the test article subjected to the qualification
test will successfully meet requirements. Most of the structural
articles undergoing qualification tests will be rendered non-flight
worthy and thus classified as test dedicated. Mechanical and
avionic equipment undergoing qualification testing will also be
classified as non-flight worthy without major refurbishment.
Integrated testing will be orchestrated to demonstrate that the
systems perform together as required under stipulated environment.
The Approach and Landing Test (ALT) for the preferred program
entails dropping a modified PLS vehicle from an appropriate
aircraft to demonstrate approach and landing qualities. The ALT
will involve two forms of approach: free-fall without power and
free-fall with add-on rockets to provide a supersonic approach.
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IFigure 6-12. Verification/Validation Facilities Logic
Manned Spacecraft Comparison. Lessons learned from other
space programs were reviewed, see Table 6-7. This review dealt
with the status of major vehicle test articles and selected system
capabilities. The Apollo Program dedicated test articles to the
major test programs. The Shuttle ALT vehicle was eventually
relegated to non-flight status. The preferred PLS intends to
dedicate a modified vehicle to this test. Static load tests, if
taken to the ultimate, render the article unfit for flight, and as
such most static test articles are designed for test only. That
was the case for Apollo CSM/LM and i/4-scale and full-scale Shuttle
models. PLS plans to use a non-flight test article.
The initial Verification/Validation testing facilities have
been identified in Figure 6-12 for the PLS preferred concept. The
majority of these facilities already exist, as indicated in
Table 6-4, and will be updated to support PLS requirements.
The Apollo flight system provided a manual override as a
backup, which is not practical for the Shuttle or PLS as neither
can be fully flown manually. An independent system avoids the
potential generic problems of the primary system. The first Apollo
flights were unmanned and controlled by a mechanical system. The
Shuttle did not incorporate unmanned capabilities, nor will the
PLS.
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Life Cvcle Development.
Development test and
evaluation (T&E) serves a
number of useful functions.
It will provide information to
PLS decision makers
responsible for making cost
and risk decisions which
impact life cycle cost and
reliability over the life of
the system. T&E will be
conducted to demonstrate the
feasibility of conceptual
approaches, to minimize risk,
to identify design
alternatives, to compare and
analyze tradeoffs and to
estimate operational
effectiveness and suitability.
As the PLS undergoes design
and development, the emphasis
in testing will move gradually
PHASE A I PHASE B
(CONCEPT I (CONCEPT
EXPLORATION) / DEMONSTRATION)
DEVELOPMENT TESTtNG
ENVIRONMENT TIE
_RELIABILITY DEV1
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DESIGN LIMIT .L
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QUALIFICATION TESTS
INTEGLATION TESTS
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PRODUCTION)
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Figure 6-13.
Phases
Test and Evaluation
from development to operational T&E. The later phase will focus on
questions of operational effectiveness, suitability and
supportability. As noted T&E is a process that will be continuous
through the development and operational phases, A,B and C/D,
Figure 6-13.
Phase A, or Conceptual Exploration, is the time frame when the
T&E Master Plan (TEMP) is conceived. The TEMP is the basic
planning document for all T&E functions and is the guiding manual
for planning, reviewing and approving T&E programs and provides the
basis and authority for all other detailed test related documents.
The TEMP will identify all critical technical characteristics,
operational issues and T&E schedules. The TEMP will be reviewed
and updated as the program matures. Key topics contained in the
TEMP are shown in Figure 6-14. In addition to development of the
TEMP, development testing will begin during Phase A and continue
into Phase B.
During phase B, also known as Concept Demonstration
Validation, environmental testing will commence and continue into
Phase C or Full Scale Development phase. Life, limit and
qualification testing will be performed on prototype and production
articles during Phases B and C.
Integration and flight testing will occur during the C/D
phase. Testing during phase C/D will be handed off to the NASA for
operational testing with Rockwell providing support.
6._.4 Operations Planning
The first production vehicle (PLV-02) build is delayed so that
the first operational launch would occur three months after the
last OFT flight. A successful OFT program could result in a nine
6-32
month interval between the
last OFT flight and the first
operational flight due to the
two contingency OFT flights
built into the schedule. The
delay in the production of the
first operational vehicle has
a minor impact on the
production staffing. The
second shift operation will
have to be reduced for about
one year. These people, who
have intimate knowledge of the
PLS vehicle could provide a
great service at Palmdale, for
instance, to process the ALT
vehicle and at KSC to help
validate the PLS processing
facilities.
Figure 6-14. Key Elements of the
Test and Evaluation Master Plan
The mission planning effort for the first DRM flight in
August, 2002, is presented on Figure 6-15. Comparing this figure
with the related data for the first OFT (Figure 6-6) shows a
reduction of lead time from one year to eight months for the
operational system. Further mission planning lead time will
materialize with additional operational maturity.
The operations study results established that the optimum turn
around time for the PLS program to support eight flights a year was
forty three calendar days. Figure 4-14 presented this 43-day
turnaround flow.
6.1,5 Sa_et 7 and Reliabilitv
The aspects of safety and reliability were addressed during
the study, but no formal safety plan or hazard analysis was
performed. The reliability requirements for logistics and
operations were defined in Reference 6-1).
Safety. The PLS design requirements have been developed with
full understanding that the number of potential hazards are
influenced by the design itself. The PLS preferred concept has
many design requirements characteristics that will reduce the
number of hazards requiring control. For example:
H202 and JP4 Propellant - elimination of hydrazine, which was
the propellant in the reference concept.
Electromagnetic Actuators (EMA's) - Hydraulics and auxiliary
power units (APU's) are not necessary to support the
aerosurfaces, landing gear and brakes.
Robust Design Structure - The launch escape loads are a design
driver and assures large ascent load margins.
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Landing Gear - Design to accommodate maximum weight and
landing cross winds.
Avionics - Failure tolerant design to allow mission
continuation after failure.
A detailed hazards analysis for the PLS will be performed
during a later development phase. A number of general hazard
subjects are known now and should be addressed during the initial
design phase. A summary of the data for future reference is
presented in Table 6-8.
The intent of any design and specifically the PLS is to
reduce or control the number of hazards the final design presents
to the operational phase of the program. The other two hazard
levels can not be eliminated, but all initial and final design
efforts should try to control them. Catastrophic hazard, like the
loss of the booster due to time critical failure, or critical
hazards requiring an emergency action by the crew or system must be
addressed and understood and control or risk understood and
approved by theprogram office.
Reliability. Redundancy increases system reliability, but at
the cost of increased complexity in fault detection, isolation and
control. A future is needed to establish a system to balance the
gains in reliability vs. the impact on operations.
System reliability can be increased with good system design
and not increase maintenance requirements, selection of overall
system architecture and clever parts selection and reliable parts
placement in critical areas.
The probability of mission success is the number that should
determine redundancy levels. It can easily be shown that a system
that has 3 or 4 strings or a fail operational/fail operational/fail
safe (FO/FO/FS) using poor quality parts and a poor system design
could have a probability of mission success less than a FS system
with good parts and a clever system design.
Even when parts and architecture are optimized, redundant
systems often add complexity to other systems. For example, one
must incorporate more sensors, and MDM's, etc., to be able to
detect a fault in a system. These extra components reduce the
reliability in other systems by adding parts and complexity. In
addition, the adding of the fault isolation and control facilities
also includes the possibilities of errors in fault detection. In
other words, false alarms could reduce overall mission success
probabilities as well.
A compromise must be reached between reliability,
maintainability and redundancy levels. One of the most difficult
engineering decisions is what success probability is acceptable.
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Table 6-8. General Hazard Areas for the PLS Vehicle
Hazardous Hazard Hazard Safety
Condition Cause_ _ i_
LDSS OF INABILITY TO PRESSURE MAINTAIN TBD
HABITABLE CLOSF-JSEAL LOSS MIN. CABIN
ENVIRONMENT HATCHES PRESSURE
UNKNOWN CREW ELIMINATE
GASIEOUS TOXICITY TOXIC SOURCES
CONTAMINANTS ASPHYXIATION
EXCESSIVE CREW CO/CO2 NOT
CO2 ASPHYXIATION TO EXCEED TBD
LOSS OF CABIN CREW TBD SFM
AIR CIRCULATION DISCONFORT VENTILATION
COOLING HEAT STROKE WITH COMPLETE
CHANGE OF AIR
IN TBD MINUTES
POST LANDING CREW TOXICITY BREATABLE
TOXIC FLUID ASPHYXIATION ATMOSHERE
VENTING/INGESTION
INABILITY TO/ SEPARATION DUE LOSS OF PLS MECHANISMS
INADVERTENT TO STRUCTRUAL INTO SAME DESIGNED TO
SEPARATION FAILURE OF ORBIT STRUCTURAL
FROM SSF LATCHING MARGIN OF 1,4
MECHANISM
• INABILITY TO JAMMING OF UNUSABLE FAL - SAFE
INADVERTENT INTERFACING/ PLS - LOSS RELEASE
SEPARATION RELEASE OF CAPABILITY MECHANISM
FROM SSF. MECHANISM
(CONTINUED)
HUMAN ERROR LOSS OF VEHICLE BUILT-IN INHIBITS
AND/OR LIFE IN RELEASE
SEQUENCE
PLS/SSF CONTRACT POSSIBLE CRITICAL FUNCTION
IMPACT DURING LOSS OF SAFETY ASSESSMENT
DOCKING CAPABIUT_
MECHANICAL DAMAGE ENSURE SYMMETRICAL
RECONTRACT TO PLSISSF RELEASE OF PLS
AT RELEASE
INADVERENT DAMAGE TO CRITICAL FUNCTIONS
RCS FIRING SSF AND LOSS INHIBITED
WHILE DOCKED OF PLS
CONSUMABLE
Hazard Elimination/Control
ProvisionsR___
PROVIDE TBD MAKE-UP PRESSURIZATION
TO ALLOW FOR TBD LEAKAGE
PROVIDE REAL TIME CREW ATMOSPHERIC
CONTAMINANT MONITORING SYSTEM
PROVIDE COICO 2 REMOVAL CONTROL
PROVIDE FO/FS CABIN VENTILATION/AIR
CIRCULATION SYSTEM
TOGETHER WITH MONITORING CAPABILITY,
PROVIDE BACK-UP OXYGEN SUPPLY
SAME
SAME
ENSURE THAT NO SINGLE ACTION/
COMMAND CAN JETTISON PLS,
ENSURE PRESSURE INTEGRITY,
COMPLETED TEST AND CHECKOUT
SEQUENCE AND CREW POSITIONING
PRIOR TO JE'I'I'ISON.
ENSURE FO/FS DOCKING
TO SSF PROCEDURE
ENSURE FO/FS DOCKING
TO SSF PROCEDURE
PROVIDE INHIBIT TO PREVENT
PREMATURE OPERATIONS
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Table 6-8. General Hazard Areas for the PLS Vehicle (Concluded)
Hazardous Hazard Hazard Safety
Condition Cause Eff_t B.eaub'P.,.l_,_
FIRE/EXPLOSION 02 PARTIAL IGNITION OF 02 laP NOT TO
CONDITIONS PRESSURE IN PLS MOUNTED EXCEED TBD %
EXCESS OF DEVICES
30%
HOT SURFACES IGNITION IGNITION POINTS/
IN PLS SOURCE HOT SURFACES NOT
TO EXCEED TBD "F
Hazard Elimination/Control
PmvJslons.Bemark_
MONITOR PLS ATMOSPHERE TO
ENSURE SAFE LEVEL, ANALYZE/
TEST MATERIAL COMPATIBILITY
IN TBD ",6 0 2 PP
DEVELOP COMPARTMENTATION,
MAXIMUM AUTO IGNITION
LEVELS FOR PLS
OVERPRESSURE LOSS OF PLS CABIN FO/FS PRESSURE CONTROL
OF PLS CABIN VEHICLE PRESSURE NOT SYSTEM
VOLUME CREW TO EXCEED TBD
MATERIALS FIRE MATERIAL FLAMMA- FO/FS PRESSURE CONTROL
FLAMMABILITY/ BILITY ASSESSMENT SYSTEM
INCOMPATIBILTY PER MATCO
LOSS OF LOSS OF PAINS PLS THERMAL MAINTAIN HEAT
ENTRY CAPABILTY DAMAGE/ SHIELD INTEGRITY
VEHICLE
CREW LOSS
FO/FS SYSTEMS
FOR CRITICAL
FUNCTIONS
RCS ANOMALES TUMBLING
UNDETECTED PLS THERMAL MAINTAIN HEAT
DAMAGE TO HEAT DAMAGE SHIELD INTEGRITY
SHIELD
LOSS OF LOSS OF LOSS OF FO/FS SYSTEMS
ENTRY CAPABILITY ELECTRICAL CRITICAL FOR CRITICAL
(CONTINUED) POWER CONTROL FUNCTIONS
FUNCTIONS
PROVIDE FO/FS TRANSPARENCIES
DEGREE OF ANOMALY IMPACT
COULD RANGE FROM DISPERSION
OF LANDING THROUGH LOSS/BREAK
UP OF VEHICLE
PROVIDE HEAT SHELD INSPECTION
OPTION AT SSF
SAME
ASYMMETRICAL TUMBLING FO/FS SYSTEMS SAME
RETRO FIRING FOR CRITICAL
FUNCTIONS
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6.1.6 Quality Assurance
This subject will undergo perhaps the single most significant
series of changes during the PLS program life cycle. The quality
program specifications developed during the 1960's and 1970's will
undergo a fundamental refocus of requirements, which incorporates
the precepts of TQM initiative of the 1990's into the objectives of
the quality specifications. This is not to imply that these will
or should be discarded, for one significant factor to success in
manned spaceflight has been that of strict and disciplined
attention to details - a well-known characteristic of quality
programs.
The quality programs of the 1970's/1980's were also generally
not addressed with any significance until the Phase C/D arrived,
the premise being that emphasis on compliance, controls,
procedures, and verification did not occur until then. The PLS
quality program will have its formal beginning during Phase A. It
will be a dedicated emphasis. It is particularly important because
of the transitional nature of TQM expansion across industry-
/government during the same time frame as the PLS program.
Elements of this TQM emphasis are already beginning to be reflected
in this DRD. Operations/Maintenance emphasis is, we believe, a
strong "Customer Want" for improving turnaround efficiency and
lowering the life cycle cost. The MFBP concept is the very
beginning of development of detailed process flows and process
capability assessments, providing efficient blending with the
Government's IQue oversight initiative.
Phases A and B. During Phase A, it is extremely important
that the top-level quality functional deployment (QFD) matrices be
addressed. The basic premise of "Total Quality" starts with true
understanding of "what the Customer really wants" and approaches
to help provide it to him. Since approaches can impact basic
architectures (e.g. the maintainability approach), they need to be
addressed as early as possible to avoid costly engineering changes
later in the program. This is a characteristic of our Japanese
competitors. They "drive out" changes before commitment to
manufacture.
Two of the highest correlation "wants" (QFD terminology) to
implement, for example, have been those of: (i) systems simplicity
and (2) that of defining the operational fault tolerance needed and
the redundancy management schemes to support it. This correlation
is increased when moderate-to-extreme weight/volume and resultant
performance sensitivity exists from the very beginning. One
example, performance margins which can tolerate a major failure
condition right after launch commitment. The impact of this
example to the Phase C/D quality program to be implemented is
profound! Understanding of processes, their variability and
reduction of their variability are main themes. As fault tolerance
declines, permissible variation rapidly declines. A program
intolerant to variation can emerge. Conversely, with a fault
tolerant design approach, variability reduction can be safely
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implemented (as well as better understanding obtained over those
areas still remaining which remain intolerant).
Phase B should then form the next set of quality program
foundations. This phase must see convergence of a number of
efforts, (for example: QFD/sub-tier matrices, development
convergence with MFBP, design system organization with MFBP (part,
sub-assembly, assembly number "trees", critical process definition
and flow down into process requirements/capabilities trades
(starting here also to bring the knowledge of critical
subcontractors onto the team). The initial formation of formal
simultaneous engineering teams takes place. The quality program
for Phase C/D needs to be specifically and fully planned here, also
particularly the specific MIL-specification/TQM transition timing
with PLS as discussed earlier. Advanced technology integration, in
the process of historical hard interface control tooling vs.
electronic interface control, and related process control
parameters, needs to be specifically defined.
As the MFBP continues development, definition of process
parameters also will continue. This includes an objective of
measurements made of products conformance in as real-time as
possible (such as, weld ultrasonic head mounted right behind weld
head). Use of statistical process control also needs to be
structurally organized during this phase, so that SPC is not just a
"randomly-applied" tool.
Phase C/D. The quality program needs to focus on as many of
the "fundamentals", now integrated into TQM initiatives. The focus
is initially on prevention of defects, development of process flows
and capabilities determinations, application/definition of "work
teams" (cross-function), training of teams, readiness to perform
tasks and increased individual involvement in doing the right
things right, the first time. These "work teams" are expansions of
the "design teams" from the prior phases.
The quality program must here maintain fundamental assurances
of stability and control to the Customer. Therefore, calibration
validity of measurements, engineering change control (which should
be minimized with the up-front Phases A and B emphasis),
nonconforming parts/materials control, test and records integrity,
etc. The objective of achieving program success, by providing
outstanding value to the Customer with outstanding first-time thru
quality at reasonable cost and a dependable schedule, is fully
definitized and implemented during this phase.
The quality program requirements specification [MIL-Q-9858 A]
tailoring activity was deferred until hardware procurement in Phase
B and/or C/D. Tailoring of the specification will be an on-going
process as part of refining the acquisition plan.
6.2 MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL
The purpose of this section is to present an overall
management and control approach to the PLS Acquisition Phases, A, B
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and C/D. This section identifies and explains the key aspects of
the approach and explains how the PLS Team should be organized for
the total program.
6.2._ Manaqement Team
A key feature of our approach is the organizational structure,
Figure 6-16, and its mode of operation. Engineering, with its
design responsibility, is balanced by Operations and Support and
Manufacturing producibility responsibilities. In an overview roll
are the functions of Technology Development, Risk Management,
Systems Safety, and Cost Control. These functions, together with
the support organizations shown, will operate as a consolidated
team for effective communications. An integrated system review
board (ISRB) will be the forum for all system and trade study
reviews and requirements baselining. This provides board members a
voice in all issues and then requires the chairman (the Program
Manager) to identify direction for expeditious resolution. All
functions participate in the ISRB and have direct access to the
program manager relative to any concerns in their areas at any
time. The ISRB actions are formally documented. It is through
this formal documentation that the PLS program would be directed,
tracked, and controlled. The program manager has final signature
authority for all board actions.
New technologies that provide cost effective payoff and
reasonable risk will be identified and planned for utilization.
Labor savings devices such as expert systems, CAD/CAM, robotics,
automatic checkout, and paperless record systems will be assessed
for ways to achieve cost minimization. Monitoring the
effectiveness of our low-cost-driven efficient operations approach
will be a key feature of our continuing program risk assessment
activity. Risk management is the responsibility of System
Engineering but will receive top management attention.
To ensure that the program focuses on life cycle cost,
specific assignments will be given to the cost project and risk
management functions. The Cost Project manager will assess
design-level trades and analyses and develop definitive costs as
the design matures to ensure low-cost optimization. The Risk
Assessment manager will review cost allocations and study results
at the programmatic level to assist the program director in meeting
the total system's cost goals. Since the industrial infrastructure
model is important to the early part of the acquisition phase, and
will aid in leading to low-cost approaches, Project Engineering is
given the assignment for its completion as a primary
responsibility.
Each management position is held by a technically qualified
expert. They attend weekly program reviews conducted by the
program manager. These individuals are charged with maintaining
close coordination with his customer counterpart to ensure that
program objectives are being met.
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Figure 6-16. PLS Program - A Close-
Coupled and Effective Organization
To achieve the desired
cost an optimum reliability
goals in an integrated
end-to-end operations,
manufacture and design
concept, key subcontractors
have been selected for their
expertise to ensure that
techniques not common to the
aerospace industry are
considered. NASA's extensive
supplier network will be
solicited for new ideas that
can contribute significantly
to the primary goals of the
PLS.
6.2.2 Prouram Control
Management information
and control systems will
provide visibility and
maintain cost and schedule
control for all aspects of the
PLS Acquisition Phases. Table
6-9 lists the major systems
and tools to be used to manage
the PLS contract along with
the responsible functional
organization and their
application. Each system's
primary use has been
identified to show how it
provides the program manger
with necessary visibility in order to control cost, schedule, and
technical performance.
Upon contract award, for each phase, functional budgets will
be issued for the contact period. The Program Manager provides
master change record authorization, which defines the total detail
contract baseline and allocates contract budgets to the various
organizations. Program changes requiring budget reallocation are
accomplished by the ISRB/MCR process.
A performance management system provides cost and schedule
visibility to the program manager. It includes closed-loop
planning; work authorization (MCR); budget and schedule analysis,
reporting and visibility and baseline change control associated
with specific work change control. Figure 6-17 shows the internal
process of one proven performance management system.
The performance control system must be an automated system for
collection and processing of all cost, budget and schedule
information associated with specific work authorizations. The
system is utilized for maintaining internal program management
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Table 6-9. Proven Management Tools are Required for Program Control
Functional
Organization
Responsiblity
?rogram
_4anagement
_ubconn'act.s/
Material
_11 functions
Mana_zcmentTool and Systems
Work breakdown sn'ucture
Responsibilityassignmentmatrix
Program milestoneschedule
DetailedTask Plan
General Order
Performance Control System
Study Plan
Forecastingfunding
Contractbudgetallocationplan
Planningand scheduling
Technicalcontrolmanagement
PurchaseOrder
Change Notices
Interdivisionalorders
Technicaldirectionotices
Functional schedules
Cost account plans
Estimates at completion
Variances assessment report
PerformanceApplicability
Cost
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Scheduling
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X
X X
X X
X
X X
X X
X
* legend:W -Weekly; M -Monthly;Q -Quarterly;,A/R -As required
Technical
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Data
Frequency*
A/R
A/R
M
A/R
A/R
W
A/R
Q
A/R
W
W
A/R
A/R
A/R
A/R
W
A/R
Q
M
control. PCS reports are automatically generated to provide timely
expenditure and schedule data required for effective monitoring and
control. This system would have the features and operational
procedures of a validated cost/schedule control system criteria
system such as used on GPS and B-I programs.
At the weekly review's, conducted by the program manager,
summary cost and schedule data will be reported by Business
Management, to ensure that technical, cost and schedule baselines
are synchronized.
The work breakdown structures (WBS's) serve as the baseline
documents for program control and are used to guide development of
the program schedule. They also support integration of all task
assignments and are the framework for the program manpower planning
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and cost estimates. Management
will use the WBS's for program
control accounting, visibility, and
reporting. The Program Master
Schedule (Figure 6-1) indicates
milestones reflecting the major
contractual and program milestones
for management planning and
control. A Responsibility
Assignment Matrix (RAM), developed
early in the Acquisition Phase,
will relate the program tasks
defined by the WBS to the
responsible individuals. In
addition, a time phased man-loading
summary will be developed that
contains a schedule of man-hours
per contract WBS subtask per month.
The areas of emphasis and peak
activity will be displayed,
supporting the program objectives.
An automated responsibility
assignment list will provide
specific visibility into contract
data requirement schedules and
status. Monthly forecasts of data
submittals will be disseminated to
Figure 6-17. Closed-Loop
Performance Management System
all concerned and monitored by the business manager for the program
manager. Data Management will provide single point control for the
administration, accountability, and coordination of all contract
data requirements lists (CDRL's).
The CDRL/DID reference documents and related contract
provisions will be analyzed by Data Management personnel
experienced in implementing NASA, U.S. Air Force and DoD
Requirements. Detailed responsibilities for preparation, inputs,
review, approval, and support will be assigned.
Data Management personnel serve as a point of contact for
customer functions regarding distribution statements, distribution
changes, CDRL data item description (DID) and reference document
changes, submittal schedules, submittal/approval status, and
detailed records. Distribution of transmittal letters and data
product copies will be as specified in the CDRL, other contract
provisions, and PCO direction.
6.3 TRADE STUDIES
Two major manufacturing trade studies: (1) Fabrication of the
heat shield back face structure, (2) Test program fidelity trade,
and one supporting analysis: Manufacturing facilities/resources,
have been performed. These studies are fully documented in
Reference 5-1.
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6,3._ Sinq_e Piece vs. Multiple Section Fabrication of Heat Shield
Back-Face Structure (T-5) Trade Study
The use of advanced composite materials offers the potential
for greater performance, lower overall costs, and improved design
flexibility over more traditional metallic structures. In the case
of the PLS heat shield back-face structure, the use of high
temperature graphite/polyimide advanced composite materials offers
the potential for improved structural and thermal performance over
traditional designs such as aluminum sheet metal skin and stringer.
In order to realize the inherent performance advantages of the
graphite/polyimide, however, numerous aspects concerning structural
design, fabrication methods, and repairability of the structure
must be addressed.
The principle objectives of this trade study were to address
the structural design, fabrication methods, and the manufacturing
and operational repair approaches for the PLS heat shield back-face
structure. The heat shield back-face structure consisted of a one
piece sandwich design comprised of graphite/polyimide facesheets
and polyimide honeycomb core. This task identified the factors
involved in producing a successful part and included a compilation
of PLS composite heat shield considerations which would have
influence over whether a strict adherence to the reference
configuration is to be used or an alternate or hybrid configuration
would be preferred. The concept selected as the preferred
back-face heat shield structure, Figure 6-18, consists of a two
piece structure, sandwich design, consisting of graphite/polyimide
facesheets, honeycomb core, integral stiffeners and hardpoints.
6.3._ Test Prouram Fidelity Trade (T-15) Trade Study
The goal of the test program fidelity trade was to establish
concepts for the PLS test program that are capable of achieving low
life cycle costs. This study addressed this subject and the
concepts and criteria that surfaced during the investigation with
potential attributes of attributing to low life cycle costs through
testing or related functions. These results are summarized below.
Details of this study may be found by referencing the test program
analyses data documented in Reference 5-1.
• 40% of the orbiter anomalies were attributed to design
flaws that escaped the test program.
• Design flaw escapes were attributed to lack of realistic
environmental and/or stress/limit testing.
• A high fidelity PLS test program is achievable without
perturbation of normal costs/schedules by subjecting products
to selected tests aimed at early flaw identification.
• Mature 1992 state-of-the-art components/producers will
bring to the program a level of reliability never realized in
manned space travel before
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Figure 6-18. Backface Heat Shield Structure
• The PLS test program, to be effective, must include
realistic (dirt/debris laden) environmental testing.
• PLS design should be driven by operations verification
requirements, robustness, specification constraints,
performance, over/under design and the capability for rapid
product removal/replacement.
• Time allotted for product removal/replacement should be
specified and verified.
• Complete/minimize margin assessments early in the flight
program.
• Implement system engineering department/TQM to
avoid/minimize cost growth and schedule delays.
6.3.3 Manufacturinq Facilities/Resources (S-7} Supportinq Analysis
The goals of minimizing the facilities costs for fabrication,
assembly, installations and testing of the PLS will best be
achieved by utilizing existing available facilities. This would
reduce the requirement for new facilities, thus reducing costs.
The detail type and size of facilities required will be determined
by the technology requirements, schedules, and transportation
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requirements. Initial fabrication requirements have been
identified and existing facilities meet these requirements with
modifications. Facilities required for sub-assemblies, assemblies,
systems installations and test have been identified and sites
available to perform these functions have been identified,
including new facilities required. Existing government facilities
would also be used. Reference facilities requirements support
analyses are documented in Reference 5-1 and identified in the
facilities Tables 6-4, 6-5 and 6-6.
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7.0 TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PLAN
This section documents the technological sufficiency of most
system and subsystem choices in a review organized by the Work
Breakdown Structure's (WBS) Configuration Axis; this organization
corresponds most closely with the traditional hardware-oriented
Work Breakdown Structure. The Technology Development Plans for two
topics needing investment to provide accelerated development are
presented in this section. These are the solid hydrogen storage
method for the fuel cell alternative and the Booster Warning
System.
When missions other than the reference DRM-1 are considered,
most of the new mission requirements can also be met with current
technology or with very minor development effort. The major
exception to this assertion of technological adequacy lies in the
electrical energy supply (power supply) for the PLS. The
electrical energy supply needed for the PLS to satisfy DRM-1 is
about 168 kwh and is supplied by batteries. These are silver-zinc
(Ag-Zn) batteries with a limited recharge capability--about 20
charge-discharge cycles. Rechargeable silver-zinc batteries have
been selected over one-shot Lithium Thionyl Chloride batteries
because the reusable silver-zinc batteries are projected to have a
much lower cost.
The Booster for the PLS will require a Warning System (BWS) to
alert the crew to impending catastrophic events and to activate the
Launch Escape System (LES) rockets. Much of the background
knowledge in sensors and signatures to detect deteriorating
conditions has already been acquired, but a complete system
architecture is not yet available.
Finally, relatively small investments in the areas of hydrogen
storage/regeneration and warning systems should be made to provide
confidence that these collateral technologies can be available to
the PLS program when needed.
7.1 ORGANIZATION
The PLS uses a 3-dimensional Work Breakdown Structure (WBS);
the three axes in this approach are:
1) The Configuration Axis (1.X) describes the systems and
subsystems including many of the hardware systems. It
corresponds most closely to previous hardware oriented work
breakdown structures.
2) The Functional Axis (2.X) describes the program functions
from technology development to program phase out. Second
level of the Functional Axis contained the following elements.
3) The Cost Axis (3.X) describes the categories of purchases.
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Since most technology concerns are directed toward hardware
systems, the order of presentation is modified to highlight these
concerns. Accordingly, the review begins with the hardware
oriented Flight Configuration System (WBS 1.6) and then considers
the support elements, WBS 1.1 through 1.5.
7.2 REVIEW OF TECHNOLOGY SELECTIONS AND OPTIONS
Technology selections for the Personnel Launch System (PLS)
and its Design Reference Mission-i (DRM-I) are conservative and
require only design development efforts as contrasted to technology
development efforts. All design selections meet or exceed the PLS
goal of achieving technology status of NASA Level 6 (prototype
tested in a relevant environment) by 1992. This goal is an upward
revision of the original goal of NASA Technology Level 5
(brassboard tested in a relevant environment) by 1992. Also, the
technology selections meet other PLS objectives and groundrules in
the areas of manned safety and minimum life cycle costs through
designs and operating plans for maintainability, reliability and
simplicity.
Technology alternatives for the PLS are summarized in Table
7-1. Reasoning behind the choices is presented in the text of this
section. For most systems, existing technologies are adequate and
the more advanced capabilities of technologies requiring
development are not needed to achieve acceptable performance.
Also, development costs and/or the costs of the new materials would
not be recovered in reduced operating expenditures.
Manufacturing technologies supporting all of the selected
systems have at most investment issues, and not technology
development issues. Computer-Assisted Design/Computer Assisted
Manufacturing (CAD/CAM) is the state of the art, and any issues in
this area are investment issues and not technology development
issues. Given the projected low numbers of PLSs which are to be
built, more advanced topics such as Computer Integrated
Manufacturing have questionable relevance--the production rate does
not support a major investment in advanced tooling.
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Table 7-1. Technology Alternatives
WBS Element & Altm-nafivc Technology Issues & Stares
Wing Group - Structure
Composites- *Graphite/Polyimide
[C_ has highest temperature
capability of well characterized
materials]
High Temperature Metal Alloy
Manufacturing Experience Limited.
Early quality problems under control.
Structural Adhesive has composites
been reformulated to eliminate
asbestos. TPS is required.
Heavy - Limited Space Experience.
TPS may be required for multiple reuse.
Tail Group - Structure
*Graphite/Polyimide
Aluminum
Body Group
Basic Thrust Structure
*Aluminum alloy 2024
Lithium-Aluminum alloy
Graphite / Polyimide
Titanium Aluminide
Primary Structure
Crew Cabin
High temperature capability desired.
Aluminum alloys are marginal, Gr/Pi
selected for other uses.
Substantial mfg experience - lowest cost.
Li-Al: Limited experience; Li-Al &
Gr/Pi: Lower weight & higher costs
are not needed or justified.
Developmental & very expensive.
Access Tunnel - Aluminum 2219
Upper Access Panels
*Aluminum alloy honeycomb
LiAL, TiAL
Graphite/Polyimide
Heat.shield Structure
*Graphite/Polyimide
Thermoplastics
Titanium Aluminide
Subsumtial mfg experience - lowest cost.
Al appears thermally adequate. TPS rq'd.
Not needed and expensive.
Alternative if Al is not adequate.
Using A1 would require too thick TPS.
Gr/Pi structural repair method, structural
adhesive both require certification.
Not as mature as Gr/Pi.
Not needed, too expensive.
* = Selected for PLS
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Table 7-1. Technology Alternatives (Continued)
WBS Element & Alternative
rhennal Protecdon System (TPS)
Body Protection
Bottom
*HTP-6 (FRCD Tile (Direct Bond)
Stratified density tile " "
Carbon/Carbon Tiles ....
Carbon/Silicon Carbide " "
Upper Surface
*FRSI Blanket (Direct Bond)
Other blankets, tiles available
as alternatives
Leading Edge Protection
*Carbon/Carbon (ACC) (Fasteners)
Carbon/Silicon Carbide (C/SiC)
(Fasteners)
Attachment Methods
Metallic fasteners for leading edge
*Direct bond adhesive(s)
landing Gear (Nose Gear, Main Gear)
*All Electric
Hydraulic
Propulsion - Reaction Control System
*Hydrogen Peroxide 0Vlono)
Monopropellant Hydrazine
Bipropcllants
Cryogenic BipropeUants
Propulsion - Orbit Maneuvering System
*Hydrogen Peroxide/JP-4
Nitrogen Tetroxide/Monomethyl
Hydrazine
Monopropellam Hydrazine
Cryogenic BipropeUants
* = Selected For PLS
Technology Issues & Status
Existing Orbiter tiles suffice.
Lower maturity, costs similar to FRCI.
Lower maturity in application.
Much lower maturity.
Existing Orbiter blanket suffices.
Upgraded Orbiter technology suffices.
Being developed for Hermes - a high
probability candidate for later selection.
No technology issues
Improved adhesive(s)required and
available;willneed certification.
Adapting fighter gear is expected
to be design challenge only
Desire avoiding hydraulics
Low toxicity, technology ready.
Toxicity complicates ground ops.
Add'l performance not needed,
complex system, toxic.
Cost, technology and volume issues
Low toxicity, little experience
compared to NTO/MMH.
Toxicity complicates ground ops, large
experiencebase.
Toxic,heavy,bulky,little
experienceatPLS thrustlevel.
Cost,technology and volume issues.
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Table 7-1. Technology Alternatives (Continued)
WBS Element & Alternative
Prime Power
One-time Batteries (Lithium
Thionylchloride)
*Rechargeablc Batteries (Ag-Zn)
Fuel Cell ('Modified Orbiter)
Low Weight Rechargeables
Low Weight Fuel Cells
Electric Conversion & Distribution
*De
AC
Mixed
Actuators
*Elec_mechanical
*Electrohydraulic
Hydraulic
Avionics
GN&C - *Autonomous with
Pilot Backup
Communications & Tracking
Data Processing
Vehicle Health Monitoring - *BITE
Displays & Controls - * HUD
Software: High Order Languages-
*ADA
Antennas * Under TPS
Deployable
Cooling * Passive
Active
Environmental control
* 1 Loop (Water)(Redundant)
2 Loops
Personal Accommodations
* Apollo-type waste management
* New seats
Recovery and Auxiliary Systems
*Solid rocket motors for abort
propulsion
* Parachutes
* = Selected for PLS
Technology Issues & Status
All power sources have safety issues.
Low weight, very high cost.
High Weight,'20 cycles, mod cost.
To o complex, costly for DRM- 1.
Development with time risk.
Development with time risk.
No technology issues.
No requirements identified.
If needed, convened in/near use.
Design challenges, but no tech-
nology issues.
Desire to avoid complex
generation and distribution system
Architectural & design issues, but
not technology issues.
Adapt SOA designs.
Adapt SOA designs.
Arch & design issues only.
Adapt SOA designs.
Adapt SOA designs.
EM transparency questionable.
Deployable is backup design.
May be marginal.
By environmental control system, ff
needed.
No technology issues.
No technology issues.
No technology issues
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Table 7-1. Technology Alternatives (Concluded)
WBS Element & Alternative Technology Issues & Status
Operations -
Fleet (Ground) Processing
A large number of interdependent topics
including:
* Automated checkout systems
* Auto ground processing expert systems
* Auto logistics planning expert
* Improved weather protection on ground
Mission (Flight) Processing
A large number of interdependent topics
including:
* Automated mission control expert systems
* Auto launch control expert systems
* Advanced lighming protection on ground
and in flight.
* = Selected for PLS
At or very near the State-of-the-
Art.
Architectural and design issues,
but not technology development
issues.
At or very near the SOA.
Architectural and design issues,
but not technology development
issues.
7.2.1 Desiqns and Technoloqies Selected for the PLS Spacecraft.
Those designs and technologies selected for the PLS are
described with the presentation organized by the Configuration Axis
of the WBS for the Flight Configuration System and related hardware
(WBS 1.6) and specifically the Manned Spacecraft (WBS 1.6.7):
Wing Group (WBS 1.6.7.1)
Exposed Wing Graphite/Polyimide or
High Temperature Metal Alloy
Carry Through Graphite/Polyimide (Gr/Pi)
Tail Group (WBS 1.6.7.2) Graphite/Polyimide
Body Group (WBS 1.6.7.3)
Basic Structure
Thrust Structure Aluminum Alloy 2024
Secondary Structure
Crew Cabin Aluminum Alloy 2219
Access Tunnel Aluminum Alloy 2219
Tunnel Fairing Aluminum Alloy 2219
Upper Access Panels Aluminum Alloy or Gr/Pi
Heat Shield Base Graphite/Polyimide (Honeycomb)
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All these materials have acceptable technology status;
only the Graphite/Polyimide (Gr/Pi) composite material has not
been used extensively in space.
Quality control problems with the manufacture of
Graphite/Polyimide materials and production of parts have been
resolved as the technology has matured. The only remaining
challenge with the Graphite/Polyimide material in these
applications is the development and qualification of field
repair techniques for the structures.
The thermal adequacy of the Graphite/Polyimide (covered
by TPS materials) for the wing and of the A1 2219 for the
upper access panels is based on preliminary analyses and must
be confirmed by later detailed analysis.
An additional option in structural materials is Titanium
Aluminide. TiAI is being developed for the National Aerospace
Plane (NASP) program. The additional thermal/structural
capabilities (and higher costs) are not believed to be needed
for the PLS.
Thermal Protection System (WBS 1.6.7.4)
The Thermal Protection System (TPS) consists of a variety of
materials and designs to keep internal PLS temperatures at safe
(and comfortable) levels during reentry.
The Thermal Protection Systems selections all have acceptable
development status. There are also a substantial number of
alternatives with higher capabilities with acceptable developmental
status, to provide backup in case initial choices are inadequate.
The TPS consists of the following major components:
• Leading Edge protection
• Body - high temperature protection
- moderate temperature protection
• Attachment Methods - Adhesives
- Fasteners
• Insulation
• Seals
The selected leading edge protection method is Advanced Carbon
fiber/Carbon matrix (ACC), a well studied derivative of the
Reinforced Carbon/Carbon (RCC) material used on the NSTS Orbiter.
A prominent option is Carbon fiber/Silicon Carbide (C/SiC) matrix
composite fabrications similar to those being developed for Hermes.
c/SiC fabrications have higher strength at service temperature than
do the Carbon/Carbon fabrications used on the Shuttle. While full
details are not yet available, it appears that C/SiC does not have
as stringent requirements for anti-oxidation coatings as does ACC.
It is expected that the ACC and/or C/SiC fabrications will be
attached to with metallic fasteners because the fabrication's back
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surface temperatures will probably be higher than can be tolerated
by direct-bond adhesives.
The body TPS is divided into two major components - the bottom
heat shield and the upper (lee) side surfaces. The bottom (high
temperature) heatshield structure will be covered with HTP-6 (FRCI)
tile attached by direct-bond adhesive. The thickness of the tile
will be chosen to provide acceptable back surface temperature for
the adhesive. It is expected that the relatively rigid heatshield
will permit large tiles to be employed so that the need to control
surface smoothness with gap-fillers can be mitigated. The upper
surfaces of will be exposed to considerably lower temperatures
than the bottom and an adhesive-attached blanket is adequate; FRSI
material has been selected.
Alternative materials exist for most of these choices:
• A stratified density tile developed by NASA-Ames
Research Center is a good alternative for the STS HTP-6
tile.
• Carbon/Carbon tiles directly bonded to the lower heat-
shield structure are considered to be an alternative to
HTP-6, but this has not been investigated thoroughly.
• A thicker layer of the STS FRSI blanket appears to be
an appropriate response to providing any needed higher
temperature capability for the PLS topside. Most of the
other options can also be applied to the top.
• The wings use a Graphite/Polyimide structure with an
ACC leading edge and HTP-6 tiles/FRSI blankets on the
cooler surfaces. An alternative is to use a high
temperature metal alloy for both structure and thermal
protection. ACC or C/SiC would still be required for the
leading edge. In the event that additional protection
against oxidation were needed for the metallic surfaces,
Nextel 440 fabric could be attached to the metal with a
ceramic adhesive. Nextel is a modified quartz (SiO2)
fiber which can be woven into a moderately flexible
fabric.
Potential attachment methods include:
Fasteners: Fasteners for the C/C or C/SiC leading edge
fabrications are expected to be made from metal alloys and
represent a design challenge but have no technology/-
developmental problems.
Adhesives: The principal adhesive used to attach the Tiles to
the SIP and the SIP to the Orbiter is RTV-560. RTV-560 (Room
Temperature Vulcanizing-560) has a thermal limit of about 550
F. Since the Graphite/Polyimide TPS support structure has a
thermal capability of about 600 F, and it is desired to design
the PLS to use this capability for a safety margin, RTV-560 is
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barely adequate for this application. Fortunately a modified
RTV has been investigated and found to perform satisfactorily
at 625 F. Direct Bond Adhesive RA59P consists of 3 parts
RTV-560 plus 0.5% of the usual catalyst Dibutyl Tin Dilaurate
mixed with 1 part GR908 plus 0.2% of another catalyst
Piperidine.
To manage the heat flux during reentry, the compartments
between the heat shield and the crew compartment will require an
internal insulation. Fiberglass insulation sewn into panels is
used on the STS Orbiter and is adequate here.
A variety of reusable seals will be needed to prevent the
extremely hot gas/plasma from infiltrating compartments during
reentry via the removable access panels. Specific designs will be
needed for the windshields, access compartment doors, landing gear
doors, and the gaps made by the aerodynamic control surfaces. The
National Aerospace Plane (NASP) also has this problem and has
extensively investigated reusable seal designs. Reusable seals
are believed to represent a significant design and validation
challenge, but a variety of materials and designs are available.
Accordingly, seals are not viewed as presenting a technology
problem.
Landing Gear (Nose Gear, Main Gear) (WBS 1.6.7.5)
Adaptations of existing fighter aircraft designs have been
selected. These represent existing technology. The elimination of
hydraulics by using electrical motors for all functions is expected
to present a moderate design challenge. See the discussion under
Actuators (WBS 1.6.7.12)
Propulsion - Reaction Control System (RCS) (WBS 1.6.7.7)
Propulsion - Orbit Maneuvering System (OMS) (WBS 1.6.7.8)
The propellant combination of Jet Propellant-4 (JP4) and
Hydrogen Peroxide (H2/O2) has been selected for the spacecraft
Orbit Maneuvering System (OMS) with H202 serving as a
monopropellant for the Reaction Control System (RCS).
Other propellant combinations considered were:
• Monomethyl Hydrazine (MMH) and Nitrogen Tetroxide (NTO)
• Liquid Methane (LMe) and Liquid Oxygen (LOX)
• Monopropellant Hydrazine for both OMS and RCS.
The JP4/H202 propellants were selected over the MMH/NTO
combination because the lower toxicity of JP4/H202 will facilitate
ground servicing operations. Cryogenics, such as LMe/LOX, were not
selected because of the substantial additional effort in design,
manufacture, and operations required to accommodate vehicles with
cryogenic propellants. Since batteries have been selected for
primary power, there is currently no potential for the LMe/LOX
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propellants to used in a fuel cell to meet the primary power
requirement and thereby provide sufficient advantage to overcome
the additional effort and costs associated with cryogenic
propellants.
Hydrogen peroxide as a monopropellant has been used in the
X-15 and Centaur vehicle programs, although the JP4/H202
bipropellant combination does not appear to have been used in
space. The substantial experience with bipropellants accumulated
to date suggests that no technology problems exist.
Prime Power (WBS 1.6.7.9)
The electrical energy supply needed for the PLS to satisfy
DRM-1 is about 168 kwh and is supplied by batteries with a weight
of about 2700 pounds. These are silver-zinc (Ag-Zn) batteries with
a limited recharge capability--about 20 charge-discharge cycles.
Rechargeable silver-zinc batteries have been selected over one-shot
Lithium Thionyl Chloride (LiThCl) batteries with a weight of about
1800 pounds because the reusable silver-zinc batteries are
projected to have a much lower cost. Use of Ag-Zn batteries will
also result in slightly more complex ground processing operations
than for LiThCl batteries because they must be refrigerated between
missions to preserve their rechargeability.
The battery packaging design will have to make provisions for
a yet-to-be-specified level of redundancy such that the battery
pack can fail operational if there is an internal short or other
battery problem. All types of batteries present serious safety
problems as they can rapidly vent large quantities of toxic
gas/liquids or rupture/explode if they are abused, whether
intentionally or unintentionally. This design for safety issue
applies to all concentrated power sources and represents a
significant design challenge, but not a technology problem.
The power system mass tradeoff point for the PLS, that power
system mass which would cause batteries to be less desirable than
the alternative of fuel cells occurs at about 2,000 pounds. While
DRM-1 now appears to require about 2700 pounds of batteries, the
potential exists for this power requirement to grow for DRM-1, and
other missions may require seven times as much power (and therefore
battery mass).
Accordingly, a fuel cell power system must be considered a
principal alternative technology for the PLS. The STS Orbiter fuel
cells have slightly more capability than is needed for the PLS, but
since the cell stacks are designed with 4 kw modules, reducing the
orbiter 12 kw fuel cell (with substantial extra surge capacity) to
an 8 kw fuel cell is an easy design task. The resultant cell would
match the PLS peak power requirement of 7 kw very well.
The major problem with adapting current fuel cells and
associated equipment to the PLS is the lack of volume to
accommodate the liquid hydrogen storage dewar(s) and related
cryogenic plumbing. The PLS does not have the volume to
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accommodate both non-cryogenic propellants and the cryogenic fuel
cell reactants. Also the technology to provide an Integrated
liquid Hydrogen and Oxygen Technology (IHOT) propellants/fuel cell
reactants will not be available until the mid 1990's, well after
the PLS is to be designed. Many of the IHOT problems which need to
be resolved concern fluid management techniques and very-long-term
reusable insulation for the deep cryogenic liquid hydrogen (boiling
point 20.28 degrees Kelvin). These problems with the mid-cryogenic
liquid oxygen (boiling point 90.18 degrees Kelvin) are much less
severe. Also, with liquid oxygen being denser than water (1.21
versus 0.07 for liquid hydrogen), the volume constraint is not
severe.
Consequently, while LOX is both necessary and feasible as a
fuel cell reactant, some alternative must be found for liquid
hydrogen. The possibility of integrating Liquid Methane/LOX
propulsion with LMe/LOX fuel cells was also considered.
Unfortunately fuel cells do not use methane directly; it must be
reformed into hydrogen and carbon oxides in a separate reactor at
high temperatures (about 1,000 degrees F). The hydrogen is then
separated and sent to the fuel cell. Such reactors have been built
for use in large stationary ground power plants, but no significant
design work has been accomplished for space applications.
Another option for a hydrogen source is hydrogen generating
solid chemicals, specifically metal hydrides which are known to
provide substantial reduction in storage volume with only moderate
increases in weight over liquid hydrogen. Calcium hydride is used
commercially in ground-based hydrogen generation applications, and
Lithium hydride could be used to provide lower reactant weights.
The reaction uses the water formed by the fuel cell from an initial
supply of gaseous hydrogen. This water is sent to the metal
hydride storage/reaction tank where the metal hydride strips the
oxygen from the water to form a metal hydroxide. The hydrogen is
then recycled to the fuel cell to react with stored oxygen to
generate electricity in the process of forming more water. The
effect is to make the power generating system operate as if it were
an oxygen battery.
The major problem with the adaption of the metal hydride
storage technique is that it has never been adapted to space, and a
development program will be needed to provide confidence that the
reactor will work as expected.
Electric Conversion & Distribution (WBS 1.6.7.10)
The direct current from the batteries will be distributed through a
conventional copper wire harness. Voltage adjustments will be made
at several different power conversion units. All alternating
current devices will perform the DC-to-AC conversion at or near the
device.
The PLS spacecraft will use a mixture of copper wire and fiber
optic signal distribution harnesses. Substantial weight can be
saved and substantial additional monitoring can be accomplished
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through the use of fiber-optic instrumentation. Unfortunately,
optical technology is not yet at a state of maturity to select
all-optical avionics, and thus a mix has been selected. A desired
but not absolutely necessary part of this mixed wire/optical system
is a laser initiated pyrotechnics system. This is believed to
offer substantial safety and operational advantages in much lower
probabilities of accidental pyrotechnic initiation.. Laser
initiated pyrotechnic systems have been demonstrated in brassboard
configurations. The major impediment to their adaption appears to
be the accomplishment of enough testing to convince safety officers
of their reliability.
Actuators (WBS 1.6.7.12)
Direct current electrical motors are replacing hydraulic
actuators in aerospace applications. This replacement has been
made possible by the development of high-strength permanent magnet
materials. The use of electricity permits the elimination of the
hydraulic power generation and distribution system with its
attendant complexity and cost. Electric actuators are planned for
aerodynamic control surfaces, landing gear, the top hatch cover,
and to unfold the wings when the PLS is carried in the Shuttle
payload bay.
In some applications such as aerodynamic control surfaces
hydraulic actuators may be needed because they perform linear
motion more effectively than electric motors. In these cases, the
electrical motor will drive a local hydraulic pump which will
transfer its energy to a hydraulic actuator. All electrical motors
will require controllers to respond to the commands from the GN&C
computers by sending correct electrical currents to the motors.
These electric motors represent a recent development which has
already been adapted to new aircraft, but is only now being applied
to space applications. Significant design challenges are
anticipated, including the possibility that some form of active
cooling may be needed by the motors during reentry. These design
challenges, however, do not represent a technology development
concern.
Avionics (WBS 1.6.7.13)
The avionics systems represent adaption of existing designs
for computers, data buses, navigational instruments, displays, etc.
to the requirements of the PLS. While there are significant design
challenges, no technology development is foreseen to be needed in
either hardware or software,
Ideally, the PLS would like to use phased array antennas
and/or simple fixed antennas for all directions and all purposes.
Ideally, these would be located under the TPS tiles and blankets.
Carbon has three main forms, carbon black, graphite, and diamond;
they have relatively high electrical conductivity. This
conductivity causes attenuation of electromagnetic signals and is
enhanced and applied in radar absorbing materials used in stealth
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aircraft. Accordingly, the lower heatshield tiles (FRCI) and other
alternatives have sufficient carbon content that they would very
likely attenuate signal strength too much.
Such antennas can probably be accommodated underneath the
upper surface TPS (FRSI), which is made of modified quartz fiber.
Such antennas would see only slightly more than a hemisphere, and
this should be adequate for most purposes. The fall-back of
deployable antennas is always available.
The selected PLS spacecraft design provides for passive
cooling of the avionics in order to eliminate the complexity of
active cooling plates during manufacturing and processing. This
will be accomplished by using metal conduction paths to appropriate
heat sinks. If heat buildup problems are anticipated, the avionics
cooling can be integrated with the environmental cooling system.
In either case, technology problems are not foreseen.
A vehicle health monitoring system (VHM) is planned to exceed
that currently being used, but progress is needed primarily in
designs and software to handle the data flows appropriately. VHM
is expected to benefit from ongoing investigations in this area
being conducted at many locations. Topics in this area represent
a significant design challenge.
Substantial effort has been made to determine precursor events
which signal impending problems in liquid rocket engines and which
may be used to trigger the escape warning system. The knowledge
base in this area has not yet been integrated with other monitoring
information to provide a testable system. Accordingly some
investment is needed to provide confidence that the booster
alert/warning system architecture will be available on the PLS
development schedule.
Environmental Control (WBS 1.6.7.14)
The Environmental Control Systems provides the air and
air-conditioning for the crew. It consists of air tanks, make-up
oxygen tanks, a solid amine cartridge assembly for carbon dioxide
removal, and a single fluid (water) heat rejection/air-conditioning
system. Only the solid amine cartridges represent a technology
update; the STS orbiter is also planning to use solid amine
cartridges in the future.
Personnel Accommodations (WBS 1.6.7.15)
This topic covers all crew accommodations other than the air/-
air-conditioning system: seats and other furnishings including
storage bins, water supply, and waste disposal. The waste disposal
system represents Apollo technology: diapers and fecal bags. For
future longer missions, a better space toilet is desired, but the
volume to install it is very limited.
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Recovery & Auxiliary Systems (WBS 1.6.7.16)
These are the mechanisms to separate the PLS spacecraft from
the booster adapter, the docking system, and the parachutes. The
landing gear doors and the wing unfolding latches are included here
rather than under other titles. No technology issues have been
identified for these topics.
Adapter System (PLS-to-Booster Adapter) (WBS 1.6.15)
This cone-shaped structure adapts the PLS spacecraft to the
booster and has some subsystems of its own: Structure, Thermal
Protection, Propulsion (Solid Rocket Motors), Power (Batteries),
Electrical Distribution, Avionics, and Separation Mechanisms. The
desire to reduce serial operations at the launch pad encourages the
use of laser-initiated pyrotechnics. These represent a developing
technology for the Adapter. Laser-initiated pyros have already
been demonstrated, and require only sufficient testing to convince
safety officers of their acceptability.
7.2.2 Selections for Other WBS Elements
The other elements of the second level of the WBS (as noted
above) are:
WBS 1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
Fleet Processing System
Mission Processing System
Logistics System
Payload Processing System
Communications System
Major operational cost reductions over current space launch
systems are required for a successful PLS program. Therefore,
significant improvements over current STS practices will be
required for WBS elements 1.1 and 1.2 (Ground and Mission
Processing Systems). The goal is to adapt civil and military
aircraft technology and practices to the PLS to achieve the lower
costs associated with aircraft operations. Some specific examples
will be cited later.
Existing technology and practices, together with normal
progress and improvements, are expected to suffice for the PLS
Logistics System (WBS 1.3) and Communications System (WBS 1.5).
From the fact that PLS will be a relatively small program, it needs
to adapt proven and low cost designs and practices to minimize
costs. The logistics and communications systems are the PLS's
links to the external world and thus must be compatible with the
rest of the world. Accordingly, investment in significantly
different methods would tend to be counter-productive. Therefore
no technology development requirements have been identified during
the brief examination of these WBS elements.
The Payload Processing System (WBS 1.4) for Design Reference
Mission-1 (DRM-1) consists of crew training and related launch
preparation. When other DRMs are examined, additional payload
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processing needs will be identified. Because payloads must fit
through the access hatches, it is expected that most payload
processing requirements can be met using the approaches and methods
being developed for Ground Processing. Also, most internal payload
preparation steps would normally be accomplished at the
manufacturing site or in a separate launch site building. Only
last-minute checking and initialization of payloads should be
considered for the PLS processing facility.
Ground and Mission Processing (WBS 1.1 and 1.2) goals require
approaching airline levels of staffing for space vehicles. This
has never been accomplished before, and will represent a major
advance in spaceflight capability.
A substantial investment will be required in design to
minimize the need for operating personnel and in testing the design
results as well as preparing the ground crew to operate with the
vehicle. Some of this investment has already been made through
this study's designs: the access panels and design for access and
maintainability as well as the baselining of Built-In Test
Equipment (BITE) to provide health monitoring of a11 systems.
Since the launch and space environment are more benign than
many aspects of supersonic/hypersonic flight in the atmosphere,
designing/testing/training for low operational costs is feasible.
Among the factors permitting this judgement are:
o The PLS relies upon its booster to provide most of the
Earth-to-Orbit propulsion so that the PLS is not burdened with
complex, high performance engines.
o The PLS uses batteries rather than fuel cells, and
electromagnetic actuators rather than hydraulics.
o The previously mentioned access panels and BITE facilitate
appropriate maintenance and provide evidence that healthy
systems do not need maintenance. Essentially, elements
requiring substantial maintenance have been designed out, and
the remaining elements have been selected and designed to
permit aircraft maintenance philosophies to be implemented.
What remains to be designed into the PLS is the knowledge
acquired from aircraft programs that most properly designed,
manufactured, and tested systems can be reused with very quick,
designed-in checks to affirm that they are still healthy. This
advancement seems obvious, but will require the most difficult
change of all -- a cultural change. The PLS will be the first
vehicle to adapt this approach and will be surrounded by, and
possibly use a booster which follows the older operating
approaches.
From the standpoint of technology, no major advances are
needed -- only a commitment to apply the existing and evolving
designs and operating techniques which keep civil and military
aircraft operating every day.
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These activities represent the technological base from which
the PLS designers can select to provide capabilities to meet their
goals. No need for funding for technology development specifically
for PLS is foreseen at this time.
7.3 TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PLANS
The following pages, Table 7-2 and 7-3, present technology
development plans in two areas. Each plan has one sheet presenting
a technology definition and assessment and another sheet presenting
the components of the plan and the associated schedule and funding.
• Hydrogen Storage for Fuel Cell
• Booster Warning & Launch Escape Activation System
The cost numbers for the development programs were provided by
cognizant experts working in their respective fields.
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Table 7-2. Technology Plan - H2 Storage for Fuel Cells
Technology Category: Electrical Power
Major Technology: Hydrogen Storage for Fuel Cell
Fiaures of Merit B_cg.uJzcd
Current: Cryogenic Storage of
Liquid Hydrogen
Storage Volume 96.3 Ibs in 21.4 cu.ft.
Spherical Tanks
< 10cult
Proposed: Calcium Hydride Reactor 1066 Ibs in 9 cuft
Non-cryogenic tanks
are easier & less
expensive to design
in all shapes
_pJ_JC.att.o._s BcE¢_gam
For PLS: Reduced Storage Volume 1995 Contingent -
Needed only if
batteries do not
suffice
Other Applications: Long-term Storage of Hydrogen
Operational Benefits
1. Reduced Storage Volume
2. Indefinite Storage "Gme
3. Avoid Deep Cryogen Storage/Use Hazards
AlternatlYe Technoloales
1. Lithium Hydride for weight reduction
2. Mixed Lithium & Calcium Hydrides forweight reduction and appropriate hydration
properties
3. Highly non-spherical cryogenic storage tanks
4. Metal Hydride / Chernic,_l storage of oxygen -- e.g. hydrogen peroxide--
Avoids all cryogens, but has substantial mass penalty.
Life Cycle COsts & Benefit_
1. Life Cycle Costs should be slightlylower for hydride systems over liquid hydrogen;
liquid oxygen will still be needed.
2. The major benefit is reduction in hydrogen storage volume.
For PLS this is a contingent enabling technology.
Risks: Low
Development and schedule risks are low for all alternatives; phenomena are well understood.
Cost risk is slightly higher; unforeseen problems may require rework.
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Table 7-2. Technology Plan - H2 Storage for Fuel Cells (Cont'd)
Technology Category:
Electrical Power
Major Technology:
Hydrogen Storage for
Fuel Cells
Agency / Contractor:
Intema.onal Fuel Cells or
Other Fuel Cell Manufacturer
Description:
Adapt alkaline / alka" metal
hydride generation of hydrogen gas
to space use as an alternative to liquid
hydrogen storage.
• Design container / reactor
and associated plumbing and controls.
• Conduct Vibration tests to
simulate launch / flight environment.
Objectives:
Verify that vibration does not
impair ability of reactor to be operated
and controlled in a flight environment.
Notes:
1o
2.
3.
Zero gravity tests are not considered
to be needed.
Special facility probably not needed.
Test of Lithium Hydride &/or
mixtures of Uthium and Calcium
Hydrides would range from $1 M
to $10 M additional depen_ng
upon early test results.
TechnoloovlActlvltv I 1991
1.
2.
Design container /
reactor and asscx:iated
plumbing & controls.
Test container /
reactorin vibration
environment simulating
launch and flight.
Resources, $,M
I 1992 I 1993 119941
3 4 3
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Table 7-3. Technology Plan - Booster Warning & LES System
Technology Category: Avionics
Major Technology: Booster Warning & Launch Escape Activation System
(Booster Warning System) (BWS)
g.e_l._,tm.Lo_ Ftaures of Merit Current Level ReouirQd
Current: Incomplete/partial systems Demonstrated Partial Systems
System Effectiveness and Tests
Ground Test
Proposed: Establish criteria, amhitecture, simulate, reduce to ground hardware and test.
Right hardware is not desired.
_Jb_,_tJg/t_ Need
For PLS: BWS design readiness demonstration 1994
Other Applications: All manned launch vehicles
Ooeratlonal Benefits
1. Improved Safety
Date Criticality
Moderate -
Early tests
reduce cost
and schedule
risk
STS does not
have LES, but
could use early
warning
Alternative Technoloole_
None - There are many alternatives for the design and components, but no alternative
technologies.
Life Cycle Costs & Benefits
1. The cost for the demonstration will be 3 to 5 man-year equivalents.
2. The development cost for the PLS booster is low, probably less than 50 man-year
equivalents through IOC and 3 to 5 man-years per year during the operations phase.
3. The benefit of developing a BWS/LES A_vation System is the reduction of crew
fata_es.
Based on Apollo / STS experience, the benefit of avoiding one crew loss is estimated
as 2 years of the PLS operating budget.
Low
Development and schedule risks are low ; phenomena are well understood.
The proposed simulations and tests will eliminate bad architectures and confirm at least
architecture.
Cost risk is slightly, higher; unforeseen problems may require rework.
one good
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Table 7-3. Technology Plan - Booster Warning & LES System (Cont'd)
Technology Category:
Avionics
Major Technology:
Booster Warning and Launch
Escape Activation System
(BWS)
Agency I Contractor:
Rockwell International or
Other Launch Vehicle Mfr.
with Avionics Capability
Description:
Ground test an integrated
Booster Warning System using
standard electronic modules
via a staged program:
• Establish Criteria - determine
physical parameters to measure
and how many sensors must
agree.
• Decision Architecture
Selection - Determine system
organization and redundancy;
e.g.: Triple redundancy vs
Dual-Dual redundancy.
• Simulate sensor network /
computer with software.
• Construct Brassboard
computer with standard cards
(e.g. JIAWG modules) and
simulated sensor network.
• Test Brassboard system to
confirm correct operation and
rejection of false alarms.
Objectives:
Verify BWS design readiness.
Flight hardware is not desired.
Notes:
1. Special facility not needed.
TechnoloavlActivltv I 1991
1. Establish Criteria
2. Architecture Selection
3. Simulate Architecture and
Sensor Network
4. Construct Brassboard with
Standard Modules
5. Test Brassboard
I 1992 I 1993 119941
Resources, $,M 0.2 0.3
Reference: "Progress Toward the Development of Real Time Monitoring Capabilities in a Rocket
Engine Health Monitoring System Laboratory Testbed', Lisa M. Krause, J.G. Perry,
J.M. Maram, and A.M. Norman, RI / Rocketdyne Division, Canoga Park, CA 91303,
AIAA-89-2759, AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE 25th Joint Propulsion Conference,
Monterey, CA, July 10-12, 1989
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